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Abstract 
In this thesis I provide an interpretation of Kant's theories of knowledge, 
nature, and being in order to argue that Kant's ontology is a productive ontology: 
it is a theory of being that includes a notion of production. I aim to show that 
Kant's epistemology and philosophy of nature are based on a theory of being as 
productivity. The thesis contributes to knowledge in that it considers in detail 
Kant's ontology and theory of being, topics which have generally been ignored or 
misunderstood. 
In arguing for Kant's productive ontology, I argue against Heidegger's 
interpretation of Kant, which states that Kant understands being as "produced 
permanent presence" or as divinely created materiality. Based on Kant's definition 
of being as positing, I argue, by contrast to Heidegger, that Kant understands being 
as the original productive relation between subject and object. This can also be 
expressed as the relation between formality and materiality, or between epistemic 
conditions and existence, that is productive of objects of experience. Being is not 
producedness but a relation of productivity, through which both subject and object 
are themselves productive. The subject is productive in its spontaneity, and nature, 
determined as dynamical interaction, is interpreted as productive. The subject, I 
will argue, does not understand nature as produced, but approaches it with a 
comportment towards its production as object of experience. Because of its own 
subjective productivity - spontaneity or "life" - the subject has a "productive 
comportment" towards nature. 
Ontology, I claim, concerns the realm of the productive relation of being, the 
realm of the relation between epistemic conditions and existence, and therefore the 
realm of possible experience. This marks Kant as divergent not only from what 
Heidegger calls "the ontology of the extant", but also from the concept-based 
ontology of the German rationalists. 
The general aims of the thesis are, first, to argue that being for Kant is the 
original relation between subject and object, and that ontology concerns this 
relation; second, to argue that ontology and being are understood in terms of 
production and productivity; and third, to argue that Heidegger is wrong to ascribe 
to Kant an understanding of being as "produced pennanent presence". I approach 
these aims by examining a number of Kant's texts in detail, focusing particularly 
on Kant's theses about existence and being in The One Possible Basis for a 
Demonstration of the Existence of God and the Critique of Pure Reason; on 
Kant's philosophy of nature and dynamical matter in the Transcendental Analytic 
and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science; on Kant's doctrine of 
experience and objectivity in the Transcendental Deductions; on ontological 
reflection and the productive comportment of "life" in the Critique of Judgment; 
and on Kant's final theory of matter, life and production in the Opus Postumum. 
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Introduction 
1. The theme and aims of the project 
That we have insight into nothing except what we can make 
ourselves. First, however, we must make ourselves. Beck's original 
representing.! 
4 
This marginal comment from Kant's Opus Postumum suggests a relation of 
knowledge to production; specifically, a relation of the conditions of possible 
knowledge to what the subject makes. It suggests, also, that a subjective self-
making must precede that relation. Kant's remark on "Beck's original 
representing" gives us a context for these lines: Jakob Sigismund Beck, writing 
explanatory excerpts of Kant's texts in 1796, claimed that Kant's notion of the 
relation of understanding to objectivity must be understood in light of the "original 
mode of representing".2 Original representing was, for Beck, the original 
synthesizing activity of understanding on which all objects and concepts depend: 
There really is no original representing "of an object", but simply 
an original representing. For whenever we have the representation 
of an object, it is already every time a concept, that is, it is already 
always the attribution of certain determinations by means of which 
we fix for ourselves a point of reference [ ... J. The transcendental 
statement, "the understanding posits a something originally", is 
what first of all gives sense and meaning to the empirical 
statement, "the object affects me". For the first statement is the 
I Immanuel Kant, Opus Poslumum, ed. Eckart Forster, trans. Eckart Forster and Michael Rosen 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1993), Ak. 22:353, p. 114. Hereafter abbreviated to OP. 
2 OP pp. 271-2, n. 68. 
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concept of the original representing itself in which all the meaning 
of our concepts has to be grounded. Indeed, the concept I have of 
my understanding as a faculty in me, even the concept I have of my 
own ego, receives its sense and meaning in the first instance from 
this original positing.3 
5 
Beck interprets Kant to be saying that original representing in general, in which 
the understanding posits a something in general, is the condition of possibility for 
experiencing that an object affects the subject. This original representing in 
general precedes the always-already conceptualized representation of objects, and, 
Beck implies, makes possible the concept of the self as the subject of 
representations. Beck's "original representing" is an original relation between the 
understanding and the world, in which the conditions for objectivity and 
subjectivity are established. It is clear, however, that original representing comes 
from the spontaneity of the subject: the subject brings about the conditions for 
objectivity and subjectivity. In so doing, the subject brings about the conditions for 
possible knowledge. Those things into which we can have insight are "made" by 
the understanding, in the sense that the understanding establishes the original 
relation to the world. 
We see similar passages, aSSOCiating knowledge with production, in the first 
and third Critiques. With reference to the progress of natural science in the 
Preface to the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously says that 
with the recognition of the importance of experimentation came the recognition 
that "reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own".41t 
is the adoption of experimental science, and thus the realization of the importance 
of the active relation of reason to nature, that leads to the conclusion that 
knowledge always involves the production of knowledge. Similarly, in the 
Critique of Judgment, Kant says that "we have complete insight only into what we 
3 J.S. Beck, E\planatory Abstract of the Critical Writings of Prof Kant, trans. George di Giovanni, 
in di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (trans.), Between Kant and Hegel (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 
204-49, here at pp. 221,229. Emphasis added. 
4 Kant, Critique (?lPure Reason. trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), B xiii. 
Hereafter abbreviated to CPR, with references to the A and B editions. 
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can ourselves make and accomplish according to concepts".5 Here, this principle 
serves to limit the bounds of possible knowledge: we can acquire knowledge only 
insofar as we can produce it. The realm of possible knowledge extends as far as 
the realm of our production of knowledge. 
In all three passages, Kant suggests that one condition of the possibility of 
knowledge is the productivity of the understanding. In the Opus Postumum 
passage, Kant implies further that this productivity occurs in an original relation to 
the world that precedes conceptualized experience. In this thesis I will look at 
Kant's association of production and productivity with the conditions of possible 
knowledge, and at Kant's locating productivity at the level of an original relation 
between mind and world. I will argue that an original productive relation is the 
ground of possible experience, and that the realm defined by this relation is the 
realm of what Kant understands as "ontology". Kant does not straightforwardly 
adopt the rationalist ontology of Wolff, Leibniz, and Baumgarten, which in his 
view defines ontology as "the science of the properties of all things in general, [ ... J 
the science that deals with the general predicates of all things".6 Instead, he 
redefines ontology as "the science that comprises a system of all concepts and 
principles of the understanding, but only insofar as these extend to objects given 
by the senses".7 That is, ontology is concerned not just with concepts and 
principles, but with the applicability of concepts and principles to existing objects 
of experience. Rationalist ontology of the Wolffian school is explicitly oriented 
towards concepts and is concerned with the essence of logically possible beings, 
thus marginalizing the question of existence. Kant, by contrast, implies that the 
concern of ontology is the relation between the concepts of the mind and the 
existence of the world. The inclusion of existence in ontology, along with Kant's 
assumption that we come into contact with existence through experience alone (an 
assumption that is made into a transcendental principle in the first Critique) 
suggests that Kant's ontology, unlike that of Plato or Spinoza, is an ontology of 
5 Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), §68, Ak. 384. 
Hereafter abbreviated to CJ. 
6 Kant, Metaphysik MrongOl'ius (1782-3). Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Karl Ameriks 
and Steve Naragon (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), Ak. 29:784. p. 140. Hereafter abbreviated to LM. 
7 Kant, What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the time of Leihni:: and 
Wolff!. ed. Friedrich Theodor Rink (1804), bilingual edition. trans. Ted Humphrey (New York: 
Abaris Books, 1983). 53 (tranlsation slightly modified). 
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experience. The realm of ontology for Kant is the realm of the relation between 
mind and world, the realm of possible experience, and the realm of the production 
of experience. 
Kant's new understanding of ontology as a system of concepts and principles 
that apply to sensible objects is accompanied by a new understanding of what 
being means. Being, for Kant, does not refer to the essence of the sensible objects 
to which concepts are applied. For Wolffian rationalism, being is equated with' 
essence, so the essence of a thing - its substance, monad, or inner nature - is 
equivalent to what it is to be that thing. This understanding of being is routinely 
and unquestioningly attributed to Kant by commentators, such that Kant's thing in 
itself, which is often assumed to be equivalent to a monad, is also taken to be the 
being of a thing. This line of interpretation seriously misunderstands Kant's 
conception of being. For we cannot know anything about the being of things in 
themselves, so when we ask about the being of things, we must be referring to 
appearances. But to say that the being of an appearance - what it is to be an 
appearance - is to be a thing in itself, goes against Kant's entire doctrine of 
experience. Kant's numerous arguments against the possibility of our having 
experience of simple substances and inner natures of things show that what it is to 
be an object of experience is precisely not to be a simple substance; rather, what it 
is to be an object of experience is to consist entirely of relations. 8 The character of 
an object of experience consists in its relations to other objects of experience, and 
its being consists in its relation to the experiencing subject. This is confirmed by 
Kant's very clear and well-known statement that being is "merely the positing of a 
thing".9 What it is to be a thing is to be posited, and thus to be in relation to a 
subject. Against interpretations of Kant which either ignore or misconstrue his 
conception of being, therefore, I will argue that being, for Kant, is the original 
relation between subject and object, and thus that Kant's ontology is indeed 
concerned with the meaning of being. The realm of ontology - the realm of 
possible experience, of the subject-relatedness of objects and the object-
relatedness of subjects - is also the realm of being. As this is also the realm of 
8 CPR A265 / B321. 
9 CPR A598 / B626. 
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the production of experience, I will show that being is the productive relation 
between subject and object, and that Kant's ontology is a productive ontology. 
By "productive ontology" I mean a theory of being that includes a notion of 
production, and I will claim that this is what Kant propounds. In saying this, I do 
not mean to imply that Kant is the first or only philosopher to take this view. 
Spinoza quite clearly has a productive ontology, as does Schelling; Leibniz and 
Locke, in different ways, could be said to consider the being of things in terms of 
production. But whereas the notion of production has long been recognized to be 
an integral part of the metaphysics of Spnioza and Schelling, and while the 
metaphysics of Leibniz and Locke have long been considered to be inseparable 
from a physics of dynamical productivity, no study of Kant has (to my knowledge) 
recognized that a notion of production is integral to his critiques of theoretical 
reason, practical reason, and judgment, as well as to his theory of matter. While a 
number of studies have recently emerged on Kant's dynamical theory of matter, 
none have noted that the notion of production involved with this theory is also 
present in Kant's theory of knowledge.\O In arguing for Kant's productive 
ontology, my aim is to show that conceptions of production and productivity are 
deeply ingrained in Kant's theories of knowledge, nature, and life, and that Kant's 
understanding of being is based on these conceptions. 
This orientation towards Kant's texts has developed, in part, from a reading of 
Heidegger's interpretations of Kant. Heidegger gives extensive treatments of Kant 
in at least five book-length texts, and gives shorter treatments in a number of other 
texts and essays. I I In his best-known work on Kant, Kant and the Problem of 
10 Recent studies on Kant's theory of matter and his relation to the sciences include Gerd Buchdahl, 
Kant and the Dynamics of Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), hereafter KDR; Michael Friedman, 
Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992); Eric Watkins (ed.), Kant and 
the Sciences (Oxford: OUP, 2001); Susan Meld Shell, The Embodiment of Reason (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1996); Jeffrey Edwards, Substance, Force, and the Possibili~l' of Knowledge (Berkeley: 
U of California P, 2000); and Eckart Forster, Kant's Final Synthesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UP, 2000). An excellent older study of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy in relation 
to the sciences is Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1969). 
II Heidegger's book-length texts on Kant include Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. 
Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990), hereafter KPM; The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1982), hereafter BPP: 
Phenomenological Intelpretation of Kant's Critique (?f Pure Reason, trans. Parvis Emad and 
Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1997): What is a Thing?, trans. W.B. Barton Jr. and 
Vera Deutsch (South Bend: Gateway, 1967), hereafter WT: and The Essence of Human Freedom, 
trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2002). A number of short works engage with Kant, 
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Metaphysics, Heidegger proposes a "retrieve" of Kant by interpreting the first 
Critique as laying the ground for metaphysics and "unveiling the inner possibility 
of ontology".12 According to Heidegger, Kant achieves this ground-laying by 
implying that an ontological understanding of being precedes and makes possible 
the "ontic" knowledge of beings (i.e. our everyday experience of things). In 
aligning this ontological understanding with the transcendental knowledge that 
characterizes human finitude, Heidegger is able to find in Kant a fundamental 
ontology, an analysis of the finite essence of human beings in terms of their 
being. 13 
While I believe the secondary literature on Heidegger's Kant interpretations to 
be insufficient, it is not my intention to redress that balance here. 14 Nor do I intend 
to evaluate the successes and failures of Heidegger's general interpretive strategy 
in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Rather, as I explain further in chapter 
one, I take two of Heidegger's claims as starting points for investigation, both 
from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. In this text Heidegger specifically 
discusses Kant's ontology in terms of production. First, Heidegger claims that the 
Kantian subject has a "productive comportment" towards things, understanding 
their being as produced permanent presence. Heidegger maintains that Kant 
understands being in this way, and that he does not move beyond an "ontology of 
the extant".15 According to Heidegger, being for Kant means the producedness of 
a thing, specifically its creation by God, as pennanent, static presence. Secondly, 
as he also argues in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger claims that 
the Kantian subject must establish an original, pre-conceptual comprehension of 
the being of things before the things themselves are understood. This is an original 
relation between subject and object, in which the being of things is established and 
foremost of which is "Kant's Thesis About Being", trans. Ted E. Klein Jr. and William E. Pohl, in 
Pathmark.s, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: CUP, 1998). 
12 KPM8. 
13 KPM I. 
14 Book-length treatments of Heidegger on Kant have tended to focus on KPM and tend to devote 
more space to interpreting Heidegger than to interpreting Kant. These include Charles M. 
Sherover, Heidegger, Kant and Time (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1971); Henri Decleve, Heidegger 
et Kant (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970); Frank Schalow, The Renewal a.fthe Heidegger-Kant 
Dialogue (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), and recently Martin Weatherston, Heidegger's 
b1felpretation a.fKant (Basingstoke: Pa1grave Macmillan, 2002). 
15 BPP 106 ff; 149 ff. 
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comprehended: being is disclosed before beings are uncovered. 16 In aligning being 
with producedness, Heidegger claims that this original relation establishes things 
as produced. 
While I have started my investigation from Heidegger's general position and 
adopted some of his claims, I find that Heidegger gives a limited interpretation of 
the relation of being and production for Kant, and does not take into account the 
ways in which Kant himself makes production and productivity themes for 
discussion, particularly in the Critique of Judgment and Opus Postumum. Where I 
agree with Heidegger is in his claim that a pre-conceptual relation between subject 
and object is the original basis for experience. I agree, further, that being is 
established with this relation, and that this relation has something to do with 
production. However, I disagree with the claim that in this relation, the being of 
things is disclosed as their producedness. With this, Heidegger reduces Kant's 
notion of being to a notion of material presence created by God. By contrast, I 
argue that Kant's notion of being is not a notion of material presence, but is the 
original subject-object relation itself. Being is not sheer materiality, but is the 
relation between materiality and fonnality. This original relation, on my account, 
does not establish the producedness of things, but is itself productive of things as 
objects of experience. That is, the original relation of being produces formalized, 
objective things that can appear to a subject. My claim, then, contra Heidegger, is 
that being for Kant is neither producedness nor presence, but a relation of 
productivity that makes possible the presence of objects to a subject. 
The two sides of this relation of being are the subjective, formal side and the 
objective, material side. The relation of being can thus also be described as the 
original relation of form and matter: only within this relation can objects be 
present to a subject, and can a subject know an object. In order for this relation to 
come about, and in order for objects of experience to be possible, the subject, as 
spontaneous, must indeed comport itself towards things, and comport itself with a 
view to production. I agree with Heidegger that the Kantian subject has a 
"productive comportment" towards things. But whereas Heidegger claims that the 
subject, for Kant, is predisposed to comprehend things as produced (by God), my 
16 spp 70 ff. 
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claim is that the subject is predisposed to comprehend things, first, with a view to 
their production as objects of experience, and second, as productive. In the initial 
subject-object relation, productive spontaneity relates itself to the world with a 
view to producing objects of experience through formal determinations. Those 
objects of experience are then judged part of a nature governed by causality, and 
interpreted, by analogy with the subject's own productivity, as productive of other 
objects. The inherent productivity of human understanding, and the subsequent 
comportment of understanding towards the world in terms of production, is 
something that Kant makes explicit, largely in the third Critique. Heidegger does 
not recognize that Kant makes "productive comportment" thematic, nor that Kant 
acknowledges the limitations it places on human understanding. It is the 
productivity of human understanding, Kant says, that compels us to interpret 
nature in terms of production. Human productivity, and its role in the original 
relation of being, mean that nature is determined to be productive. 
One consequence of productive ontology is that neither the thing' nor the 
subject, neither existence nor epistemic conditions, can be understood in terms of 
inert, isolated substance, but must be understood in terms of dynamic, productive, 
interactive relations. My argument therefore also stands against interpretations of 
Kant which state that perception is caused by things in themselves, or which state 
that pennanent substances constitute the material basis of appearances. (I will refer 
to and argue against such positions from time to time.) On my interpretation, 
appearances and experience are made possible by the relation between subject and 
object, and this relation is the relation of being. Things in themselves, noumena, 
and supersensible objects are excluded from this relation, although they might be 
thought to underlie it. The empirical relations through which we have experience 
and knowledge are preceded and made possible by the original, productive, 
transcendental, ontological relation of being: Beck's "original representing". 
In sum, the general aims of this thesis are as follows: 
1. To argue that ontology for Kant concerns the realm of relation between 
epistemic conditions and existence, and to argue that being for Kant is the 
original relation between subject and object; 
2. To argue that ontology and being are understood in tenns of production and 
productivity: ontology concerns the realm of the production of experience, 
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and being is the productive relation between a productive spontaneity and a 
nature that is interpreted to be productive; 
3. To argue that Heidegger is wrong to ascribe to Kant an understanding of 
being as "produced permanent presence" based on the subject's 
comportment to a divinely created world, and to claim instead that Kant 
understands being as a productive relation, in which the subject comports 
itself to things with a view to their production as objects of experience. 
This amounts to an argument for Kant's productive ontology, in response to the 
silence of other commentators on Kant's ontology and on Kant's notion of 
production, and in response to Heidegger's reductive reading of Kant's 
understanding of being. As the title suggests, I will examine productive ontology 
insofar as it forms the basis for Kant's philosophy of knowledge, his philosophy of 
nature, and his theory of the meaning of being. 
2. Production and causality 
In arguing that Kant's ontology is a productive ontology, I will claim that Kant 
understands both the subject and nature as productive. Kant describes the subject 
as productive in at least three ways that correspond to his three critiques: 
epistemically, morally, and technically. I will be concerned primarily with the first 
type of productivity, in which the understanding in its spontaneity produces 
objects of experience and knowledge through the fonnal determination of 
representations. Technical productivity, which I will not discuss here, is the 
activity of the subject in creating artifacts and artworks (the latter through genius). 
Both epistemic and technical productivity are accompanied by moral productivity. 
which Kant describes as the power to originate actions according to a concept or 
principle. Moral productivity is associated with freedom and, as I will discuss in 
chapters four and five, with the concept of life, which is defined broadly as the 
power of self-activity. It is because the human subject is essentially constituted in 
terms of freedom and life that she is able to produce moral actions, produce 
knowledge, and produce artworks. It is also due to this constitution that the human 
subject interprets nature as productive. 
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While Kant does state quite clearly that the subject is productive, it is more 
problematic to describe nature as productive. It is, of course, only nature insofar as 
it is experienced that can be said to be productive: it is characterized as productive 
based on its formal determination through the employment of the understanding's 
transcendental principles in experience. Nature in itself, prior to or independent of 
experience, cannot be said to be productive, for it cannot even be said to be causal, 
and productivity is clearly thought to be a type of causality. But herein lies the 
problem: production for Kant is associated with the human subject, who exercises 
free causality and is able to generate novelty. Kant attributes to nature only 
mechanical or efficient causality, famously denying that nature could 
spontaneously produce an entirely new object or chain of events. How, then, are 
we to understand a notion of natural production in Kant's texts? It is worth briefly 
setting this out. 
Kant's early career was marked by two beliefs that set him against the 
philosophical heritage of Leibniz and Christian Wolff: the belief that existence is 
necessary to explain the possibility of anything, and the belief that physical influx 
is the best explanation for the possibility of the world. Physical influx, or the 
ascription of real interaction and causality to substances, was growing in 
popularity as a cosmological explanation in the mid-eighteenth century, over 
against occasionalism (the ascription of all causality to God alone) and pre-
established hannony (the ascription of causality only to the inner nature of 
substances, preconfigured by God to result in cosmic harmony).17 Belief in 
physical influx suggests a commitment to a theory of matter as either atoms or 
forces exercising reciprocal causality. In Kant's case, it involved the belief that 
matter is a dynamical continuum, a position he continued to hold, in various 
fonns, throughout his life. As Martin Carrier summarizes: 
Kant's theory of matter comprises a threefold commitment to a 
dynamist, a plenist, and a continualist thesis. The dynamist thesis 
says that extension and impenetrability are not primary properties 
17 John II. Zammito, Kant. Herder and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago: U of Chicago p, 
2002), 44-5. See also Alison Laywine, Kant's Ear~r Metaphysics and the Origins of the Critical 
Philosophy (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1993),25-31. 
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of matter but derive from more fundamental forces. According to 
the plenist view, matter fills its space completely and without 
empty interstices. Finally, on the continualist position matter is 
infinitely divisible; there are no atoms. 18 
14 
Kant developed these themes from his early texts, Thoughts on the True 
Estimation of the Living Forces and the Physical Monadology, in which they are 
presented as physical theses, through to the first Critique and the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science, in which they are treated as transcendental 
principles for the possibility of experience. In the Opus Postumum, as I will 
explain in chapter five, Kant comes to understand the dynamical continuum as a 
transcendental material condition of possible experience, thus merging his two 
earlier positions. Kant's commitment to a dynamical continuum and to physical 
influx is accompanied by a commitment to existence as a necessary condition for 
the possibility of the world as we experience it. Indeed, Kant holds to a claim that 
some material must exist, and this material must either be or be experienced as a 
continuum of interacting forces exercising reciprocal causality. 
Kant's association of existence with dynamical interaction seems to suggest 
his association of nature with productivity. If existing things are reducible to 
fundamental forces whose interactions cause the formation of new bodies, surely 
nature is understood as a productive continuum of force. Yet Kant's theory of 
matter does not state that substances produce other substances; it says only that 
there is reciprocal intersubstantial causality. Furthennore, in the third antinomy of 
the first Critique, productivity is contrasted with the causality of nature, for 
productivity is attributed only to freedom. Insofar as the subject's will has an 
empirical character, Kant says, its actions can be fully explained through the 
efficient causality of dynamical interaction. Only when we consider the subject's 
actions in their relation to practical reason do we consider these actions to have 
been produced, for reason alone is a productive cause. 19 Practical reason "is not 
dynamically detennined in the chain of natural causes" but acts freely, and can be 
18 Martin Carrier. "Kant's Theory of Matter and his Views on Chemistry", in Watkins (ed.), 205-
30. here at p. 206. 
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described as "the power of originating a senes of events".20 To produce is to 
originate, to bring about some new existence or event absolutely. The subject has 
this power through the freedom of practical reason, and while a similar power 
might be thought to underlie the series of efficient natural causes as its ultimate 
cause, it cannot be attributed to nature itself. 
The association of production with the power to originate according to a 
principle, or more broadly, the power to act according to representations, is 
repeated in Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics and the Critique of Practical 
Reason.21 The verb that Kant uses in these contexts is er~ellgen (translated as 
"produce" or "generate"), which is also used to describe the subject's epistemic 
productions (the generation of principles, for example; Kant sometimes also uses 
hervorbringen, translated as "yield" or "give rise to", for epistemic production). In 
both moral and epistemic production, the subject originates something that 
requires spontaneous action and that would not have arisen through natural 
causality alone. Nature, lacking spontaneity, cannot be productive in this sense but 
can only be causal. Curiously though, Kant uses erzeugen in the title of the A 
edition second analogy: the well-known principle of the rule-governed succession 
of appearances is described as the "Principle of Production".22 Although Kant 
changed that title in the B edition, the original title suggests that Kant believed 
natural causality could be thought in terms of production. Or rather, it suggests 
that Kant thought that we experience the production of natural things, and that the 
a priori principle of causality makes this experience possible. This suggests a use 
of the term "production" that does not refer to freedom, but that is associated with 
mechanical causality. 
I want to suggest that the tenn "production" can be applied to natural causality 
without illegitimately ascribing freedom to nature. First, we can consider nature 
productive by analogy with our own free productivity, as Kant describes in the 
Critique of Judgment. In the Critique of Judgment, organized natural beings -
those beings that appear to produce and be produced through concepts - are 
19 CPR A549-50 /8577-8. See also A92 / 8125, where Kant similarly implies that to produce the 
existence of an object would require causality of the will. 
~() CPR A553-4 / 8581-2. 
~I LM Ak. 29: 1023. p. 49 L see the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason. trans. and ed. Mary 
Gregor (Cambridge: CUP. 1997). Ak. 9n. 
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experienced in tenns of Erzeugung.23 As I will explain in chapter four, the 
productivity of organized beings cannot be explained by efficient causality alone, 
and must be thought by analogy with human concept-driven causality. Kant's 
position on natural production in the Critique of Judgment is this: we do 
experience nature to bring about new objects and events, and to originate fonns 
seemingly according to concepts, which means that we experience nature as 
productive. However, it is invalid to ascribe an understanding to nature itself, so 
we may think that aspect of its productivity that exceeds mechanical causality by 
analogy with our own productivity. Even though we must attempt to explain 
natural phenomena as far as possible through mechanical, efficient causality, we 
can and do experience nature as productive, precisely because productivity is part 
of the essence of the human subject. In being constituted by the capacity to 
exercise free causality, the human subject inevitably interprets nature as exercising 
free causality - albeit with the awareness that such an interpretation is only 
provisional. 
Second, we can consider nature productive insofar as its causality appears to 
generate new fonns. Kant claims that it is only in the case of organized natural 
beings (those that seem to produce according to concepts) that we are compelled 
to use the analogy with our own free causality. Otherwise, nature can be 
understood in tenns of mechanical causality alone. But even natural beings that 
are fully explicable by mechanical causality seem to us productive: dynamical and 
chemical interactions generate bodies and events that appear new to us. These 
bodies and events are not new absolutely, for according to the solution to the third 
antinomy, only freedom can produce absolute novelty. But nature generates bodies 
and events that are new relatively to other appearances. This kind of productivity 
is hardly distinguishable from efficient causality or alteration. But I would like to 
suggest that we may call it productivity nonetheless. Kant's discussion of the 
forces that appear to originate new bodies in the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science, for instance, suggests that nature can be thought as productive in 
its mechanical causality. In this case nature is not thought to be free~l' productive 
22 CPR A189. 
23 See, for instance, CJ §64, Ak. 370-2. where Kant describes the three ways a tree is thought to be 
productive. 
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by analogy with human understanding; it is thought to be causally productive, 
with mechanical causality explaining the generation of new bodies. As I will 
explain in chapters four and five, even this interpretation of causality as 
production is due to our productive understanding. In thus interpreting nature as 
productive, we do not attribute freedom to nature - we simply interpret certain 
kinds of causality as relatively original. There is, then, a type of productivity that 
can be attributed to nature without illegitimately ascribing freedom to nature, and 
without introducing an explicit analogy to human productivity: natural 
productivity is natural causality, insofar as it originates what appear to us as new 
things and events. 
I think, therefore, that it is legitimate to call certain kinds of natural causality 
natural productivity. For Kant's argument against ascribing productivity to nature 
is really an argument against ascribing freedom or spontaneity to nature. As long 
as we do not fall into this trap - as long as we maintain that nature is governed by 
mechanical causality and that it can bring about its effects through mechanical 
causality alone - we are free to say that nature is productive in its ongoing 
generation of relatively new forms, bodies and events. Not all causality is 
interpreted as production, of course: it would require a stretch of imagination to 
construe Kant's famous example of rule-governed succession, a boat moving 
upstream, as natural productivity. But insofar as natural objects grow, generate, 
and fonn bodies through chemical or physical interaction, nature is interpreted to 
be productive. So insofar as Kant holds to a theory of physical influx or of a 
dynamical continuum, he maintains that nature "produces" bodies and is 
"productive" in its ongoing interaction. Throughout the thesis, therefore, I will use 
the tenn "natural productivity" to denote this type of natural causality. 
There are three further disclaimers I wish to make. Because I am concerned 
with Kant's ontology, I have restricted my study of Kant's notion of production to 
what I have called epistemic production: the production of experience and 
knowledge. Because natural production also plays a part in ontology, and because 
nature is interpreted as productive based on moral production, I have discussed 
moral production where necessary, usually in tenns of Kant's conception of life. 
However I have not in general been concerned with Kant's practical philosophy, 
nor with concepts of freedom, autonomy, and moral action. Although I would 
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claim for Kant that the productivity of the subject is ultimately grounded in the 
subject's freedom, I have not been able to undertake a detailed analysis of freedom 
or moral productivity; to do so would undoubtedly be worthwhile, but would 
require a much longer work. 
Similarly, I have been unable to discuss technical production in this thesis -
the production of artworks through genius, as Kant describes in the Critique of 
Judgment. Production through genius is a very interesting topic, as genius is 
defined as nature working through the subject. Kant seems to suggest a 
productivity of nature that can only manifest itself through the subject's spirit, life, 
or "mental predisposition"; artworks come about through the relation of nature to 
the subject's self-activity or productive capacity.24 While this is a fascinating 
development of Kant's theory of production, it is not directly related to his 
ontology, and so I have not been able to discuss it here. I have restricted this study 
to an examination of Kant's productive ontology, and thus of the productive 
elements that make up the relation of being: productive spontaneity, and nature 
that is interpreted productively. 
Given this proviso, it may seem surprising to some readers, particularly those 
familiar with Heidegger, that I almost entirely ignore the topic on which Kant has 
most to say concerning production: the productive imagination. Kant uses the 
adjective produktiv and the noun Produkt in the A Deduction of the first Critique 
to distinguish the productive from the reproductive imagination. In its productive 
function, the imagination synthesizes a priori the manifold of appearance prior to 
apperception, producing the manifold as a unity of associable things.~5 The 
imagination is "productive" in that it produces synthetic unity, and thereby 
produces the affinity (objective association) of appearances and the reproducibility 
of appearances according to laws; indeed, Kant suggests that imagination lS 
responsible for producing experience itself.26 The productive imagination lS 
almost entirely written out of the B Deduction. It reappears in the Schematism (as 
~4 CJ §46, Ak. 307-8. 
25 CPR A 118-24. 
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producer of the schema of a concept) but is otherwise assigned the lesser role of 
being the power to exhibit an object prior to experience.27 
Heidegger makes much of the role of productive imagination m the A 
Deduction, claiming that since it unifies what is given a priori, it unifies the pure 
a priori intuition of time, and thus mediates between time and transcendental 
apperception.28 Briefly, the productive imagination, for Heidegger, produces a 
temporal "horizon" within which the being of things is understood. Productive 
imagination, for Heidegger, makes possible the understanding of being as 
permanent presence. As I disagree with Heidegger's claim that being for Kant is 
interpreted as "produced permanent presence", so I also disagree that the 
productive imagination enables such an interpretation of being. But I disagree 
more generally with Heidegger's claim that the productive imagination should be 
singled out for analysis outside of the productivity of spontaneity as a whole. Kant 
describes the entire process of experience-fonnation as a productive one, and the 
imagination enacts only one part of that process (and is only said to do so in the 
first, subsequently rewritten Deduction). Experience is the product of a number of 
productive transcendental activities, which synthesize and unify spontaneously. I 
have found it more useful to examine the epistemic productive process as a whole, 
and to focus on transcendental apperception as the central component of this 
process. Thus while I devote much of chapter three to discussing the productivity 
of spontaneity, I do not especially discuss the productive imagination. 
3. Structure of the chapters 
The five chapters of the thesis proceed chronologically through selected works 
of Kant's, starting with The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the 
Existence of God of 1763, proceeding to the Critique of Pure Reason, the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, and the Critique of Judgment, and 
finishing with the Opus Postumum, written over the last ten years of Kant's life. 
Chapters one, two, and three, which address the Critique of Pure Reason, do not, 
27 CPR A140-2 / BI79-81; B151-:~: CJ Ak. 240. 
~x KPM52-7. 87-138. 
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however, move chronologically through the text. In fact, they proceed in reverse 
order, starting in chapter one with the thesis about being from the Transcendental 
Dialectic, addressing the Analytic of Principles in chapter two, and examining the 
Transcendental Deductions in chapter three. 
In the first chapter I determine the location and bounds of Kant's ontology and 
notion of being, and introduce the two claims of Heidegger's to which I will 
respond throughout the thesis. I argue that Kant progresses beyond Christian 
Wolffs ontology of the concept by stressing the importance of existence, and find 
that Kant's ontology is both epistemological and existential. Using Heidegger's 
notion of productive comportment, I also argue that existence for Kant is tied to a 
notion of production: to the idea of divine creation in The One Possible Basis for a 
Demonstration of the Existence of God, and to the concept of natural production in 
the first Critique. Through an examination of Kant's claim that being is positing, I 
introduce Kant's understanding of being as a relation between subject and object, 
between epistemic conditions and existence. 
In chapter two I focus on the existential side of the relation of being, stressing 
that existence for Kant cannot be approached outside of the epistemic framework 
of concepts and principles. I also take up Heidegger's claim in What is a Thing? 
that Kant's philosophy of nature is "mathematical" and suggest that this is a 
reductive interpretation. I examine some of the principles of the Analytic in detail, 
including the Anticipations of Perception and the first analogy, to show how the 
object of experience is transcendentally determined in such a way that its existence 
as dynamical productivity becomes manifest. I investigate natural production 
further, showing how the "nature in general" of the first Critique is specified as 
matter, and ultimately as force, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science. I also stress that material existence is necessary to the epistemic 
framework of concepts and principles, in order to show that the relation between 
existence and epistemic conditions is crucial to both. 
This relation, the relation of being, is the topic of chapter three. In the 
Transcendental Deductions, with the synthetic unity of apperception, we see how 
the subject-object relation of being comes about, and in what sense it is an 
epistemically productive relation. I will argue that being is the relation between a 
spontaneous subject and the world it has received through the senses, the relation 
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that produces objectivity and subjectivity, and gIves a thing its being - its 
relatedness to a subject, as an object. The examination of this relation, however, 
draws attention to the more original relation of affection, and raises the question of 
the ontological status of the affective relation that underlies the relation of being. 
There are, then, two questions that drive this chapter: what does the relation of 
being consist in? And what ontological status does the ground of appearance and 
affection have? I will argue that the answers to these questions lie in the concept 
of the transcendental object, and in its adaptation into reason's idea of a 
supersensible object. In addition to the Deductions, I will discuss the Phenomena 
and Noumena chapter, the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection, and selected 
passages from the Dialectic. I will argue against Heidegger, whose position 
implies that for Kant the being of things is their materiality; on my account, the 
being of things will be shown to be their formality. 
In chapter four I tum to the Critique of Judgment, to show how ontology and 
productivity are made thematic there. In the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, 
through drawing attention to the judgment of the formality of things in the 
judgment of taste, Kant makes the relation of being a topic for reflection. 
Aesthetic judgment, I argue, is concerned with the conditions for cognition in 
general, and is thus concerned with the being of the object: its subject-relationality 
in general. Kant suggests that the subject's feeling of life is fired up by aesthetic 
judgment, and defines life as the self-active spontaneity or productivity of the 
subject. Not only is "life" part of the judgment in which the being of things is 
established; its concept is also used as a template through which we interpret 
natural beings whose organization and productivity are otherwise 
incomprehensible. I will argue that in the Critique of Teleological Judgment, Kant 
claims that we unavoidably take a productive comportment towards nature, based 
on our own productive spontaneity. I contrast my claim that Kant recognizes this 
comportment with Heidegger's claim that he does not. 
Finally, in chapter five, I look at Kant's Opus Postumum to detennine his final 
productive ontology. I address two problems of production that emerge in the 
previous chapters' analyses: the problem of the material production of di\'erse 
individual bodies, and the problem of the original production thought to underlie 
spontaneity and nature and to make their relation possible. I claim that with the 
I ntroducti on 
concept of ether, Kant attempts to solve both these problems, and that in his 
formulation of proofs for the existence of ether, Kant's transcendental idealism 
and theory of being are modified. In his final years, Kant proposes that we accept 
the existence of a dynamical continuum prior to experience. The original affective 
relation between this dynamical continuum and the self-activity or "life" of the 
subject - a relation that is both material and fonnal - is ultimately how Kant 
understands being. 
The thesis ends with a conclusion in which I reiterate that Kant's ontology 
should be understood as a productive ontology. I also summarize the findings of 
the chapters and propose some areas for further research. 
Chapter I 
Chapter 1 
Kant's ontology: knowledge, existence, and production 
But since one used to treat ontology without a critique - what was 
ontology then? An ontology that was not a transcendental 
philosophy. Thus one philosophized back and forth without asking: 
can one do that? 1 
1.1 The ontological background 
The question of ontology is seldom addressed in current English-language 
interpretations of Kant's theory of knowledge and matter. When it is addressed, 
the question tends to be fonnulated in tenns of the dispute over really existing 
entities or the problem of affection; the question of Kant's ontology becomes a 
question concerning the reality and efficacy of things in themselves.2 Proponents 
of this approach understand "Kant's ontology" to be a compendium of the entities 
the existence of which Kant believed in and tried, with varying degrees of success, 
to prove. Such accounts have as their aim a comprehensive enumeration of the 
types of things or beings that can be thought to exist for transcendental idealism. 
By contrast, Heidegger's interpretations of Kant, particularly in The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, take a 
"fundamental ontology" approach to the question of being in Kant's texts. This 
approach, as explicated in Heidegger's Being and Time and other works from that 
period, takes its central question not to be that of beings or individual things, but 
rather to be the question of being. Fundamental ontology is not concerned with the 
I Mefaphysik Mrongm·ills. LM Ak. 29:785, p. 140. 
2 See, for example, Kenneth F. Rogerson. "Kantian Ontology", Kant-Sll1dien 84: I (1993). 3-:!4; 
Garrett Thomson, "The weak. the strong, and the mild: Readings of Kant's ontology", Rafio 5::! 
(1992). 160-76. A notable if rather incoherent exception is G .A. Schrader. "Ontology and the 
Categories of Existence"'. Kanf-Sll1dien 54 (1963).47-62. 
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essence or properties that make a particular being what it is; nor is it concerned 
with the "thatness" or presence of beings. Rather, it is concerned with the meaning 
of being that is already in some sense understood in metaphysical claims about the 
essence or presence of beings. The major problematic for fundamental ontology is 
to determine, or at least inquire into, the meaning of being, and the problematic for 
a fundamental ontological approach to a historical text is to inquire into the 
meaning of being presupposed by that text. For Heidegger, Kant's understanding 
of being determines his understanding of those beings that can be thought to exist 
and be known. An ontological inquiry into Kant, then, must go beyond a 
discussion of existing beings, and must ask after the meaning of being that Kant's 
system presupposes. 
Given that Kant famously defines being as positing, and given that he calls 
ontology "a system of concepts and principles which [ ... ] take no account of 
objects that may be given", is Kant's an ontology of being, of beings, or neither?3 
Is ontology for Kant strictly epistemological, or does it have an existential 
element? In this first chapter I aim to determine the location and bounds of Kant's 
ontology, starting from the question of what Kant himself thought ontology to be. I 
will employ a distinction between epistemological and existential ontology, to 
determine whether Kant's ontology is oriented towards knowledge or existence. 
Epistemological ontology is a theory of being based on concepts and principles 
and has as its aim certainty about the grounds of knowledge, while existential 
ontology is a theory of being based on existence and has as its aim certainty about 
the grounds of existence. I will argue that while Kant appears to propound a 
strictly epistemological ontology, existence is a necessary ground and component 
of it, such that Kant emerges with an ontology that is both epistemological and 
existential. I will also argue that Kant's ontology is a productive ontology - that 
is, his theory of being involves a notion of production. This chapter, then, will 
outline the interrelation of knowledge, existence, and production as they relate to 
Kant's theory of being. 
Kant's understanding of the word ontology [Ontologie] would have come 
largely from Christian Wolff. In addition to being the major modern philosophical 
3 CPR A845 /8873. 
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influence in Kant's early years, Wolff was apparently responsible for popularizing 
"ontology" as a philosophical tenn.4 Ontology, for Wolff, is the study of logically 
possible being; that is, being the predicates of which are not contradictory. The 
predicates of a possible being constitute the essence and definition of that being, 
which in tum constitute its concept.s Ontology for Wolff is the study of being 
insofar as it is definable and conceptualizable: conceptual definition is the 
condition of possible being. Creation by God is the condition of actual being, for 
beings obtain merely as possible until something is added to their possibility to 
make them existent.6 Ontology, however, is not concerned with the existence of 
things, for existence is added to their concepts by God, and is thus the concern of 
rational theology. The question of the ground or first cause of existence is also a 
theological, rather than an ontological, question for Wolff. Ontology seeks 
conceptual knowledge of beings: it inquires into the essence of things, where 
essence is equated with the thinkable concept. 
Thus Wolffs rationalist ontology is concerned with the essence and 
knowability of beings rather than with their existence or the ground of their 
existence. Essence entails conceptual definition and conceptual definition is the 
ground of our knowledge of essence: any object satisfying the condition of 
conceptual definition is a ground of knowledge, and is thereby also an essence or 
a being. Wolffs ontology is an epistemological study of essence, in which 
anything that can be logically thought as an essence is thought to be a being, 
including those concepts to whose possibility existence has not yet been added.7 
Existence is not a necessary feature of a being, but a supplementary one. In 
4 Although the tenn had been in use since 1613, Wolff popularized it in his 1730 Philosophia 
prima sive ontologia methodo scientijica pertractata. See Jose Ferrater Mora, "On the Early 
History of Ontology", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XXIV (1963-4), 36-47, p. 36. 
According to Lewis White Beck, Wolff was also responsible for dividing philosophy into the 
theoretical and the practical, and for fonnalizing the division of metaphysics into ontology 
(metaph.-rsica generalis) and the "special metaphysics" of theology, cosmology, and psychology. 
Kant adopted these tenns largely from Baumgarten's Metaphysica. For a comprehensive view of 
the aims of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalist ontology, see Lewis White Beck, EarZv 
German Philosophers (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1969). On Wolff, see esp. pp. 256ff. The 
importance of Wolffs philosophy to Kant's philosophical development is well summarized and 
given a rather more positive spin in chapter :2 of IN. Findlay, Kant and the Transcendental Object 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)' while Eric Watkins discusses Kant's retention of Baumgarten's 
cosmological principles in "Kant on Rational Cosmology", in Watkins (ed.), 70-89. 
5 L.W. Beck 263-4. 
6 L.W. Beck 265. 
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marginalizing the question of existence, Wolff propounds an essential or 
epistemological ontology rather than an existential one.8 German rationalist 
ontology had been characterized by this division of questions of knowledge and 
existence, and indeed by the marginalization of the existential question by 
epistemological concerns, since the mid-seventeenth century. It was by means of 
this distinction, and by means of a strong distinction between possibility and 
actuality, that Wolff asserted his difference from the radical Spinozism of which 
he was accused.9 
Lewis White Beck maintains, as do many Kant scholars, that Kant accepted 
philosophy's epistemological priority. Yet Kant was evidently dissatisfied with the 
Wolffian ontology; Mora describes the first Critique as "the work of a man who 
was obsessed, and deeply distressed, by ontology".l0 Kant felt that with the 
"modest" Transcendental Analytic he had surpassed and replaced "the proud name 
of an Ontology that presumptuously claims to supply, in systematic doctrinal fonn, 
synthetic a priori knowledge of things in general".)) The Transcendental Analytic, 
Kant's system of concepts and principles, replaces rationalist ontology with a 
radically new epistemology. In his conception of ontology as epistemology, and 
his categorization of the questions of the origin of existence and the definition of 
being under cosmology and theology respectively, Kant maintains the Wolffian 
definition of ontology and division of philosophical topics.):! Like Wolff, Kant 
understands ontology in epistemological terms, and appears strongly to distinguish 
this epistemological ontology from the question of the existence of things and of 
the origin of that existence. While the structure of Kant's first Critique does attest 
7 L.W. Beck 396. See also p. 267, where Beck criticizes Wolff for confusing "the ground of 
knowing [ ... ] with the ground of being". 
8 L. W. Beck (185) uses a similar distinction between essential and existential ontology, formulated 
by Etienne Gilson, Being and some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies, 1949). 
9 L.W. Beck traces the existential-epistemological distinction back to the German Cartesian 
Johannes Clauberg. "With [Clauberg] there begins a rationalistic ontology in which the potentiality 
of being thought defines being. [ ... ] A direction is established in German philosophy away from the 
classical ontological realism of scholasticism, and its primary concern with being, toward the 
priority of the epistemological problem" (185-6). Jonathan lsra.el suggests. that this distin.cti~n 
helped to propel German rationalism away from the "dangerous" Ideas of Spmoza, although It dId 
not protect certain philosophers, including Wolff, from accusations of Spinozism; see chapters 26, 
29, and 34 of Israel's Radical Enlightenment (Oxford: OUP, 200 I). 
10 Mora 36. See Findlay, however, for the opposing view. 
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to a maintained distinction between epistemological and existential questions, 
however, it is clear that for Kant existence is of central importance to the 
possibility of knowledge, and that epistemological and existential questions are 
interrelated. 13 
I will argue that the existential side of Kant's ontology is far more developed 
and important than most commentators have suggested. First, we will see in the 
1763 essay The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God 
that Kant makes existence in general a necessary condition for possibility in 
general, and thus makes existence an aspect of ontology. The existence of things is 
not a predicate to be added to a concept, but rather the positing of thing. In The 
One Possible Basis, this positing is accomplished by God, whose divine creation 
continues to be thought as the ground of existence. In the Critique of Pure Reason, 
however, Kant characterizes the existence of things as a modality of the thing's 
relation to a subject, and understands the ground of existence primarily in terms of 
natural production. This change in Kant's understanding of existence involves a 
shift from understanding things in terms of producedness, to understanding them 
in terms of productivity. 
I will use this claim to criticize Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, which 
involves the assertion that Kant understands being as "produced pennanent 
presence" that is disclosed in an original a priori relation between subject and 
object. I will argue to the contrary that being, for Kant, defined as the positing of a 
thing, is nothing other than this original relation itself. Being, on my reading, is 
the relation of subject and object, the relation of knowledge-conditions to the 
world, in which knowledge becomes possible and existence becomes manifest. 
Being, as this relation, is the original condition of possibility of the formal 
detennination of the manifold, and of the manifold appearing to us in the ways 
that it does, including its appearance as productive. The original relation, 
therefore, does not disclose things as produced, but is rather the original 
productive condition of possibility of the productivity of things. Kant's ontology, 
13 Kant's renewed interest in existence may have resulted from the growing popularity in Kant's 
early career of theories of physical influx, which affimled intersubstantial causation against 
Leibniz's theory of preestablished hamlony. Particularly influential on Kant would have been 
Christian Crusius, who developed an ontological foundation for physical influx by stating that real, 
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based on a notion of being as the relation of knowledge-conditions to existence, 
will thus be shown to be both epistemological and existential, located in and 
bounded by the realm of representation. The implications of Kant's overthrow of 
rationalist, concept-based ontology, and the renewed emphasis he gives to 
existence, go far beyond the Analytic; they pervade his philosophy of nature and 
his metaphysics as a whole. Furthermore, we will see that the epistemological and 
existential ontologies are not in any sense distinct for Kant: their boundaries are 
blurred, their objects overlap, and their grounds are common. 
1.2 Existence and divine creation in The One Possible Basis 
The central concern of Kant's 1763 essay The One Possible Basis for a 
Demonstration of the Existence of God is ontology. It is concerned both with 
rationalist epistemological concept-based ontology and with existential ontology. 
Indeed, the essay brings these two senses of ontology into collision: Kant criticizes 
the Cartesian and Leibnizian ontological proofs for God's existence precisely 
because they attempt to deduce God's actuality from a concept, and this criticism 
is based on an inquiry into the meaning of the terms being and existence. For Kant, 
a proper understanding of existence - not as a real predicate but as absolute 
positing - will show up the flaws in traditional ontological proofs, and make way 
for a new basis for a demonstration of God's existence. 
In this text, Kant uses "existence" [Dasein] to apply to actual things, while the 
broader term "being" [Sein] is also applied to logically possible but non-actual 
things. With this distinction (which I will explain in more detail below) Kant 
retains a similarity to Wolff. Kant's major point against rationalist ontology, 
however, is that existence cannot be added to or deduced from a concept - that 
existence is not the sort of thing that can be included in a concept. Yet for Kant, 
this does not mean that ontology can ignore existence; rather, ontology must 
consider existence as something other than a predicate pertaining to concepts. 
Existence will become part of ontology while remaining distinct from essence or 
causal connection was essential to any discourse concerning a coherent world. See Zammito, Kant. 
Herder. and the Birth (~r Anthropology. 43-9. 
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conceptual detennination. Kant begins with an analysis of the notion of existence, 
which, while "very simple and well-understood", is nevertheless difficult to define 
precisely. 14 
Kant begins his analysis of existence with the statement: "Existence [Dasein] 
is not a predicate or detennination of any thing".15 This is to say that existence is 
not a quality of a thing, and thus cannot be included in the concept of a thing. The 
concept of a thing is completely detennined; whether that thing is possible or 
actual does not affect the predicates pertaining to it. Predicates, for Kant, are 
detenninations of content, so all the predicates that pertain to a thing pertain to it 
equally in possibility as in actuality. The existence of a possible thing does not add 
any predicate, but rather indicates that a thing which was possible is now actual, 
retaining the same predicates it had as a merely possible thing. "[I]t cannot be that 
if they [possible things] existed they would contain one more predicate, for in the 
possibility of a thing according to its thorough detennination, absolutely no 
predicate can be missing", says Kant. 16 In order to demonstrate that something 
exists, one does not look in the concept of the thing, but rather in the origin of 
knowledge one has of the thing (experience or some other basis ).17 
Empirical knowledge of the existence of something is sufficient to establish its 
actuality. But the fact that there are actually existing things, Kant clearly implies, 
is due to God's creation. The creator holds all possibility in his idea, and is unique 
in being able to make the possible actual: 
The being who gave existence to the world, and to [Julius Caesar], 
would know all of [Caesar's] predicates without a single exception 
and yet regard him as a merely possible thing which would not 
exist save for his decree. [ ... ] Not a single detennination would be 
wanting in the idea that the supreme being has of [things], and yet 
14 Immanuel Kant, Del' Ein::ig Mogliche Beweisgrund ::11 einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes / 
The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God, bilingual edition, trans. 
Gordon Treash (Lincoln: ·University of Nebraska Press, 1979), Ak. 70-1. Hereafter abbreviated to 
on. . 
15 OPB Ak. 72. Kant uses the same argument in his lectures on Baumgarten's metaphYSICS. See 
Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782-3), Ak. 29:821-2. LM pp. 175-6, and Metaphysik L2 (1790-1), Ak. 
28:554-5,LMpp.319-2l. 
16 OPB Ak. 72. 
17 OPB Ak. 72-3. 
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This passage reinforces Kant's point that existence is not amongst the predicates 
that determine a thing, but also suggests that existence is equivalent to createdness 
by God. Existence results from the "moving" of something from possibility to 
actuality, from God's idea of it to his creation of it by decree. God does not need 
to add anything to possibility to make a thing actual; he simply posits the thing 
with all its predicates. Existence cannot be thought as the "complement of 
possibility", as Wolff conceived it, but must be thought to be the product of God's 
actualizing activity.19 While this distinguishes Kant's view from Wolffs, it also 
ties the pre-critical Kant to a notion of divine creation as the necessary condition 
of actuality. Later in the text, Kant asserts: "That things exist [ ... J is attributable to 
the wise choice of one who wills them".20 The assumption of divine creation, 
however, does not introduce a Cartesian circle into Kant's argument, firstly 
because he sets out not to prove God's existence but only to establish the grounds 
for such a proof, but more importantly because this assumption is not required for 
his argument against traditional ontological proofs. Whereas Descartes maintained 
that existence is included in the concept of God, the pre-critical Kant claims that 
God is included in (or implied by) the concept of existence. Kant does indeed 
assume that existence means createdness by a divine author, but that assumption is 
not necessary to his argument: whether God is thought to exist or not, Kant's 
definition of existence as a non-predicate implies that God's existence cannot be 
deduced from the concept of God. 
The assumption of divine creation, however, gives a double meaning to Kant's 
second statement, that "existence is the absolute position of the thing".21 Absolute 
position might mean human logical positing, or it might mean God's absolute 
creation, "pronouncing his omnipotent fiat over a possible world". 22 Both senses 
IX OPB Ak. 72. 
19 On Wolff, see L.W. Beck 265-6. For Kant's explicit critique ofWolffs definition of existence as 
the "complement of possibility", see OPB Ak. 76, Mefaphysik Ll. LM Ak. ~8:554. p. 320, and 
CPR A230-11 B283-4. 
~o OPB Ak. 103. 
~I OPB Ak. 73. 
22 OPB Ak. 74. 
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are implied, for Kant suggests that it is God's "positing" things into existence that 
allows humans to posit them as existing. Positing, Kant says, is identical with the 
concept of being [Sein] in general.23 Something can be posited in relation to a 
predicate (a narwhal is brown, e.g.), in which case being is the copula of 
judgment. But in addition, "should not only this relation but the thing in and for 
itself be viewed as posited, then this being is the same as existence".24 Existence 
[Dasein] is thus understood to be a specific instance of being [Sein]; while the 
former indicates absolute positing, the latter can also mean predicative positing in 
general. This is why the word is can be used to indicate relations that non-entities 
or possible things have to one another.25 In pronouncing his fiat, God establishes 
absolutely the existence of things which were previously only possible relations, 
but does not thereby add any new determinations to his idea of the things. It is 
inaccurate, therefore, to say "A narwhal is an existent thing", for this suggests that 
existence is a predicate included in the concept of a narwhal. We ought to say "the 
predicates that I think together as a narwhal belong to certain existent sea 
creatures"; in other words, we ought to think of the concept of a narwhal, with all 
its predicates, as absolutely posited.26 The narwhal is actual by virtue of God's 
absolute positing, and thus positable as actual on the human scale, by human 
observers. 
God, like the narwhal, cannot be predicated into existence; because existence 
is not a predicate, God cannot be said to exist simply by virtue of the concept of 
God including every positive predicate. God's existence cannot be proved, Kant 
says, on the basis of mere concepts. In Kant's basis for a demonstration, God's 
existence can be posited by virtue of the necessity that there be some existence: 
God's necessary existence is the necessity that there be some existence. Kant 
makes this claim by showing that possibility, and therefore conceivability, requires 
that there be some existence. Everything that is possible is also conceivable, for 
that which is internally possible must be logically coherent according to the 
principle of contradiction, and what is logically coherent is also conceivable. What 
allows for this internal possibility is the actuality of something or other. The 
23 OPB Ak. 73. 
24 OPB Ak. 73. 
2-' OPB Ak. 74. 
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possibility of things in general is abolished "when no matter or no datum for 
thought exists, [for then] nothing conceivable is given".27 If there were no 
existence - if nothing could be absolutely posited - then nothing could be 
conceived and nothing would be possible. There is no contradiction in the denial 
of all existence, 
But that there be some possibility and yet absolutely nothing actual 
contradicts itself. For if nothing exists, nothing conceivable is 
given and one would contradict himself in nevertheless pretending 
something to be possible. [ ... ] To say "nothing exists" means the 
same thing as "there is absolutely nothing." It is obviously self-
contradictory to add, despite this, that something is possible.28 
Possibility in general, then, reqUIres that there is not nothing: it reqUIres the 
existence of something. The condition for possibility in general is an actual 
something, "in which and through which everything conceivable is given; [ ... ] a 
certain actuality whose annulment itself would totally annul all internal 
possibility".29 Given that there is possibility, such a thing exists necessarily. 
"From this much it is obvious that the existence of one or more things lies at the 
base of possibility itself, and that this existence is in itself necessary".30 Through 
analysis of the concept of that necessary existence grounding all possibility, Kant 
shows that this being must be unitary, simple, immutable, and eternal, containing 
the highest understanding and will. The existence of God is thus shown to be the 
condition of all possibility. 
God's existence is shown to be demonstrable not on the basis of the concept of 
God, but on the basis that all possibility requires some existence. "Some 
existence" must then be necessary, and this necessary existence can only be God's. 
God is thus the supreme condition of all possibility and contingent existence, for 
the existence of individual things results from God's absolute positing. There are, 
26 OPB Ak. 73-4. 
27 OPB Ak. 78. 
2X OPB Ak. 78. 
2'1 OPB Ak. 83. 
30 OPB Ak. 83. 
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then, two senses of existence: (1) the existence of things, as the products of God's 
absolute positing, and (2) the necessary existence of God, which is the necessary 
condition of all possibility and thus also of absolute positing. God's existence 
cannot be the product of absolute positing (for then God's possibility would have 
to precede his existence, which goes against Kant's argument); nor can God's 
existence be a predicate of the concept of God. God's necessary existence is the 
necessity of existence as such; it is the original condition of all possibility and of 
the existence of things. Thus the existence of things is made possible not only by 
their prior possibility in the mind of God, but by the necessity of existence as such. 
In making existence a necessary condition of all possible and actual beings, Kant 
brings existence into ontology. Ontology is no longer concerned only with 
logically possible being, but is concerned with the existence that logically possible 
being presupposes. Epistemological ontology, concerned with the conditions of 
knowledge, now includes existence as its ground. 
Furthermore, the existential ground of epistemological ontology is productive. 
God, the necessary existence, creates beings. Natural production occurs only 
through God's initial creation: 
Everyone knows that regardless of all grounds for the generation of 
plants and trees, the regular organization of floral pieces, avenues, 
and the like are possible only through an understanding which 
plans and a will which executes them. All the might or power of 
generation as well as all other data for possibility are insufficient 
without an understanding to make complete the possibility of such 
order.3 ) 
God is not only the ontological ground of possibility and actuality; he is the 
creator who originates the very possibility of matter and the craftsman who puts 
matter into its natural order. 32 He does this, as Alison Laywine stresses, not 
31 OPB Ak. 88. 
32 OPB Ak. 126-7. The second half of OPB is dedicated to considering the order and lawfulness of 
nature as a posteriori support for an a priori argument for the existence of God. Kant criticizes 
traditional physicotheology as being insufficient to prove God's existence, for it allows for the 
possibility that matter is independently self-creating. Kant advocates an "improved" 
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through his being as such, but through his free choice.33 This understanding of 
production, insofar as it is based on free divine creation, is close to Leibniz's. 
However, the method Kant uses to get there is quite different: it is an analysis of 
existence, and not of the concept of God, that leads to this conclusion. The 
possibility and conceivability of things, and thus their actuality, depend on the 
existence of God, not on the concept of God. 
Kant's emphasis on existence comes with a belief that divine creation is the 
only way of explaining the existence of things. One could argue that the idea of 
creation was implicit in Kant's analysis of existence all along, and that absolute 
positing is nothing other than divine creation. The connection between Kant's 
inquiry into being and his notion of production could thus be said to predetennine 
what he takes to be the meaning of existence. This is precisely the line that 
Heidegger takes in his Basic Problems of Phenomenology, where he argues that a 
certain "productive comportment" towards the world is implicit in Kant's 
philosophy, as Heidegger takes it to be in the entirety of western metaphysical 
thought. Heidegger maintains that the idea of createdness - that something 
possible is "conveyed over" to the actual, whether by adding predicates or by 
absolute positing - is based on the medieval distinction between essentia and 
existentia, which Kant preserves as reality and actuality.34 The Aristotelian 
heritage suggests that the distinction between essence and existence is 
fundamental for production: only if a possible concept is distinct from actual 
existence can the production of beings occur. Whereas for Wolff this involves 
adding actuality to the concept of the essence of the thing, for Kant, the thing is 
physicotheology which arrives at God as the ultimate creator of all possibility from an analysis of 
the necessary unity of the universe rather than its contingent connections (see Ak. 123-7). Kant also 
addresses the debate over preformation and epigenesis, the question of whether God originally 
created each individual organism, or whether God created only the initial conditions for a system of 
natural generation. Kant is clearly more open to epigenesis as an explanatory model, a position 
which is consistent with his early scientific views and which he continued to hold throughout his 
life, (see CJ, esp. §§80-81). For a discussion of the epigenesis-preformation debate in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as it affected Kant, see Helmut Muller-Sievers, Se(l-
Generatiol7: Biology, Philosophy, and Literature around 1800 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997); and 
Shell. For a general overview of Kant's early scientific position, see Buchdahl, Metaphysics and 
the Philosophy of Science, Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, and Laywine. 
33 Laywine 126-7. "On Kant's account [in OPB], God freely chose to create matter; he freely chose 
to subject matter to Newton's laws of motion; and he freely chose to endow matter with certain 
forces." 
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simply posited with all its predicates, and its concept or essence remams 
unchanged. With both philosophers actuality involves some activity on the part of 
God. Heidegger traces actuality back to agere, acting: that which is actual is 
possibility which has been actualized, enacted.35 And this specific characterization 
of all extant things as enacted, Heidegger says, comprehends beings in terms of a 
productive comportment towards them. This is the charge that Heidegger lays on 
Kant, asserting that Kant's connection between being and production is entirely 
traditional. 
What is remarkable in The One Possible Basis is not the content of Kant's 
conception of divine creation, but the method by which he arrives at it. It is 
through an analysis of existence, and the necessity of existence to knowledge, that 
divine creation emerges as the productive basis of existence. Kant evidently 
maintains a distinction between possibility and actuality, and thus between essence 
and existence; he also maintains a conception of an active God that posits beings 
into createdness. Heidegger's charge of productive comportment, as I will show in 
the next section, is generally appropriate. But as we move into Kant's critical 
philosophy in section lA, we can use this notion of productive comportment 
against Heidegger's rather limited reading to show that existence, for Kant, is the 
product of natural and not divine activity. Furthermore, the relation between 
essence and existence, between the epistemological and existential ontologies, will 
prove to be far more complex in Kant's system than Heidegger's analysis allows 
for. 
1.3 Heidegger's theory of productive comportment 
In order to detennine the relation between production, existence, and 
knowledge for Kant, I will make use of Heidegger's claim that Kant understands 
being in tenns of productive comportment. This will give us a way, in the 
34 SPP 93, 99. Friedman (Kant and the Exact Sciences. 188) points out that Kant distinguishes the 
essence of a thing from the nature of a thing: the former pertains to concepts, while the latter 
pertains to existence. ., . ., .. . 
35 The connection between actIOn. actiVity, and actuality IS from Anstotle s MetaphYSICS. esp. 
Theta VI-VIII. 
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following chapters, of considering how a notion of production influences Kant's 
understanding of nature and human spontaneity. Productive comportment is, for 
Heidegger, an intentional attitude of a Da-sein towards a thing: an attitude that 
interprets the thing and its being in tenns of its function in a productive system.36 
This comportment understands that things have been produced, are producible, or 
are not in need of production. It is this productive comportment that Heidegger 
says has guided the interpretation of the existence and essence of beings SInce 
early Greek philosophy.37 
Heidegger argues that one of the earliest examples of such thinking is to be 
found in the relation between morphe (fonn) and eidos (look, idea) in Greek 
philosophy. While for modem philosophy the look or essence of a thing is 
detennined by its fonn, for Greek ontology it is the opposite: the fonn of a thing, 
morphe, is detennined by its look, eidos. Heidegger suggests that this is explained 
by technical production, in which the look precedes the fonn: the producer begins 
with the idea, the anticipated look, of what is to be produced through shaping and 
fonning. 38 The eidos is the image of imagination which detennines what the thing 
36 Heidegger uses the word Da-sein in his earlier philosophy (pre-1935) to refer to "that being for 
whom being is an issue". While convenient to take it as short-hand for human consciousness, it is 
important to distinguish Heidegger's meaning from previous philosophical accounts of mind, 
subjectivity, soul, etc. What is crucial about human consciousness as Da-sein is that its being is an 
issue for it. 
37 BPP 104-5. Heidegger does not here go into the reasons why a thinking of production grounds 
thinking about things, but the reasons can be adduced from his other works. In Being and Time, for 
instance, Heidegger seems to suggest a sort of materialist anthropological explanation - humans 
think in terms of production because production, transforming things of nature into things of use, is 
the primary mode of human activity in all cultures and at all points in history. Beings are thus 
primarily understood as either useful or unuseful, Vorhandene or Zuhandene, ready-to-hand or 
present-at-hand. In this he moves along a Hegelian-Marxist trajectory, asserting the value of the 
hand-made item over the mass-produced and valourizing the craftsperson over the labourer. Unlike 
Hegel and Marx, though, Heidegger does not suggest that the producer's subjectivity is constituted 
or transformed by his mode of production; it is, rather, being that is transformed as modes of 
production develop. While in Heidegger's early work it is explicitly Da-sein's understanding of 
being that changes, in his later work it is being itself that reveals itself in different ways. See Being 
and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), esp. §§ 14-24, and Contributions to 
Philosophy (from Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
1999), esp. divisions II and III. 
Interestingly, Henri Bergson offers a similar account of the human tendency to understand 
nature by way of production. In Creative Evolution he criticizes both the mechanistic and 
teleological explanations of nature on the grounds that they fail to allow for "an unforseeable 
creation of form" (p. 45). This, he says, is due to the grounding of biological theory in a principle 
of repetitive production based on human craftsmanship. Generation is thus understood as if all were 
given or foreseen in advance. See Henri Bergson, Creative Emllllion, trans. Arthur Mitchell 
(M ineola. NY: Dover, 1998). 
3X BPP 106. 
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"already was and is before all actualization".39 Because the eidos is prior to the 
actualized thing, and because it contains the total reality of what the thing already 
was, the eidos is the unchanging "truth" of the thing: this emerges most clearly in 
Plato, where the idea represents the true reality of the particular. Heidegger also 
argues that the eidos, which contains all the qualitative determinations of a thing, 
constitutes the thing's completedness, its delimitation as what it is, and thus its 
thing-determinateness.4o Only because a specific eidos governs production can a 
thing be defined as some specific thing, and its whatness be ascertained. This 
outlook on beings considers that things are understandable as specific things 
because they have been formed or produced according to an eidos. And this means 
that beings are apprehended as having been produced to stand completed on their 
own: they are produced, placed-before (Heidegger plays on Herstellen) the 
apprehending person for use, released from their relation to the producer. The 
reality, whatness, or essentia of a being is thus directly related to its usability and 
its standing independently present, ready for use.41 
Heidegger explains that the Greek word for "that which is", ousia, originally 
referred to property, and beings became synonymous with "at-hand disposable" 
possessions.42 Ousia, that which is, is the present at hand, available for use; 
existence, then, is interpreted as pennanent presence. "Being, being-actual, or 
existing, in the traditional sense, means presence-at-hand".43 In his Introduction to 
Metaphysics Heidegger adds that the Greek sense of being, as permanent presence, 
has the character of standing in itself, manifesting itself for apprehension.44 He 
therefore describes the mode of access to the extant as Vo rfin den , finding the 
existent thing present before us. That which exists is, for ancient Greek 
philosophy, accessed through an "intuitive finding present" [das anschauende 
V01finden] which is also known as aisthesis, a beholding perception.45 Heidegger 
points out that such perception is only a modification of productive behaviour, 
which involves "sight" in the sense of the fore-sight of the anticipated look of the 
39 BPP 107. 
40 BPP 108. 
41 BPP 108-9. 
42 BPP 108-9. See also his Introduction to Metaphysics. trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1959), esp. 60ffand 194ff. 
43 BPP 100. 
44 Introduction to Metaphysics 63-4. 
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thing to be produced; while the thing's whatness is prescribed by fore-sight, its 
thatness is established through intuitive seeing. The actuality of the actual is 
manifested only in pure intuition. Furthermore, the actuality of the thing can be 
established only by referring back to its production, the fact that it has been 
produced according to an eidos and completed, set before us for use. When things 
are understood according to productive comportment, their actuality is only 
comprehensible in the context of their production and perception - things have 
been produced and set out to be found present by intuition. Heidegger's point here 
is that the concepts of both essencelreality and existence/actuality refer back to 
production and are grounded in human productive comportment. 
This, for Heidegger, is the ground on which the Western ontological tradition 
is based: the producedness of beings is the presupposition for their capacity to be 
apprehended in perception, and it is with a productive comportment towards 
beings that we apprehend and understand the world.46 A productive existential 
ontology, then, is at the basis of epistemology. Even things which are not 
understood to be produced by a producer - things of nature - are understood in 
terms of productive comportment, for these are understood to be the raw materials 
which are already present for producing other things. Productive comportment not 
only understands individual things as produced, but apprehends the world in tenns 
of a structure of producing.47 And this comportment towards beings detennines 
how their being is understood. It is due to productive comportment that objects are 
understood as independent: as produced, beings are finished and released from 
their relation to a producer, standing independently on their own, available for use. 
This means that things have an existence, a being-in-themselves, that is not 
dependent on humans: "the being that is understood in productive comportment is 
exactly the being-in-itself of the product".48 In being apprehended in tenns of 
productive comportment, things are already understood to be in-themselves, to 
have being which is not dependent on a human producer. The being-in-itself of a 
thing is thus alwal's already established in the apprehender's comportment 
4:' BPP 109-10. 
46 BPP II ~-3. Similarly for Bergson: the assumption of natural philosophy that nature produces 
like from like allows human action, based on induction, to proceed (44-5). 
47 BPP 115-6. 
4X BPP 113. 
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towards the thing. It is this particular point that Heidegger uses to approach the 
place of production for Kant. 
Heidegger maintains that there is "an undeviating continuity of tradition" from 
ancient and medieval philosophy to Kant, insofar as being is consistently 
interpreted by way of production.49 For the Kant of The One Possible Basis essay. 
absolute positing is divine creation, and existence is createdness: only something 
which has been created by God can then be posited by a human subject. Heidegger 
suggests that the medieval sense of creation that Kant inherits is related to, though 
not identical with, the ancient concept of production. From Greek to Latin 
philosophy, Heidegger claims, there is a shift from understanding the world in 
terms of natural and human production (phusis and techne) to understanding the 
world in terms of creation by God: that which is is understood as ens creatum, 
while God is the unique ens increatum, the creator of all beings which is not itself 
in need of creation. 50 Medieval and early modem philosophy thus continue to 
understand beings in terms of production. The pre-critical Kant is clearly thinking 
along these lines when he suggests a divinely created world and describes God as 
eternal and immutable necessary existence: the creator who does not himself stand 
in need of being created, whose existence is not posited existence. 
Heidegger's claim is that beings, for Kant, are thought as produced penn anent 
presence. Thus he adds that absolute positing for Kant means "positing as letting 
something stand of its own self,.51 When a thing is absolutely posited, it is posited 
in and for itself, standing independently of its creator. The creator gives the thing a 
"being in itself' so that it may stand on its own. And this essential level of being is . 
inaccessible to the human observer. It is certainly clear that in The One Possible 
Basis, Kant attributes to things an internal possibility or substance created by God 
and inaccessible to human intuition. It is this internal possibility that gives things 
their "thoroughgoing relations of unity and coherence" such that they exhibit 
universal hannony with one another. 52 While the human observer can speculate 
about the purpose of this hannony, she cannot access its true workings. 
49 BPP 117. 
50 BPP 118-9. 
51 BPP 117-8. 
52 See OPB Ak. 96ff. 
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For Heidegger this limitation of knowledge with respect to creation IS 
explicable in the context of productive comportment. He interprets Kant to be 
saying that human intuition cannot access the "true being" of things because the 
former has not created the latter.53 To substantiate this claim he draws upon two of 
Kant's pre-critical remarks: "finite beings cannot of themselves know other things, 
because they are not their creator", and "no being except the creator alone can 
cognitively grasp the substance of another thing".54 Just as knowledge of the eidos 
is restricted to the producer for the Greeks, knowledge of the true being or 
substance or inner possibility of things is limited to that being who has created the 
things. Human knowledge, meanwhile, is limited to those things that human 
intuition can reproduce through the process of representation. While God's 
knowledge is existentially and essentially creative, human knowledge is 
epistemically reproductive of that which is already produced. This implies not 
only an understanding of being in terms of production, but also a connection 
between the conditions of knowledge and the conditions of production. Only what 
is existentially produced by God to be permanent presence can be perceived, and 
only what is epistemically reproduced according to the application of the 
cognitive faculties to the perceived object, can be known. Furthermore, 
Heidegger's model allows us to see how the existential and epistemological 
ontologies become separated in modem thought: existential creation is God's 
business, while epistemic reproduction is humanity's. 
Heidegger's analysis also shows that these two ontologies cannot be unrelated. 
For beings that can be epistemically represented must first have been existentially 
created. This makes existence, as producedness, the condition for the possibility of 
knowledge. And knowledge (or experience) of things is the only way we can 
establish their existence or producedness. In experiencing something, we establish 
its being as being-produced, as having been created to be present to experience. 
We do not grasp what the substance or inner possibility of the thing is~ we grasp 
only that the thing has been created. Heidegger comments on Kant's two pre-
critical statements thus: 
:'3 BPP 149. 
:'4 Kant, Reflection no. 929 and Mctaphysik L1, LM Ak. 28:204, p. 27, qtd. BPP 149-50. 
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A genuine cognitive grasp of a being in its being is available only 
to that being's creator. The primary and direct reference to the 
being of a being lies in the production of it. And this implies that 
being of a being means nothing but producedness. [ ... ] The being 
of things is understood as being-produced. In Kant this is present 
basically as a self-evident matter of course, but it does not receive 
explicit expression.55 
4] 
Thus on Heidegger's reading, Kant understands being as the substance or inner 
possibility of things created by God. Because that substance or inner possibility 
can be grasped only by God, however, being becomes synonymous with the mere 
existence of beings, for their existence, established in experience, indicates that 
God has created them, and thus identifies them as having being (i.e. substance or 
inner possibility accessible only to God). The being of beings, then, refers 
primarily to their existence or producedness. 
The implication of Heidegger's analysis is that Kant conflates being with 
beings; in other words, that he elides the meaning of being with the existence of 
individual things. On Heidegger's account, Kant equates being with the created 
existence of things and does not ask how they differ. For this reason, Heidegger 
believes that Kant remains finnly within an "ontology of the extant".56 Kant's 
ontology presupposes that the being of beings is their producedness. Heidegger's I 
aim is to reveal the understanding of being presupposed by Kant's explication of 
existence, and his analysis, I believe, accurately reflects Kant's One Possible Basis 
essay. In 1763, Kant clearly does explicate existence based on the notion that God 
actualizes possibility; existence IS produced presence. The underlying 
presupposition that being is equivalent to produced presence follows from Kant's 
ontological shift away from Wolff. The consequence of Kant's inclusion of 
existence in ontology is that existing things grounded in the necessary existence of 
God become the focus of ontological concern, so being is thought in tenns of 
presence rather than essence, and in tenns of producedness rather than 
conceivability. On Heidegger's analysis it is precisely Kant's advance beyond 
55 BPP ]50 . 
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Wolff in including existence III ontology that makes him vulnerable to 
Heidegger's charge of conflating being with beings; and it is Kant's advance in 
defining existence as absolute (divine) positing that leaves him open to the charge 
of reducing being to producedness. 
However, Heidegger's analysis IS suitable only insofar as Kant defines 
existence as absolute (divine) positing. If existence is taken to be the product of 
God's positing, and if God's activities remain unknowable to us, then being will 
be thought in tenns of the producedness of things. But if existence is taken to be 
the product of human positing, and thus as the result of our own activities, being 
must be thought in a different way. I claim that this shift occurs in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, where the existence of things is the material content of experience, 
which is detennined as existence by the transcendental category of existence. The 
intuited manifold is detennined as "existence" by human understanding, through 
application of the categories; furthennore, it is detennined as causal, productive 
nature. Under these circumstances, existence is not equivalent to createdness by 
God, but is detennined, within the bounds of possible experience, as natural 
productivity. How must we characterize Kant's underlying presupposition of being 
when existence is characterized as the material content of experience, detennined 
by epistemic structures? We will see that both existence and being must be 
defined in tenns of the relation of object to subject. Heidegger, in arguing that 
being for Kant is produced pennanent presence, does not sufficiently take into 
account that existence is always existence within the conditions of possible 
experience; nor does he recognize that within these conditions, it is productivity 
rather than producedness that allows for knowledge. The relations between being, 
existence, knowledge and production in the Critique are considerably more 
complicated than Heidegger's analysis suggests. 
Where Heidegger is most successful is in identifying that Kant's ontology is a 
productive ontology. Both Kant's theory of existence and his theory of possible 
knowledge, as we have seen them in The One Possible Basis, rely on a notion of 
the production of existence. We have also seen how Kant's ontology has advanced 
beyond Wolffs. The Wolffian notion of ontology had nothing to do with existence 
or actuality: it was concerned with logically possible being. Kant's notion of 
ontology requires existence as well as logical non-contradiction; it requires a 
Chapter I 
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relation between subject and object. We will see that being, for Kant, is 
synonymous with this subject-object relation, and that being requires both 
existential and epistemic conditions. While Kant continues to define "ontology" 
epistemologically, as the science of the conditions of possibility of knowledge, he 
adds that the concepts must bear a relation to objects of the senses. Kant defines 
ontology in his essay of 1791, "What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in 
Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?": 
Ontology (as a part of metaphysics) is the science that comprises a 
system of all concepts and principles of understanding, but only 
insofar as these extend to objects given by the senses and can, 
therefore, be justified by experience. It does not deal with the 
supersensible, the ultimate end of metaphysics, and thus belongs to 
the latter only as a propadeutic. Ontology is the porch or entry way 
of metaphysics proper and will be called transcendental philosophy 
because it contains the conditions and first elements of all our 
kn I d ··57 ow e ge a prZOrl. 
With this statement Kant says explicitly that ontology is concerned with concepts 
and principles insofar as they relate to appearances - ontology is not concerned 
with the supersensible, or with things in themselves, but is located in the realm of 
representation and possible knowledge. While that is to say that ontology is 
concerned with epistemological grounds, it must also be concerned with 
existential grounds, insofar as they make up the material component of objects of 
possible experience. Ontology is located where the formal conditions of 
experience meet the material conditions of experience, and is limited by the 
bounds of possible experience. Kant's is an epistemological ontology, but one that 
refuses to restrict itself to the logical examination of concepts: ontology is a 
system which grounds knowledge by connecting concepts to existing things. 
Ontology is both epistemological and existential for Kant. 
57 What Rcal Progress, 53 (translation slightly modified). Earlier, similar definitions of ontology 
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The above quotation could, of course, be an abstract of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, indicating that Kant thought of that work as an ontology, as he himself 
suggests in its closing chapters.58 I will now go on to look at being and existence 
in the first Critique, to consider the development of Kant's doctrine away from 
divine creation and to consider the extent to which he nevertheless maintains a 
productive comportment, as Heidegger suggests. 
1.4 Existential grounds in the Critique of Pure Reason: The move to natural 
production 
The above remarks suggest that Kant's first Critique is an ontological work, 
where ontology is understood to be an epistemic system of concepts and principles 
of the understanding, insofar as they make experiential knowledge possible a 
priori. I have also suggested that the epistemic system must rest on existence 
which is characterized by a notion of production. While The One Possible Basis 
presents a theory of existence based on divine creation, we will see a different 
notion of production taking hold in the first Critique, blurring the distinction 
between existential and epistemic grounds. An existential ontology might, as 
Adorno suggests in his lecture course on Kant, be "salvaged" from 
. I 59 eplstemo ogy. 
The first half of the Critique of Pure Reason (Transcendental Aesthetic and 
Transcendental Analytic) is ontological in precisely the sense Kant describes. The 
second half, the Transcendental Dialectic, concerns that to which ontology is 
propadeutic, according to Kant: the supersensible, as soul, cosmos, and God. 
Heidegger compares the divisions of the Critique of Pure Reason to the divisions 
of W olffian metaphysics: the Aesthetic and Analytic are characterized as 
metaphysica generalis (ontology), while the Dialectic with its three chapters is 
characterized as a critique of metaphysica specialis (psychology, cosmology, 
theology).6o Kant's explicit discussion of being occurs not in what is properly his 
51! CPR A845-6 / B873-4. This is also clear in the sections on ontology in LM 
59 Theodor W. Adomo, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Rodney 
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ontology, but rather in his critique of theology. Kant criticizes the ontological 
proof for the existence of God in much the same terms as he had in The One 
Possible Basis essay. As in that essay, he does this by way of definitions of being 
and existence. These terms do not have exactly the same meanings as they did in 
Kant's pre-critical work. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Dasein is used to name 
the modal category of existence: it is among the pure concepts of the 
understanding, equivalent to the concept of actuality. Sein, by contrast, is the 
copula of predicative positing, a logical predicate rather than a real predicate. Thus 
Kant's thesis about being: 
'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept 
of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is 
merely the positing of a thing, or of certain detenninations, [as 
existing] in themselves. 61 
Kant tells us that a "real predicate" is a predicate that deten11ines a thing, that 
is added to the concept of the thing and enlarges it.62 As in The One Possible 
Basis, Kant asserts that being is not a predicate of this kind. The addition of being 
to a thing's concept does not enlarge the concept of what the thing is. It does not 
affect the thing's reality. It is useful at this point to note Kant's important 
distinction between reality [Realitat] and actuality [Wirklichkeit]. "Reality", for 
Kant as for Baumgarten and Wolff, does not describe that which is real in the 
sense of really existing, but rather describes the determinateness of a thing.63 From 
the Latin res, Kant aligns realitas with Sachheit, thingness or thing-
detenninateness; in the table of categories reality is listed under quality.64 The 
reality of a thing is its quidditas, its what-content; thus a "real predicate" is an 
essential predicate which detennines what the thing is.65 To say that being is not a 
real predicate is to say that being contributes nothing to the detennination of a 
61 CPR A598 / B626. I have added brackets around Kemp Smith's words "as existing'", which do 
not appear in the German text. 
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thing, cannot tell us anything about what the thing is in its essence. As in The One 
Possible Basis, Kant says here that "the [actual] contains no more than the merely 
possible" and uses the well known example: "A hundred [actual] thalers do not 
contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers".66 The possible and 
the actual do not differ in their reality: both are determined by the concept of a 
hundred thalers. They differ, rather, in their actuality: only the actual money has 
existence, extantness, or as Heidegger will have it, presence-to-hand. 
Being, which is not a real predicate, has nothing to do with reality. Rather, 
being is both a logical predicate and an existential predicate. In its logical use it is 
the relation-word or copula which relates predicates to their logical subjects. In its 
existential use, "we posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed 
posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept".67 This second use 
of the word "being" is roughly equivalent to the meaning ascribed to the word 
"existence" in The One Possible Basis. The thing is not just a possible manifold of 
predicates, but is actual and can be known a posteriori.68 This is what Kant means 
when he asserts that being is the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, 
in themselves. Being, as well as functioning as a logical copula, can be an 
assertion of actuality, describing a thing's thatness rather than its whatness. This 
definition of being differs from Kant's definition of existence in The One Possible 
Basis, however, in that we are the ones who do the positing, and things themselves 
are not generated by our positing activity. The pre-critical essay states that things 
come into existence by virtue of God's absolute positing. The Critique of Pure 
Reason, by contrast, claims that human subjects posit that a thing exists on the 
basis of experience. Yet this fails to account for the origin of existence, explaining 
only the origin of our account of existence. The notion of divine creation built into 
the pre-critical concept of existence has seemingly vanished. 
hh CPR A599 I B627. I have substituted the word "actual" where Kemp Smith confusingly uses the 
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What, then, has happened to Kant's pre-critical notion of God as the 
necessarily existing, productive ground of all existence? What grounds and 
originates the existence of things? Kant asserts that we may think of God as being 
such a ground - just as we may think of the concept of God as including 
omnipotence - but we must not presume that such a concept has any actuality. 
Reason, Kant says, needs to assume something necessary as a basis of existence in 
general, but from this "purely arbitrary idea" the existence of such a being cannot 
be proven.69 However, we may legitimately postulate a necessary being as the 
ground of all existence, so long as we do not presume the necessary existence of 
such a being.70 That is, the idea of a necessary being that grounds all existence is 
an ideal of reason. An ideal, Kant says, is an idea that has been individuated and 
hypostatized into an individual thing, "determinable or even detennined by the 
idea alone".71 The ideal has no objective reality - that is, no appearance that 
corresponds to it - but it functions in a regulative capacity, as a concept of 
something entirely complete by which reason may measure the incomplete.72 An 
ideal is an epistemic regulator, in this case masquerading as an existential ground. 
The sum-total of all possibility is such an ideal. According to the Scholastic 
principle of complete determination, which Kant retains, this sum-total of all the 
possible predicates of things is presupposed as a condition of the determinateness 
of any given thing. Each thing has a certain number of positive predicates from the 
sum total, and the remaining predicates are negative for that thing; that is, for 
every possible predicate, a thing is either positively or negatively constituted. Thus 
each thing is capable of being completely detennined. This principle, Kant says, 
contains a transcendental presupposition, namely, that of the 
material for all possibility, which in tum is regarded as containing 
a priori the data for the particular possibility of each and every 
thing.73 
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The idea of this sum-total is an ideal of pure reason, necessary for understanding 
the detenninability of things in general. Kant adds: 
If [ ... J reason employs in the complete detennination of things a 
transcendental substrate that contains, as it were, the whole store of 
material from which all possible predicates of things must be 
taken, this substrate cannot be anything else than the idea of [an 
All ofrealityJ; an omnitudo reaiitatis.74 
The existence of things, as far as we can expenence and detennine them, 
presupposes the ideal of a qualitative totality, a store of all possible content for 
things. "Nothing is an objectfor us, unless it presupposes the sum of all empirical 
reality as the condition of its possibility".75 This is a powerful statement which, as 
we will see, has resonance through the Critique and Kant's later texts. The 
possibility of our knowledge of individual objects presupposes that we have an 
idea of the totality of all reality as the ground of the real detenninations of those 
objects. 
Yet this idea of the totality of all reality is transfonned by reason into an 
existential ground; it is made identical with the concept of an ens realissimum, the 
concept of a "total reality" thing which contains within itself all possible 
detenninations of existing things.76 Reason objectifies this concept, taking it to be 
a being, and calls it "the primordial being", "the highest being", "the being of all 
beings [das Wesen aller Wesen]".77 The idea is hypostatized into the concept of 
God. Yet to assume the existence of this idea as a thing is to overstep the limits of 
the transcendental idea: 
These tenns are not [ ... J to be taken as signifying the objective 
relation of an actual object to other things, but of an idea to 
74 CPR A575 / 8603. Kemp Smith omits what I have placed in brackets. which occurs in the 
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concepts. We are left entirely without knowledge as to the 
existence of a being of such outstanding pre-eminence. [ ... ] 
Reason, in employing it as a basis for the complete determination 
of things, has used it only as the concept of all reality, without 
requiring that all this reality be objectively given and be itself a 
thing. Such a thing is a mere fiction in which we combine and 
realise the manifold of our idea in an ideal, as an individual 
being.78 
49 
"The being of all beings" is not an actual object and does not necessarily exist; it 
is only the idea of such a being that reason presupposes. This being, the sum-total 
of all possible determinations, must not be understood as a thing. It is not that the 
possibility of things presupposes some necessarily existing thing, but rather that 
our concepts of the possibility of things require the idea of a sum-total of all 
reality. It is by means of a "transcendental subreption" that reason moves from this 
idea to that of the ens realissimum, "substituting for [the idea of a sum-total] the 
concept of a thing which stands at the source of the possibility of all things".79 
Why does this transcendental subreption take place? Why does reason insist on 
transferring the idea of a sum-total that makes concepts possible, onto the idea of 
an existent thing purported to make things possible? The origin and ground of 
existence is at stake here, and Kant is suggesting that our attempt to derive 
existence from this hypostatized idea is illegitimate. Indeed, our attempt to derive 
existence from any hypostatized idea is illegitimate, and the concept of a 
necessarily existing thing can never be anything other than just such an idea. The 
existence of empirical things cannot be derived from the idea of a necessarily 
existing thing. Yet such ideas are our only way of postulating an absolute ground 
of existence: 
Why are we constrained to assume that some one among existing 
things is in itself necessary, and yet at the same time to shrink back 
from the existence of such a being [HTesen] as from an abyss? [ ... ] 
n CPR A579-80 / B607-8. 
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While I may indeed be obliged to assume something necessary as a 
condition of the existent in general, I cannot think any particular 
thing [Ding] as in itself necessary. In other words, I can never 
complete the regress to the conditions of existence save by 
assuming a necessary being, and yet am never in a position to 
begin with such a being.8o 
50 
Kant admits that some necessary ground must be assumed as the condition for 
existence in general, but denies that any particular thing can be thought to exist 
necessarily as this ground. The movement is enforced by the two regulative 
principles of necessity and contingency. The first "calls upon us to seek something 
necessary as a condition of all that is given as existent", while the second "forbids 
us to treat anything empirical" as this condition.8) Since nothing empirical can be 
thought to exist necessarily, reason may assume a necessary existential ground 
only outside the bounds of experience, "outside the world" as Kant puts it: 
That being or principle [of a necessary original being] must be set 
outside the world, leaving us free to derive the appearances of the 
world and their existence from other appearances, with unfailing 
confidence, just as if there were no necessary being, while yet we 
are also free to strive unceasingly towards the completeness of that 
derivation, just as if such a being were presupposed as an ultimate 
ground.82 
The important point here is that we are able to consider the existence of things as 
!fthere were no necessary being. Kant's claim about existence, then, is that while 
reason may presuppose and strive towards an absolute existential ground, the 
existence of appearances can and should be derived from other existent 
appearances. The question of existence can be separated from the question of 
divine creation, and aligned instead with efficient causality. There is no absolute 
110 CPR A615 /8643. 
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existential ground in the realm of appearance, for, according to the second 
analogy, all objects of experience must be thought to have been caused by other 
objects of experience. The ground of existence in the realm of appearance, then, is 
just other existence. 
This suggests that existence is associated with a notion of production: not as 
divine creation, but as natural causality and generation. That Kant wishes to 
associate the question of existence with the question of natural production is 
suggested by the similarity of his discussion concerning an absolute existential 
ground to that concerning teleological and mechanistic explanations of nature. A 
teleological explanation aims at "a necessary first ground for all that belongs to 
existence", while a mechanistic explanation "warns us not to regard any 
determination whatsoever of existing things as such an ultimate ground ... but to 
keep the way open for further derivation [of causes]".83 Accordingly, Kant advises 
us to adopt a mechanistic explanation for the possibility of natural beings, while 
using reason's idea of an unconditioned, purposive first cause to inject 
systematicity into our concepts of natural beings and processes.84 Existence, in the 
realm of appearance, is to be thought in tenns of efficient causality, and thus in 
terms of natural production - in terms of the generation of organic beings and the 
production, through physical impact and chemical interaction, of objects of 
inorganic matter. In the realm of appearances, there is existence producing other 
existence, but no single cause or ground of production can be deduced; because 
(according to the third analogy) natural beings interact with one another, all of 
existing nature is productive. 
Existence, then, is restricted to the bounds of possible experience, and if we 
are seeking an existential ground, our investigation must be limited to those 
bounds. This means that an inquiry into existence is circumscribed by epistemic 
conditions; objects that exist are objects of possible knowledge. The character of 
objects of experience, however - which I will discuss in chapter two - means 
that we will not find an absolute existential ground among them; we find, rather, 
existing things producing other existing things, in dynamical interaction. An 
absolute, unconditioned ground of existence cannot be found in the realm of 
R3 CPR A616 / B644. 
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possible experience. As we have seen, an appeal to this ground can only be one of 
reason, employed to regulate experience in terms of the idea of unconditioned 
totality. Without the regulative idea of God, we would not be able to understand 
existence systematically; indeed, "nothing would be an object for us" unless we 
held onto the idea of a sum-total of all reality. But this idea cannot be our primary 
means of explaining the production of existing beings. Individual objects exist 
because they have been mechanically caused, or naturally produced, in one way or 
another. Natural production is the material condition of possibility of things in 
nature, which must be understood in terms of the concepts and principles of 
understanding; this conceptualized nature, in tum, must be unified by the ideas of 
reason. 
This suggests that within the epistemic structure of concepts, principles, and 
ideas, is an existential ontology of natural production - that is, a notion of 
material nature as mechanism, the ongoing production of which is the condition of 
possibility of a world of existing things in general. This productive existential 
ontology is at the basis of the epistemological ontology, whereas a theory of divine 
creation, as Kant says, can only be posited at the end of scientific inquiry, after all 
natural explanations have been exhausted.85 As we have seen, Heidegger argues 
that Kant's ontology includes a productive comportment, with the understanding 
of existence and being based on producedness. My position is that existence 
continues to be understood in terms of production for Kant, but not in terms of 
divine creation; in being based on natural production, existence is understood in 
terms of productivity, and not in terms of producedness. Heidegger does not 
recognize this as a move significant to Kant's understanding of being. As I will 
show, however, the productivity of existence means that being must be understood 
as productive and dynamic rather than as "produced permanent presence". Kant's 
epistemological ontology requires an existential ontology of natural production 
underpinning it. Natural production is not only the ground of the existence of 
things, but also the ground of all knowledge of nature. Indeed, it is the material 
ground of knowledge, just as the categories are the fonnal ground of knowledge. 
85 CPR A693-4 / 8721-2: A772-3 /8800-l. 
Chapter 1 53 
Through this initial look at production in the first Critique, we can see that 
existential grounds and epistemological grounds are not distinct: production is the 
condition of possibility of existence and of knowing about that which exists. And 
this epistemic system, based on an existential ontology of production, then 
assumes a divine creator as explanation for that which cannot be explained 
naturally. Existential production is now nature's business, and epistemic 
reproduction continues to be humanity'S - but epistemology now rests on a 
theory of existential production which epistemology itself must produce, through 
experience and synthetic a priori principles. Kant's epistemological ontology, as a 
system of concepts and principles, thus requires a productive existential ontology, 
and this existential ontology requires the epistemic structure to regulate it. The two 
must feed into one another if the human mind is to know anything about nature: 
the productive existential ontology must be available to the epistemic system, 
structured by it but also immanent to it as its grounding condition. 
1.5 Being as relation 
How do the notion of being and the concept of existence fit into this structure? 
I have been talking about a productive ground for the existence of things, which 
Kant puts in the context of discussion of a necessary being. Yet it will quickly be 
seen that these claims have little to do with Kant's own notion of being as he 
defines it in the Transcendental Dialectic. Being, for Kant, is not the origin of 
beings; nor is it a property of them nor a concept which determines them. 
Furthennore, being is not a being.86 Being is an epistemic saying, an act of 
judgment that affirms the existence of a thing or the relation of a thing to a 
predicate. There is no reason to consider "being" as inhering in things or 
originating them; it is an affinnation that stems from the subject. It is significant 
that the word "is" has two different functions: that of positing existence 
(existential), and that of connecting two concepts (logical or epistemological). The 
8f> On this point, see Jacques Taminiaux, Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology. 
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"is" establishes not only the presence of a thing, but also the nature or essence of 
that thing. In both cases, though, the "is" has a strictly epistemic function, for even 
in its existential use, the "is" asserts the presence of a knowable thing to a mind; it 
does not indicate its mere existence. The "is", in its existential use, affmns the 
relation the subject bears to an object: that is, the fact that the object is actual, 
present to perception and cognition. 
Being is that very relation, the relation of subject to object. Being, for Kant, is 
the relation between mind and world, and the "is" is the iteration of that relation; 
the "is" is the proclamation by a mind that a world is present to it. This 
proclamation can only be made where some suitable material for cognition meets 
the forms of cognition, where extant things meet the epistemic system of concepts 
and principles. That realm of overlap, in which the possibility of representation 
arises, is being, subject-object relationality in general. Only under the condition 
that this is established can existence be ascribed to things. What can be ascribed to 
a world, then, is not being but existence. And existence is ascribed to the world 
through application of the categories. Thus it is that existence is one of the twelve 
pure concepts in Kant's ontological "system of concepts and principles", while 
being is neither a concept nor a principle. Nevertheless, being is amongst the 
conditions of possibility of knowledge as the initial subject-object relation that 
allows for the positing of a knowable world. Indeed, it is the supreme condition. 
Being is not a concept because it constitutes the very basis of the Kantian 
epistemological ontology, making possible the application of categories to a 
knowable object. 
Kant's notion of being has been interpreted by Paul Davies as "extra-
categorial", and similarly by Derrida as "transcategorial".87 On Heidegger's late 
interpretation of this material, being is modality itself, one of the four pre-
categorial divisions of judgments. 88 This supports an interpretation of being as 
relation for Kant. Modality, Kant tells us, is a peculiar function of judgment: "it 
87 Paul Davies has noted in Kant's critical philosophy "a sense of being that cannot be conflated 
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contributes nothing to the content of the judgment [ ... ], but concerns only the 
value of the copula in relation to thought in general". Later Kant adds that the 
categories of modality "do not in the least enlarge the concept to which they are 
attached as predicates. They only express the relation of the [object's] concept to 
the faculty of knowledge.,,89 With regard to an object, categories of modality 
contribute no determination of content but rather determine what the copula of the 
judgment - the "is" - means for thought. There are three modes of this relation 
corresponding to the three categories of modality: the object is related to thought 
either as possible (i.e. it agrees with the formal conditions of experience), as actual 
(i.e. it is bound up with the material conditions of experience), or as necessary (i.e. 
it is determined in accordance with the universal conditions of experience).90 
These categories are akin to being in that they are not real predicates; their 
employment determines the precise relation between subject and object, as either 
possible, actual, or necessary. Thus "modality" in general can be expressed as 
subject-object relationality in general, and can be aligned with being as I have 
interpreted it. Possibility, actuality and necessity are indeed modalities of being, 
for they give a precise value to the copula. The "is" affIrms the presence-to-mind 
of a thing, but the modal categories, including that of existence, must determine 
whether the thing in question is possible, actual, or necessary. 
Aligning being with modality gives being a grounding function in the table of 
categories. As the unspecifIed relation between subject and object, being allows 
for the application of categories to the thing in question. This means that being is 
an epistemically grounding relation. The establishment of the relation of 
knowability between subject and object is necessarily the fIrst step in any further 
inquiry into the object in question, whether it is made explicit or not: the narwhal 
must be established to be an object for a subject, and thus to be a knowable object. 
The establishment, with the "is", of the mind-world relation, in establishing that 
the object is intuitable, is the original condition for the determination of the object 
through the categories. Being is an original transcendental relation allowing for the 
correspondence of knowledge with the world, and thus makes knowledge possible. 
!Ill f1eidegger, "Kant's Thesis about Being". Pathmarks. 341. 
1'9 CPR A 74/ B99-1 00; A219 / B266. 
'10 CPR A218 / B265-6. 
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Heidegger does move towards this position in his 1961 essay, "Kant's Thesis 
about Being", consistently with his mature claim that being should be thought in 
terms of the relational "event" [Ereignis]. But in his 1927 Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology lectures he does not recognize that Kant casts being as the 
original transcendental relation. Instead, Heidegger claims that the intentionality of 
the human subject entails an original relation to the world, and in this relation the 
being of things is disclosed as producedness. Heidegger argues - much as he 
does in Being and Time - that a pre-philosophical grasp of being must precede 
the encounter with beings. With Kant, Heidegger says, this is expressed as a pre-
cognitive relation between subject and object, which first establishes the field of 
intuitable objectivity. 
Heidegger approaches this point through perception. Kant makes clear that 
perception is the means by which actuality is apprehended. When discussing being 
as positing, he suggests that when a thing is thought to exist, all that is added to 
the concept of the object is the perception of that thing. 91 Earlier, in his discussion 
of actuality in the Postulates of Empirical Thought, Kant specifies that "the 
perception which supplies the content to the concept is the sole mark of 
actuality".92 On Heidegger's interpretation, actuality for Kant has to do only with 
the question of whether a thing is given in perception: only perception can 
establish that a possible thing has actuality, exists. This means that existential 
assertion has the character of perception: to posit a thing's existence is to say that 
it can be perceived. "Kant thus says in short: actuality, existence, equals absolute 
position equals perception".93 
This is to say that existence, absolute position, and perception are all 
descriptions of the intuitive or epistemic relation between subject and object. 
Heidegger specifies that existence is not to be equated with the perceived object, 
but with its perceivedness, its relation to a positing subject. 94 This, of course, does 
not imply that the object exists only by virtue of its being perceived, as it would 
for Berkeley, but rather that perception establishes that the object exists for the 
91 CPR A601 /8629. 
92 CPR A225 /8273. 
93 BPP 46. Taminiaux, 69-110, has unfolded a phenomenology of perception from Heidegger's 
analysis of Kant in BPP, noting lIeidegger's curiously uncritical adoption of the traditional concept 
of perception. 
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positing subject. Heidegger points out, however, that "perceivedness presupposes 
perceivability, and perceivability on its part already requires the existence of the 
perceivable [ ... ] being".95 Perceivedness and positing cannot be equated with 
extantness, but are ways of accessing this extantness.96 Indeed, this is obvious 
from Kant's statement that perception is the sole mark of actuality: perception is 
the only way we have of knowing that a thing is actual. We must presuppose that 
the perceivable thing exists prior to and independent of its relation to the subject; 
the thing must exist before positing can take hold of it. This points to the 
presupposition in experience of the extantness of the object that is prior to the 
cognitive relation; and if extantness is presupposed in experience, then, Heidegger 
says, the subject already somehow grasps this extantness. Heidegger argues that 
this is implicit in Kant's text: the subject relates or comports itself towards the 
extantness of things as the first condition of possible knowledge.97 
For Heidegger, extantness must somehow already be grasped: extantness must 
already be disclosed before the extant can be uncovered.98 In other words, for 
Heidegger there is an original relation between subject and object in which the 
extantness of things is made manifest, prior to the existence of those things being 
determined by the categories. And Heidegger equates this extantness of things 
with Kant's conception of being. It is at this point that Heidegger is able to draw a 
parallel between what he takes to be Kant's notion of being and the existential 
structure of Da-sein as described in Being and Time. For Heidegger in this period, 
perception is an intentional comportment of the Da-sein, directed towards 
something whose mode of being is always already pre-conceptually understood. A 
disclosure of extantness belongs to Da-sein and is the condition of possibility of 
94 BPP 48. 
</5 BPP 49. 
96 BPP 67. I have used the teml "extantness" to refer to that state that things might be in before 
their relation to the subject. This is distinct from "existence", which refers to the state of things 
after they have been intuited and detemlined through the categories. 
97 Interestingly, and apparently without awareness of Heidegger's argument, Buchdahl. in Kant and 
the Dl'namics of Reason, proposes a similar reading of Kant. I will discuss Buchdahl's original and 
insightful interPretation at greater length in chapter 3. ., 
'IX BPP 71. The distinction between disclosure [crschliessen] and uncovenng [entdecken] IS 
important: that which is disclosed is that which is always already available to an intentional ~asein, 
while that which is uncO\'crcd is the object of the Dasein's intentional comportment. Heldegger 
extends this to the ontological distinction: being is disclosed, beings are uncovered. 
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the uncoverability of extant things.99 Heidegger extends this interpretation of the 
relation between perception and extantness to Kant: 
With respect to its possibility, perceivedness is grounded in the 
understanding of extantness. [ ... J It is manifestly this understanding 
of being to which Kant recurs without seeing it clearly when he 
says that existence, actuality, is equivalent to perception. 100 
What Heidegger suggests is that the being of beings must be disclosed before any 
particular beings can be uncovered; before a thing can be encountered, 
determined, and posited along with all its predicates, its being must in some sense 
already be understood. Heidegger makes clear that this pre-cognitive relation is 
not "enacted" prior to intuition; rather, it is implicit in the basic constitution of Da-
sein. "In existing, the Da-sein also already understands the mode of being of the 
extant, to which it comports existingly".IOI But Heidegger equates being for Kant 
with extantness; that is, he equates being with the presence that things are 
assumed to have independently of experience. As I explained earlier, Heidegger 
argues that this experience-independent presence is attributed to things based on 
the assumption that they have been created by God, who alone can know that 
presence. In already "somehow grasping" experience-independent presence, 
Heidegger implies, the subject has a comportment towards the world in terms of 
its divine creation. So when Heidegger says that Kant understands being as 
extantness, he means, once again, that Kant understands being as produced 
presence. 
The problem with Heidegger's interpretation is that he attributes to Kant an 
understanding of being as the mind-independent existence of things. Heidegger 
indicates that Kant understands being as the being-in-itself of things, accessible 
only to God but presupposed by the human subject in the subject's original 
99 BPP 71. See also Heidegger's introduction to Being and Time. 
100 BPP 71-2. It is unclear to me why Heidegger insists that Kant says that existence is equivalent 
to perception. Kant nowhere asserts their equivalence, but says that perception is the sole means of 
verW'il1g the existence of something. Later in the passage to which Heidegger refers (CPR ~225-6 
/ 8273-4), it becomes clear that Kant is talking about how we acquire knowledge of the eXIstence 
of things. i.e. only through perception. 
101 BPP 71. 
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comportment to the world. The association of being with the thing in itself for 
Kant is still promoted by some Kant scholars (most of whom would want nothing 
to do with Heidegger), and is a position with which I strongly disagree. If we start 
from Kant's own definition of being as positing, as asserting the relation of a 
knowable thing to a mind, we must recognize that being for Kant is located in the 
realm of possible experience, and not in the realm of things in themselves. Indeed, 
being is the original relation in which experience first becomes possible, in which 
things first become knowable and in which minds become able to know them. The 
being of things consists in their relatedness to a subject, in their participation in 
possible experience. Being does not consist in the thing in itself, which is defined 
precisely as that which cannot have any relation to a subject, that which cannot be 
judged, and that which cannot be existentially posited. 
Once we understand being as the relation that is the first condition of possible 
experience, we can no longer detennine the being of things to be equivalent to 
produced pennanent presence. Rather, being is the original condition of possibility 
of the fonnal detennination of the manifold, and of the manifold appearing to us 
in the ways that it does. This includes its appearance as productive nature. Being is 
not the producedness of things, but is rather the original productive condition of 
possibility of their productivity. The reason that nature appears as productive 
nature is, in fact, due to the productive comportment of the subject, which 
comportment is exercised in the original relation of being; but this will be made 
clear in chapters three, four, and five. Heidegger is right to claim that the Kantian 
subject is constituted by a productive comportment. He is wrong, however, to 
claim that the result of this is an equation of being and producedness; and he 
misses Kant's own recognition of the uses and limitations of human productive 
comportment. 
Heidegger's phenomenological analysis is also useful in giving us the notion 
of an original ontological relation within Kant's cognitive system. But 
Heidegger's interpretation, that the being of things is disclosed in this relation, 
relies on the belief that Kant equates being with extantness. I have argued that 
being is this original relation itself, the primary and original ground for the 
possibility of knowledge. In the chapters that follow, I will show how this relation 
is characterized in Kant's texts. However, I want to make clear that this original 
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relation does not access that which is thought to ground existence absolutely in 
Kant's system. Nor does it access the supersensible, noumena, or things in 
themselves. Rather, being is strictly epistemically grounding: the original relation 
establishes the grounds of knowledge, not the grounds of existence or the 
unconditioned. As the relation between subject and object, between epistemic 
conditions and existence, being is located in and bounded by the realm of 
appearance; the supersensible "cause" of appearance, if there is one, cannot have 
anything to do with being. 
Being is the basis of Kant's theory of knowledge, and is the original formal 
condition of the possibility of existence. It is not the absolute ground of existence 
as God was taken to be in The One Possible Basis. It is in Kant's philosophy of 
nature that we must seek the character and ground of existence: Kant' s existential 
ontology is based on natural production, while divine creation takes on the status 
of an idea that regulates our understanding of natural production. Kant's 
epistemological ontology is a system of concepts and principles with being at their 
basis. Yet as we have seen, existence is structured by epistemic conditions, while 
also constituting the ground for the possibility of their employment. While the 
grounds of existence and the grounds of knowledge were strictly separated for 
some of Kant's immediate philosophical predecessors, for Kant they are 
intertwined: existence must be structured by the epistemic system as its form, 
while knowledge must depend upon existence as its content. Ontology for Kant 
involves both existence and concepts; it is the science of the relation of concepts 
to objects, of the relation of subject to object, and is thus the science of being. 
Both being and ontology are located in, and bounded by, the realm of possible 
expenence. 
Chapter 1 Summary 
In this chapter I aimed to detennine the location and bounds of Kant's 
ontology and notion of being. I argued that Kant progresses beyond Christian 
Wolffs ontology of the concept by stressing the importance of existence. and 
found that Kant's ontology is both epistemological and existential. While 
Chapter 1 61 
"ontology" for Kant denotes a system of concepts and principles, this system 
would be empty without existence as its material content. 
Using Heidegger's notion of productive comportment, I also argued that 
existence for Kant is tied to a notion of production: to the idea of divine creation 
in The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God, and to the 
concept of natural production in the first Critique. I argued against Heidegger's 
claim that being for Kant is equivalent to produced permanent presence. I 
examined Kant's claim that being is merely positing and suggested that being, for 
Kant, is understood as the relation between subject and object. Thus both being 
and ontology are located in and bounded by the realm of possible experience, from 
which ideas of the supersensible and things in themselves are excluded. 
Chapter 2 
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The ground of existence: transcendental principles, 
matter, and fundamental forces 
[NJatural SCIence must not leap over its boundary in order to 
absorb, as an indigenous principle, something to whose concept no 
experience whatever can be adequate and which we are not entitled 
to dare approach until we have completed natural science. I 
2.1 From reason to understanding 
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In this chapter I will focus on the existential side of Kant's ontology in the first 
Critique. As I explained in chapter one, existence in the Critique of Pure Reason 
must be considered as the existence of appearances. I claimed that existence, for 
Kant, can only be approached within the epistemic framework of concepts and 
principles, the a priori fonnal structures that detennine the extant as an existing 
object of experience. In this chapter, I will discuss some aspects of that framework 
that are particularly important in detennining appearances as "pennanent 
presence" (and will reiterate that being is not detennined as pennanent presence). I 
will also look briefly at Heidegger's contention that the fact that for Kant, 
existence cannot be approached or considered without this framework, means that 
beings, and the relation of being, are "mathematical". 
Another aim of this chapter is to detennine the extent to which an absolute 
ground for existence can be found within the epistemic framework. I claimed in 
chapter one that no single being can act as such a ground. By examining Kant's 
matter theory in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, I will confinn 
Chapter 2 63 
this position by claiming that no existential ground can be found beyond or outside 
of existence itself. However, existence can be redescribed in terms of the 
interaction of fundamental forces, which explains how matter as we perceive it is 
produced. Existence, approachable only through the epistemic framework that ; 
makes experience possible, is the ongoing productive activity of force. It can only 
be approached within the epistemic framework, but it is also a requirement for the 
possibility of knowledge. As Watkins also argues, 
expenence, an epistemological notion, reqUIres an object of 
expenence, which is broadly ontological in character. [ ... ] The 
essence of the Critical tum [... is] the subtle way in which 
ontological and epistemological considerations complement each 
other in the establishment of Kant's Critical system.2 
Discussion of existence in the first Critique requires us to move from reason, 
discussed in chapter one, to understanding. In chapter one I drew attention to the 
conflict that the faculty of reason encounters between the idea of some necessary 
ground for existence and the idea of a necessarily existing ens realissimum, a 
single original and originating being. Kant's resolution of this conflict gives the 
idea of the divine creator a merely regulative status, such that things in the world 
are viewed "as if they received their existence from a highest intelligence".3 The 
idea of divine creation does not tell us anything about the constitution of an object, 
but rather guides our inquiries into the connection of the objects of experience. 
And finding unity in the connection of objects of experience is reason's primary 
aim. Kant says that the idea of a highest intelligence 
is only a schema constructed in accordance with the conditions of 
the greatest possible unity of reason - the schema of the concept 
of a thing in general, which serves only to secure the greatest 
possible systematic unity in the empirical employment of our 
I CJ §68, Ak. 382. .. ". 
2 "Kant on Rational Cosmology", in Watkins (ed.), 84-5. Watkms uses "ontological m the sense 
that I use "existential". 
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reason. We then, as it were, derive the object of experience from 
the supposed object of this idea, viewed as the ground or cause of 
the object of experience.4 
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The order of play is clear: reason constructs a schema of "the concept of a thing in 
general", and then treats the object of experience as if it were derived from the 
object of this idea. What Kant means by a "thing in general" here is the concept of 
unified objectivity in experience; reason treats it as a schema, in order to find the 
systematic unity of all empirical knowledge. Systematic unity is a regulative 
principle of reason, and the idea of a unifying highest intelligence is a schema of 
that principle.s Although this idea cannot have an object - as an idea, it lacks 
objective validity - it is thought (by analogy with real things) to have an object, 
and this object is thought to be the ground of the object of experience. 
Reason applies its principle of systematic unity, and thus the idea of a divine 
creator, in order to ascribe an order to nature which is not given by the 
understanding. While the understanding is concerned with the formal conditions 
of possibility of objects and events in nature, reason is concerned with making the 
aggregate of such objects and events, determined as lawful, into a systematic 
unity. This idea of unity is problematic, as it is not given; it is only a projected 
unity, which remains forever the aim of the hypothetical employment of reason.6 
Thus the principle of systematic unity is regulative: it does not constitute objects 
themselves, but regulates the procedures of the understanding such that its objects 
are ordered and unified. In this sense the principle has "objective but 
indetenninate validity"; it has no corresponding object, yet it serves as a rule for 
possible coherent experience.7 Without reason's presuppositions of unity and 
homogeneity in nature, we would know that every event has a cause, but we would 
not know that similar events have similar causes and so would not experience any 
regularity of content in nature. We would thus experience such natural diversity 
that we would have no universal empirical concepts, and therefore no empirical 
3 CPR A671 / B699. 
4 CPR A670 / B698. 
5 See CPR A679-82 / B707-1O. 
6 CPR A647 / B675. See also A663 / B691, where Kant describes "ideas which reason follows only 
as it were asymptotically, i.e. ever more closely without reaching them". 
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cognition.8 It is only on reason's presupposition of natural systematic unity that 
experience is empirically possible and empirically lawlike. The need for the 
empirical coherence of nature requires reason to presuppose a principle of 
necessary unity, and to hypostatize this unity in a transcendental object thought by 
analogy with real substances.9 Thus the divine existential ground is set up by 
reason to give unity to experience, in accordance with its own principle that there 
must be unity in experience. 
The idea of the divine creator grounds our explanation of the order and unity 
of existence. For reason, in its regulative use, is concerned with deriving an order 
of nature, and is therefore involved in constructing the lawlikeness of specific 
empirical groupings in nature. Reason's law of the necessary presupposition of 
systematic unity allows us to comprehend the specific differences nature exhibits 
- a structure of similarity and difference, genera and species lO - and thus to 
fonn specific laws of the order and unity of objective things and sequences. The 
lawlikeness of empirical laws is brought about by reason, injecting systematicity 
and necessity into the contingent perceptions which understanding has given as 
objective things and sequences. Reason makes possible an empirical natural 
science, where generalizations based on observational and experimental data can 
be regarded as necessary laws. I I The idea of the divine creator is the regulative 
ideal which, at the end of our empirical inquiries into a natural order. is posited to 
be at the origin of such an order. 12 The divine creator is thought, for the sake of the 
explanatory coherence of empirical laws, to originate existence: 
For it is in the light of this idea of a creative reason that we so 
guide the empirical employment of our reason as to secure its 
7 CPR A663 / B691. 
8 CPR A654 / B682. See also CJ Ak. 185. 
9 CPR A674-5 / B702-3. 
10 CPR A651-2 / B679-80. 
II See the first and second introductions to the Critique of Judgment. See also chapters 7, 8, and 10 
of Buchdahl's Kant and the Dynamics of Reason. and p. 475ff of his Metaphysics and the 
Philosophy (?f Science. Susan Neiman argues along similar lines in chapter 2 of The Unity of 
Reason (Oxford: OUP, 1994). 
12 CPR A671 / B699 ff. 
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greatest possible extension - that is, by viewing all objects as if 
they drew their origin from such an archetype. 13 
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While the idea of the divine creator guides reason from the start, it is only at the 
end of scientific inquiry that the idea of "a supreme purposive being" can be 
posited "as the ground of all things", to lend completeness to a system whose 
completeness cannot be empirically attained. 14 Kant is also clear that the idea of 
the divine creator has only a regulative use as a rule for the empirical employment 
of reason, to secure the greatest possible systematic unity of the world. 15 Thus the 
idea of the divine creator is the explanatory ground for the necessary empirical 
lawlikeness of the order of nature. 
In contrast to reason's activity in constructing a systematic order of nature 
which allows for empirical natural science, the pure understanding constructs 
"nature in general" and founds a pure natural science. 16 In pure natural science, 
general natural laws are not empirically determined but are cognized a priori for 
application to possible experience. These are the lawlike principles of substance, 
causality, coexistence, and so on that Kant sets out to prove in the Analytic of 
Principles, and which make nature transcendentally possible. These principles 
provide a formal unity to experience, but they do not provide a unity of empirical 
content. Reason's principle of systematic unity is not needed in this context: there 
is no need (at this stage) to unify empirical nature, but only to establish the 
conditions for the possibility of the experience of nature in general. Thus the idea 
of the divine creator need not be brought in as putative existential ground. Of 
course, the divine creator is a necessary idea for comprehending an empirical 
system of nature, so eventually it must be brought in; as Susan Neiman has pointed 
out, experience deprived of reason's regulative principles would be, for Kant, 
tantamount to animal or infantile experience. 17 At the stage of knowledge where 
reason is forestalled - the transcendental stage of establishing what Kant calls 
"nature in general" - the regulative idea of an existential ground is as yet 
13 CPR A67~-3 / B700-1. 
14 CPR A692-3 / B720-1 
15 CPR A686 / B714. 
16 CPR B165. 
17 Neiman 58-9. 
Chapter 2 67 
unnecessary. From the perspective of pure natural science, the existential ground 
is to be found a priori within nature insofar as nature confonns to transcendental 
laws. 
This IS suggested in the Analytic of Principles, and confinued by Kant's 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. This latter is Kant's "special" 
metaphysics of nature, a system of natural science governed by the a priori 
principles of general metaphysics as laid out in the Analytic, but taking into 
account the empirical concept of its object. While the Analytic "treat[ s] of the 
laws which make possible the concept of a nature in general even without 
reference to any detenuinate object of experience", special metaphysics 
occupies itself with the special nature of this or that kind of things, 
of which an empirical concept is given in such a way that besides 
what lies in this concept, no other empirical principle is needed for 
cognizing the things. For example, it lays the empirical concept of 
a matter or of a thinking being at its foundation and searches the 
range of cognition of which reason is a priori capable regarding 
these objects. It is then not a general but a special metaphysical 
natural SCIence (physics and psychology), III which the 
aforementioned transcendental principles are applied to the two 
. f b' 18 species 0 sense-o ~ects. 
Special metaphysical natural science remains a pure natural science, for it does not 
make use of any particular experiences; it investigates empirical concepts, and 
specifically the empirical concept of matter. 19 The focus here is not on building up 
natural science through the ordering of experiences by reason. Rather, Kant's 
concern is to show how the understanding's application of the transcendental 
principles to sense-objects in general makes possible the empirical concept of 
matter, and thus makes possible certain a priori laws of matter. 
IR Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations (~r Natural Science, trans. James W. Ellington, in 
Kant, Philosophy ~r Material Nature (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), Ak. 469-70. Hereafter 
abbreviated to MFNS. 
19 MFNS Ak. 472. 
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Matter, defined most generally, is "that in appearance which corresponds to 
t · ,,20 S h f sensa Ion. 0 t e concept 0 matter cannot be a pure concept, but must be 
empirical: it is valid only because there is something corresponding to sensation. 
Yet the concept of matter is not derived from multiple experiences of material 
bodies. Rather, the concept of matter is "constructed"; its intuition can be 
generated a priori like a geometrical figure, given the right conditions.21 To 
detennine those conditions under which construction of the concept of matter is 
possible, an analysis of the concept of matter must be undertaken. The 
metaphysical foundations of natural science, then, are the conceptual conditions of 
constructing the concept of matter. The foundations will tum out to be a set of 
concepts which accord with the general a priori conditions of experience. These 
foundational concepts make the concept of matter epistemically possible (i.e., 
constructable a priori). With the impossibility of experiencing matter as such, 
these concepts are as close as we can get, within the epistemic system, to 
understanding the material ground of existence. These concepts are not brought in 
for the sake of the explanatory coherence of a system of nature as a whole, but are 
assumed in order to explain what matter is and how it works, according to the way 
in which we experience it. We will see how, from out of the Analytic of 
Principles, the concepts by which we may think about the ultimate character of 
matter become apparent. 
In summary, Kant gives us three ways in which nature is determined for the 
sake of natural science: 
1. Nature is transcendentally ordered as "nature in general" by the principles 
of understanding, such that experience is possible. 
2. Nature is metaphysically grounded with respect to its material conditions of 
possibility through the construction of the concept of matter, such that a 
special natural science is possible. 
3. Nature is ordered according to reason's regulative principles such that it can 
be viewed as a purposive empirical system. 
20 CPR A19 / B33. 
21 The fact that the concept of matter is empirical is difficult to reconcile with the fact that it is not 
derived from experience but is exhibited a priori. I will not discuss this particular problem further 
here, but for a useful discussion see Friedman, "Matter and Motion in the Metaphysical 
Foundations and the First Critique", in Watkins (ed.), 53-69. 
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The first is the pure natural SCIence of the Transcendental Analytic and is 
concerned with transcendental conditions of experience. The Analytic yields a 
lawlike "nature in general" which in Metaphysical Foundations is specified 
through the empirical concept of matter. The concept of matter must be 
constructed through still more basic concepts: these fundamental concepts are 
determined as the "metaphysical hardcore" on the basis of which specific material 
laws can be formulated in accordance with the transcendental principles. Although 
these are empirical concepts, they are analyzed a priori, without reference to any 
particular experience. Only the third determination of nature operates on nature as 
experienced: empirical nature is ordered according to reason's regulative 
principles, its systematicity ultimately explained by reference to the idea of God. 
As I have suggested, we have no immediate need for God if, per impossibile, 
we stick to pure natural science, which, within the realm of appearances, assumes 
a purely material ground of existence. Understanding provides the fonnal 
conditions of possibility of a knowable world, and in so doing, allows for the 
concepts of the material conditions of nature to emerge. The material conditions, 
of course, can only be comprehended within the structure of formal conditions, 
making the possibility of reaching a non-formalized existential ground 
problematic. Michael Bowles calls this the impasse of matter: "without fonn we 
T) 
cannot approa~h matter, but with form, matter as such is never encountered".~~ 
Kant's description of existence, then, will necessarily be phenomenal and 
conceptualized. Existence can be described in terms of the concept of the conflict 
of the fundamental forces of matter. This concept is not derived from experience, 
but from an analysis of the concept of matter; it emerges only from the epistemic 
framework of concepts and principles. The epistemic framework, however, 
requires that existence be thought in terms of force; dynamic existence is a 
condition for the possibility of knowledge, though dynamic existence can only be 
made manifest through knowledge-conditions. 
22 Michael Bowles, "Kant and the Provocation of Matter". in Rehberg and Jones (eds.), 1-18, here 
at p. 15. 
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2.2 The Mathematical Principles: constructing presence 
I will begin with the second chapter of the Analytic of Principles, entitled 
"System of all Principles of Pure Understanding." This is a system of the 
understanding's principles "according to which everything that can be presented to 
us as an object must confonn to rules,,?3 It outlines the a priori rules of the 
understanding according to which particular things can be experienced. Following 
the division of categories, the system comprises a fourfold of principles which 
relate to quantity, quality, relation and modality. The first two divisions contain 
"mathematical" rules which govern our intuition of an appearance, while the latter 
two divisions contain "dynamical" rules which are said to govern the existence of 
an appearance. The rules of the first type are constitutive principles, constituting 
intuition in advance of perception. But the principles of the latter type are post-
perceptual: they "seek to bring the existence of appearances under rules a priori". 
However, "since existence cannot be constructed, the [dynamical] principles can 
apply only to the relations of existence, and can yield only regulative principles".24 
Dynamical principles constitute experience by regulating existence, and thus are 
regulative in a different sense than the ideas of reason. 
The notion of construction is important here. Kant defines it much later, in the 
section entitled The Discipline of Pure Reason, where he differentiates 
philosophical from mathematical knowledge: 
Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from 
concepts; mathematical knowledge is the knowledge gained by 
reason from the construction of concepts. To construct a concept 
means to exhibit a priori the intuition which corresponds to the 
concept. For the construction of a concept we therefore need a non-
empirical intuition. The latter must, as intuition, be a single object, 
and yet none the less, as the construction of a concept (a universal 
representation), it must in its representation express universal 
~.1 CPR A158-91 BI97-8. 
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Kant uses the example of constructing a triangle: from the mere concept of a 
triangle, a non-empirical intuition can be generated, either mentally or physically 
(on paper, e.g.). Yet this procedure cannot be followed in the case of qualities, 
which must be taken from experience. Similarly, construction cannot apply to the 
concept of existence: the intuition of existence can only be empirical. This is what 
Kant means when he says at Al79 / B221-2 that existence cannot be constructed: 
because existence must be given in an empirical intuition, the dynamical 
principles cannot constitute existence but only regulate it. The existence of things 
simply cannot be transcendentally constituted; it must be given by nature to 
experience. Dynamical principles can only govern our experience of the relations 
of existing things in time. These rules are by this limitation no less constitutive of 
possible experience, and no less certain a priori: they tell us how a unity of 
experience may arise from perception.26 
The mathematical principles, by contrast - the Axioms of Intuition and the 
Anticipations of Perception - are constitutive, but only of intuition: as with all 
principles of understanding, they do not constitute the object itself. The 
mathematical principles establish that intuitions must have some degree of spatio-
temporal reality: what amounts to a transcendental principle of presence. The 
principle governing the axioms is that all intuitions are extensive magnitudes.27 
This is to say that all appearances take up some detenninate space and time and 
that their intuition is successive, where the representation of parts makes possible 
the representation of the whole. That is, they have a spatiality which is 
apprehended temporally. The principle governing the anticipations is that in all 
appearances, the real of sensation has intensive magnitude.28 That is, the 
qualitative content that is sensible in an appearance has some quantitative degree 
24 CPR A 179 / B221-2. On this distinction, see Brent Adkins, "The Satisfaction of Reason: the 
Mathematical/Dynamical Distinction in the Critique of Pure Reason'", Kantian Review 3 (1999), 
64-80. 
25 CPR A 713/ B741. 
26 CPR A 180/ B222. 
27 CPR Al62 / B202. 
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which, however small, cannot vanish into nothingness. While the specific quality 
and degree (of redness, heat, etc.) can only be gathered from experience, "the 
property of possessing a degree can be known a priori',.29 So we employ an axiom 
of spatio-temporal quantity and anticipate that an intuition will have some degree 
of its qualities. We thus generate a magnitude: an appearance which endures 
spatially in time and possesses a degree ofreality.3o The fact that appearances have 
spatio-temporality and some qualitative degree is known a priori, such that 
intuitions can be constructed non-empirically by the imagination like geometrical 
figures. This is the axiomatic and anticipatory nature of these principles: 
appearances are anticipated, before expenence, to have these quantitative 
characteristics which not only make intuition possible, but also make pure 
mathematics applicable to objects of experience.31 
Appearances qua magnitudes are suitable for apprehension by a faculty that 
works successively like the imagination itself; that is, they are intuited 
successively in both time and degree. This means that the minimal requirements 
for intuition are that an appearance last a minimal amount of time and that it have 
a minimal qualitative degree, though there is no specific minimal limit. Kant 
29 CPR A 176 / B218. In other words, Kant says here that constitutive principles cannot be 
detenninative, and that the detenninate measure of any degree can only be known a posteriori. In 
his Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), Paul Guyer provides an analysis 
of the supposed inconsistencies of the mathematical-dynamic distinction. Guyer's critique of 
Kant's distinction is perhaps based on his mistaken belief that constitutive principles must be 
detenninate and regulative principles indetenninate, as well as his fundamental misunderstanding 
of Kant's use of the tenn "reality" (183-90). Guyer argues (1) that the mathematical principles 
cannot be constitutive because they are indetenninate; and (2) that the principle of intensive 
magnitude (reality) makes a claim about the existence, rather than the intuition, of appearances. In 
response to both these points I argue that the constitutive principles do not impose detenninate 
measures onto appearances, but rather constitute appearances a priori as determinately 
measurable. This means that (1) constitutive principles are not themselves detenninate principles, 
so there is no contradiction in saying that mathematical principles are constitutive; (2) the principle 
of intensive magnitude constitutes appearances a priori as having a measurable degree of reality, so 
there is no claim being made about the existence of any detenninate thing. Admittedly, Kant's 
example, which Guyer cites, that "I can detennine a priori, that is. can construct, the degree of 
sensations of sunlight by combining some 200,000 illuminations of the moon" (A 178-9 / B221) 
could lead one to think that Kant suggests that we know detennine numbers a priori by virtue of 
the mathematical principles. But the point here is that given a detenninate quantity, another 
detem1inate quantity can be constructed a priori. according to the principle which constitutes our 
intuitions as measurable in general. That is. we can construct a non-empirical intuition of the 
degree of sunlight. given the right mathematical information. whether or not we have ever had any 
experience of it. The principle itself does not detennine the actual quantity. but only detennines 
that the intuition is quantitative. 
30 It is the productive imagination that generates or "produces" magnitudes. CPR A 163 / 8204: cf. 
Al 70 / B21 1: A95-131. 
31 CPR Al65 / B206. 
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makes clear that both the duration and the reality of an appearance can be 
infinitely small: "no part of [ a magnitude] is the smallest possible, that is, [ ... ] no 
part is simple".32 The passing of an appearance from presence to absence is no 
mere dwindling away into nothingness, but entails the impossibility of intuition: 
"no perception, and consequently no experience, is possible that could prove [ ... ] a 
complete absence of all reality in the appearance".33 In other words, the principles 
which constitute intuition and anticipate perception, taken together, say that an 
appearance can be neither quantitatively nor qualitatively nothing. Thus the 
minimum requirement for intuition is that there be presence, where presence 
denotes a degree of reality enduring in space. All appearances are anticipated a 
priori to have presence. Presence as a transcendental principle is constitutive of 
intuition - meaning that presence is only a property of things insofar as it is a 
principle of understanding. The cognitive faculties have a comportment towards 
presence, such that everything perceivable must be pre-determined as spatially 
enduring reality. 
Kant does not specifically align the mathematical principles with presence in 
the Critique. This is because presence is, as I outline below, an empirical concept 
of special metaphysics. However, when explaining the oddness of the fact that the 
understanding anticipates what it has not yet experienced, he does say that "the 
real [ ... ] as opposed to negation = 0, only represents something whose concept in 
itself contains a being [ein Sein] , and does not signify anything except the 
synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general".34 That is, while quality in 
sensation can only be established empirically, the property of possessing a degree 
of a quality can be known a priori, and the concept of something represented by 
the real (i.e. qualitativeness in general) must contain a being rather than a nothing. 
Qualitativeness in general, and the concept of "a being" which accompanies it, 
signify empirical synthesis in general, and not the synthesis of particular 
sensations. Kant's implication seems to be that whatever is anticipated in this way 
J2 CPR A169 1 B211. 
33 CPR AI72 IB214. 
34 CPR A175-6 1 B217. This quotation is taken from the Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
translation (Cambridge: CUP 1997). Kemp Smith unhelpfully translates ein Scin as being, which 
would make this sentence run contrary to Kant's thesis about being. 
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is present, not-nothing, and yet there is no detenninate empirical synthesis at 
work. There is merely the anticipation of presence. 
Kant explicitly aligns presence with the mathematical principles in his 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, which indicates that presence for 
Kant is a concept of special and not general metaphysics. In the section which 
corresponds to the category of quantity (and thus specifically to the principle of 
extensive magnitude), called the Metaphysical Foundations of Phoronomy, matter 
is defined as the movable in space. Kant says not only that appearances must have 
some spatio-temporal magnitude, but specifically that matter must have some 
velocity.35 Matter moves through space in time; even when it is ostensibly at rest, 
matter is in motion, pulled by gravitational force. Kant says that rest cannot be 
explicated by lack of motion, 
but must be explicated by pennanent presence [die beharrliche 
Gegenwart] in the same place. Since this concept can be 
constructed by the representation of a motion with infinitely small 
velocity throughout a finite time, it can therefore be used for the 
subsequent application of mathematics to natural science.36 
Pennanent presence in the same place is the minimal definition of matter: a 
spatially extended thing that has an infinitely small velocity in a finite time. Every 
material thing must, at the very least, be definable as pennanent presence in the 
same place. This empirical concept of pennanent presence can itself be 
constructed, non-empirically intuited. Our ability to construct mathematically an 
intuition of "infinitely small velocity in a finite time" allows us to think about 
nature in tenns of the quantity of motions, that is, to apply mathematics to natural 
science. Kant's association of presence with motion suggests that even if matter is 
pennanent presence, it is not static, self-identical substance; the anticipation of 
things as pennanent presence is the anticipation of motion in a limited time and 
space. 
35 MFArs Ak. 480ff. 
36 AfFNS Ak. 486. 
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While special metaphysics tells us that matter must be considered to have 
some quantity of motion, general metaphysics tells us that appearances must be 
anticipated as having some quantity of spatio-temporality and some degree of 
reality. Quantity and quality are part of the formal structure of appearances 
supplied by the understanding, making experience possible. The subject's 
anticipatory comportment towards appearances has a mathematical character: the 
comportment of human consciousness towards presence is also a comportment 
towards measurability. Appearances are anticipated to be measurable in their 
extension, duration, and degree. On Heidegger's interpretation, this means that 
human consciousness, with regard to natural bodies, is attuned in advance to the 
mathematical, which leads to the reception of things as instrumental, present-at-
hand and ready for use. What Heidegger calls "the mathematical" is, for him, at 
the ground of the modem scientific and metaphysical understanding of the 
thingness of things?7 Its concept is not exhausted by mathematics or number, but 
refers broadly to learning in the Socratic sense: it refers to that which we already 
know. With numbers, the most familiar fonn of the mathematical, we take 
cognizance of something that is not created from any thing, but is held out in 
advance as something we already have. 
The mathemata, the mathematical, is that "about" things which we 
really already know. Therefore we do not first get it out of things, 
but, in a certain way, we bring it already with us. [ ... J The 
mathematical is that evident aspect of things within which we are 
always already moving and according to which we experience them 
as things at all, and as such things. The mathematical is this 
fundamental position we take toward things by which we take up 
things as already given to us, and as they should be given?8 
The mathematical characterizes modern SCIence and not Aristotelian or 
Scholastic science: with Aristotle, the basis for those things we know about 
37 WT 190fT. The text is based on a lecture given in 1935-6. 
3X WT74-5. 
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natural bodies emerges from the essence of nature itself.39 For Heidegger the 
mathematical project begins with a fundamental change in the scientific attitude 
towards nature that comes with Newton's first law of motion, the law of inertia. 
"Nature is no longer the inner principle out of which the motion of the body 
follows; rather, nature is the mode of the variety of the changing relative positions 
of bodies".4o Newton's first law states that "a body left to itself moves uniformly 
in a straight line": it speaks of something which cannot be experienced, which 
does not exist as such. The lawlike nature of the principle requires it to speak not 
only of a body in general, but of a body as we will never be able to experience it: 
Where is it? There is no such body. There is also no experiment 
which could ever bring such a body to direct perception. But 
modern science [ ... J has such a law at its apex. This law speaks of a 
thing that does not exist. It demands a fundamental representation 
of things which contradict the ordinary. 
The mathematical is based on such a claim, i.e. the application 
of a detennination of the thing, which is not experientially created 
out of the thing and yet lies at the base of every determination of 
the things, making them possible and making room for them.41 
Heidegger's description of the Newtonian-mathematical project is, of course, also 
a description of Kantian objectivity: a principle that empirical things are 
detennined non-empirically lies at the basis of every detennination of every thing. 
The notion that the lawfulness of nature is in advance of the essence of nature, and 
in advance of the experience of nature, equally characterizes modern science and 
modern metaphysics for Heidegger. 
Thus Heidegger describes the mathematical as "a project of thingness which 
skips over the things"; a project within which things show themselves based on 
their advance detennination as lawfu1.42 The "blueprint" of the structure of every 
39 1fT 84-5. 
40 J1 T 88. Heidegger notes that Newton is anticipated by Galileo with respect to the change from 
"essential" nature to ""axiomatic" nature. 
41 liT 89. 
4~ WT9~. 
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thing and its relations is given in advance, detennining the mode of experience. 
Kant's highest principle of synthetic judgments, that "every object stands under 
the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a 
possible experience",43 expresses the mathematical nature of our relation to an 
object: the inner possibility of the object is co-determined out of the possibility of 
the relation to it, and the nature of the relation to the object must be uncovered.44 
With Kant's axioms and anticipations, the faculties "reach out" to things in order 
to establish them as appearances, to give them their thingness. The thingness of 
things is specifically made possible by establishing their measurability in advance. 
In this sense, for Heidegger, objectivity is defined by the mathematicaL and 
subjectivity is defined by a mathematical reaching-out.45 The subject-object 
relation, which on Heidegger's account discloses the being of things, has 
developed a mathematical character through modem metaphysics. 
We can see how Heidegger can use this charge to further his general 
contention that Kant maintains an "ontology of the extant". The mathematical 
character of experience, on Heidegger's view, means that being is determined not 
only as produced presence, but as instrumental: presence that is produced for use. 
For Heidegger, being is detennined as vorhanden in Kant's system because the 
fonn of things is anticipated. Certainly, it is clear that no object within Kant's 
system can be thought in a non-mathematical way, if the mathematical means that 
which is given to cognition in advance of experience. The objectivity of every 
object is anticipated, the intuition of it constituted, the existence of it regulated, by 
the synthetic a priori principles of understanding. The understanding does have a 
··mathematical" comportment towards things, which, as we have seen, can also be 
described as a comportment towards presence. Every object of experience is 
detennined as present through the axioms and anticipations. But the 
understanding'S comportment, and the fact that objects of experience are 
detennined as present, do not mean that Kant understands being in tenns of 
presence or instrumentality. If. as I suggest, we understand being as the original 
relation between subject and object that first makes possible the determination of 
43 CPR A158! B197. 
44 WT 182. 
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objects of experience, then being is not equivalent to presence; rather, it makes the 
presence of things possible. In other words, the relation of being makes it possible 
that things appear as present. 
I have also suggested that things are not determined as produced in Kant's 
system, but as productive. We will see how the productivity of nature is specified 
in the following sections. Heidegger is wrong to claim that Kant reduces nature to 
produced, instrumental presence, and to claim that this presence is equivalent to 
being. On the contrary, nature is detennined as productive, and it is the relation of 
being that first makes this determination possible. 
2.3 Substance: transcendental and material 
We move on now to Kant's dynamical principles, principles which order 
existing things in terms of their relations. While the mathematical principles 
constitute all appearances in advance to be measurable and thereby justify the 
application of mathematics to appearances, the dynamical principles regulate 
appearances according to their relations, and allow for the application of 
dynamical laws. Traditionally, commentators have argued that with the dynamical 
principles Kant attempts to justify the application of Newtonian physics to 
appearances by setting out its metaphysical presuppositions. Other commentators 
- most significantly Gerd Buchdahl - have noted that there is a considerable 
"looseness of fit" between Newtonian science and Kant's Analytic.46 Buchdahl 
argues that the Analytic purports to establish only the experiential notion of an 
objective nature in general, whereas it is the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science that investigates the possibility of material nature as conforming to 
Newtonian laws.47 Certainly the synthetic a priori principles of the analogies order 
appearances such that they can be objects of natural science, but only in the most 
general sense: appearances are ordered such that they can be objects of experience 
46 This is particularly evident in Kant's rejection of atomism. See KDR ch. 10 and 11, and Neiman, 
ch. 2. For a view that Kant attempts to justify Newtonian principles along with a rigorous 
examination of Kant's reliance on these specific principles, see ch. 3 and -+ of Friedman' s Kant and 
the Exact Scicnces. 
47 KDR 222-3. 
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at all. In the Prolegomena, Kant speaks of a physiological "system of nature" that 
is constituted by the Analytic's principles. But he makes clear that this system 
refers to the pre-empirical notion of nature in general, and not to the special 
metaphysical notion of material nature. (Still less can this system be equated with 
the empirical order of nature which, as I suggested earlier, is generated by reason 
and its regulative principles.) He says: 
[ ... ] the principles by means of which all appearances are subsumed 
under these [transcendental] concepts constitute a physiological 
system, that is, a system of nature, which precedes all empirical 
cognition of nature, first makes it possible, and hence may m 
strictness be called the universal and pure natural science.48 
We have already seen in what sense pure natural science is mathematical. It is 
concerned with that which precedes empirical cognition of nature. The Analytic 
seeks to establish this pre-empirical notion of "nature in general, that is, [ ... ] the 
confonnity to law of all appearances in space and time".49 
The dynamical principles are the analogies of experience, which are regulative 
principles for understanding the relations between appearances, and the postulates 
of empirical thought, which regulate the relation of appearances to cognition. 
These principles, though regulative of intuitions, are constitutive of experience; 
they order appearances in necessary time sequences, without which we would 
have merely a collection of perceptions. Intuition, through its a priori principles, 
gives us presence as not-nothing, as spatio-temporality in general. Experience, 
however. goes beyond the intuition of presence; it gives us existing appearances in 
spatio-temporal relations which are detennined by synthetic a priori principles. 
Perceptions do not carry with them any objective time-order; this must be 
detenllined through principles which regulate the temporal order of existing 
appearances and thereby unify the perceptions into experience. The analogies, 
then, allow us to construct a time-order which in turn allows for our judgment of 
-IX Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. trans. Paul Carus (revised by James 
W. Ellington), in Kant, Philosophy of Material Nature, §2J, Ak. 306. 
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the existence of as-yet unexperienced appearances. Explaining what he means by 
the tenn analogy, Kant says: 
[ ... J from three given members we can obtain a priori knowledge 
only of the relation to a fourth, not of the fourth member itself. The 
relation yields, however, a rule for seeking the fourth member in 
experience, and a mark whereby it can be detected. An analogy of 
experience is, therefore, only a rule according to which a unity of 
experience may arise from perception. [ ... J It is not a principle 
constitutive of the objects, that is, of the appearances, but only 
regulative.50 
Evidently the analogies do not have any constitutive power over objects 
themselves; they regulate objects (in a time sequence) by constituting a unified 
experience of temporal relations amongst appearances. Existence itself IS 
dynamically regulated in that it is ordered into the dynamical relations of 
inherence, consequence, and composition, without which order existence could 
not be experienced. Yet as much as experience requires the dynamical principles, 
the dynamical principles require experience: unlike the mathematical principles, 
which can construct intuitions a priori, the dynamical principles, while themselves 
a priori, require some perception to act upon. The material existence of nature is 
necessary for the employment of the dynamical principles. The dynamical 
principles indicate this necessity; the epistemic system which constitutes "nature 
in general" points to an existential ground of material nature. 
Such indications are particularly strong in the first and second analogies. The 
first analogy, the principle of the pennanence of substance, says that for the 
possibility of experience penn anent substance must be viewed as the ground of all 
existing things, their changes and detenninations. Its principle says specifically: 
"In all change of appearances substance is pennanent; its quantum in nature is 
neither increased nor diminished".51 Kant is often wrongly accused of eliding this 
50 CPR A 180/ B222. 
51 CPR A 182 I B224. 
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principle with the Newtonian principle of the conservation of mass.52 This 
objection, as Buchdahl and Allison have also pointed out, fails to recognize the 
distinction between the transcendental employment of the category of substance, 
which works to constitute the formal notion of the object of experience in general, 
and the material employment of an empirical concept of substance, which works 
towards the construction of the concept of matter. 53 It is essential to recognize this 
distinction, and to establish in which sense Kant uses the term "substance" in any 
given case. I will argue that in the first analogy, Kant's primary concern is to 
establish the conditions of possible experience in general, and thus he explains 
only the formal necessity of a transcendental principle of permanent substance. In 
so doing, he also indicates the material necessity of an empirical concept of 
substance. But this necessity is only hinted at. We must avoid the pitfall of 
assuming that Kant is talking about material substance in the first analogy - an 
easy assumption to make, given Kant's imprecise phrasing. 
Because analogies are not constitutive of objects, but are only rules "according 
to which a unity of experience may arise from perception", pennanent substance 
cannot be said to inhere in objects themselves.54 Rather, as Kant says, 
"pennanence is a necessary condition under which alone appearances are 
determinable as things or objects in a possible experience".55 Appearances are 
determinable as things through the principle of permanence, without which they 
would be mere intuited presence. Through this regulative principle we experience 
the change, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of appearances, as well as their 
duration: such events can be experienced only on the assumption of a pennanent, 
unchanging substratum which ensures the constancy of an object through its 
changes of state. Descartes' example of melting wax is suggestive here: for Kant, 
if we did not experience the wax as having a pennanent substratum, we would 
have no experience of its two states as being in any way connected. 56 The two 
states of the wax are intuited in time, and thus in a subjective succession of 
~~ See, e.g., P.F. Strawson, The Bounds o.fSense (London: Routledge, 1966), 128ff.. ,. 
53 See 8uchdahL Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, 643; Henry E. AllIson, Kant s 
Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale UP, 1983),210. 
~~ CPR A 180/8222-3. 
55 CPR AI89 / 8232. 
56 Cf. Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy. trans. and ed. John Cottingham 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1996),20. 
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apprehension. But from mere perception we have no reason to think (a) that the 
two states are states of a single determinate thing; or (b) that the two states occur 
objectively in the order of our apprehension. Yet we do experience the wax as 
remaining the same wax throughout, and the succession of its states as occurring 
in a necessary order. 
We do, in fact, expenence duration and succeSSIOn, but these aspects of 
experience cannot have been derived from experience, since time, as the 
pennanent form of inner intuition, cannot itself be derived from experience. 
Consequently, Kant says, "there must be found in the objects of perception, that is, 
in the appearances, the substratum which represents time in general".57 This 
statement is easy to misunderstand, for it could be taken to mean that we "find" 
something materially permanent and spatial that stands for ("represents") time. 
But this cannot be what Kant means, for substance is a pure concept of 
understanding, and pennanence is its a priori schematized principle. What Kant 
means is that the pennanence we experience all objects to have must be supplied 
by an a priori principle, without which experience as we have it would not be 
possible. Pennanent substance must be presupposed as a transcendental condition 
of experience, but it is not encountered directly in experience as material presence. 
When Kant says that permanence is "found" in objects of perception, he means 
that we experience appearances as permanent, and the transcendental principle is 
the condition of possibility of this experience. Appearances simply could not exist 
for us if they were not apprehended as abiding substrata for change. Kant is not 
saying that in objects of perception we find a material substratum that represents 
time spatially; at least, he is not saying this yet. 
Similarly, Kant is not saying that the permanence of something imperceivable 
(time) is spatially represented by something perceivable (substance), as Guyer 
claims.58 This position mistakenly ascribes material substantiality where Kant is 
speaking of the transcendental principle of substance. Indeed, if substance were 
considered a material substratum, Guyer's criticism would hold. But substance 
here is an ingredient of experience as a transcendental presupposition, not as 
material presence. Pennanent substance "'represents" time in general because 
57 CPR B225. 
58 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of I\nowledge. 219; see also Findlay 168. 
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pennanence is the transcendental element of experience that allows us to represent 
time empirically - that is, it allows us to perceive time as applying to objects in 
its three modes of relation. Furthennore, "represent" must be understood in the 
Kantian sense, as the way things are brought to apprehension by a subject; not in 
the sense - which Guyer's use suggests - in which a member of parliament 
represents (i.e. stands in for) her constituents. To rephrase Kant in a way that 
circumvents <!uyer's criticism: pennanent substance is an a priori schematized 
category which, employed as a transcendental principle in experience, allows us to 
bring time empirically to apprehension. This is why Kant says: 
In other words, the pennanent is the substratum of the empirical 
representation of time itself; in it alone is any detennination of 
time possible. Pennanence, as the abiding correlate of all existence 
of appearances, of all change and of all concomitance, expresses 
time in general. 59 
Note that Kant speaks of pennanence as the correlate of the existence of 
appearances, and not as the material basis or ultimate subject of existence. Only as 
the transcendental correlate of existence can pennanence bring time empirically to 
apprehension, thus expressing time in general. If pennanence were material, its 
relation to time would be contingent, for the consistency of our "experienced 
time" would depend on whether or not we found pennanence in whatever we 
experienced. When we cease to think of transcendental substance as the material 
basis of existence, Guyer's objection is significantly mitigated. As Kant says, 
All existence and all change in time have thus to be viewed as 
simply a mode of the existence of that which remains and persists. 
[ ... J This pennanence is [ ... J simply the mode in which we 
represent to ourselves the existence of things in the [field of] 
60 
appearance. 
w CPR AI83 /8126. 
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I believe that Kant's further claims in the first analogy must similarly be 
analyzed in tenns of their regulative status with respect to appearances. All that is 
constituted here is experience; no material thing is said to be pennanent, either 
absolutely or relatively.61 Experience is possible only if appearances are viewed as 
including pennanent substance, and if we view pennanent substance as something 
which does not itself come to be or cease to be. Whatever alters in appearance is 
not viewed as the substantial in the appearance. What we view as substantial in 
appearance underlies all detenninations of time in general: if substances were 
viewed as coming to be and ceasing to be, as Kant says, "'the one condition of the 
empirical unity of time would be removed".62 We would simply not be able to 
experience duration or succession objectively if our principle of substantiality 
allowed us to think of substances as themselves coming to be and ceasing to be. If 
our principle did allow us to think that, Kant says, we would experience existence 
in two parallel streams of time: the timeline of alterations which would happen in 
"'empirical" time, and the timeline of substances which would be related to an 
"empty" time. Kant denied the possibility of experiencing empty time in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic.63 So we are left with a transcendental principle stating 
that we must view all appearances as having a substantial element which neither 
comes to be nor ceases to be. In contrast to commentators such as Strawson, I can 
see no evidence of any intention on Kant's part to prove Newton's law of 
conservation of mass (other than the admittedly misleading wording of the 
principle itself in the B edition). Kant's attempt at just such a proof in 
Metaphysical Foundations makes it even clearer that the law would have no place 
in the Analytic. In fact Kant specifies in Metaphysical Foundations that the 
Newtonian law applies only to "what is substance in matter": Kant proposes a law 
SUbject, but only an abiding image [BUd] of sensibility; it is nothing at all save as an intuition, in 
which unconditionedness is never to be met with'" (A525-6 / B553-4). 
(,1 I refer to the ongoing argument over whether Kant succeeds in arguing for absolute or relative 
pemlanence of substance, initiated by Jonathan Bennett (Kant 's Ana~l'fic [Cambridge: CUP, 
1966]). I have to say that I am baffled by the persistence of this line of questioning. To my mind 
this question is simply irrelevant to what Kant is trying to prove in this part of the text, which is 
simply that a certain synthetic a priori principle allows us to experience duration and change. The 
purely logical concept of an "absolute subject which is never treated as an accident" should never 
be applied to objects. but only to concepts in logical relation. 
h~ CPR A 188 / B231. 
('3 CPR A32-3 / B49; see also the first antinomy. A426-35 / B454-63. 
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that applies to matter on the basis of the transcendental principle of substance that 
applies to appearances in genera1.64 The first analogy is a necessary principle of 
general metaphysics which allows for the law of conservation of mass to be 
foundational for special metaphysics. 
Let me stress once again the transcendental nature of substance as it is 
discussed in the first analogy. This is in fact the second of three uses that Kant 
makes of the term "substance". The first, which I will not discuss here, is the pure 
logical concept of substance, which defines substance as that which can be 
thought only as subject, and never as predicate of something else. This purely 
logical and unschematized concept of substance should not be confused with the 
transcendental principle: Kant himself says of the pure logical concept of 
substance that he can put it to no use, "for it tells me nothing as to the nature of 
that which is thus to be viewed as primary subject".65 This pure logical concept is 
schematized to give the transcendental principle of substance that applies to 
objects of experience, which I have been discussing. Kant's third use for the term 
·'substance", which will be central to what follows, is to refer to empirical, 
material substance. Material substance is also called substantia phaenomenon, and 
is equivalent to matter for Kant. 
Many commentators object to so-called inconsistencies in Kant's text on the 
basis of failing to note the difference between transcendental and empirical 
substance.66 This important difference is not obvious in the Critique, but it is 
there. At the end of the first analogy, Kant indicates that the principle of 
pennanence has an empirical criterion: 
64 MFNS Ak. 541-1. It should be added that Kant's attempted proof in MFNS is strictly mechanical, 
and makes no reference to time. 
65 See CPR A147 / BI86-7. Rae Langton draws attention to this distinction, arguing that the pure 
concept applies to what is truly substantial, the thing in itself, of which non-substantial matter is a 
property. I admire the originality of Langton's argument but find that like Guyer and Allison, she 
reifies substance without paying attention to the transcendental nature of the principle and the 
merely logical nature of the pure concept. In arguing that pure logical concepts pertain to the thing 
in itself, Langton interprets Kant's thing in itself as a Leibnizian monad. See ch. 3 of Rae Langton, 
Kantian Humility (Oxford: OUP, 1998). 
66 Prominent examples are Guyer and Strawson. Strawson (128-9) proposes that Kant succumbed 
to "temptation to identify whatever he succeeded in establishing as necessary conditions of the 
possibility of an objective world with what he already conceived to be the fundamental. 
unquestionable assumptions of physical science"(!). Allison (Kant's Transcendental Idealism, ch. 
9) does recognize the difference between transcendental and material explanations in Kant's texts, 
but nevertheless maintains that in the first analogy Kant argues for things having some absolutely 
permanent substratum. The inconsistency in Allison's account is puzzling. 
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Pennanence IS thus a necessary condition under which alone 
appearances are detenninable as things or objects in a possible 
experience. We shall have occasion in what follows to make such 
observations as may seem necessary in regard to the empirical 
criterion of this necessary pennanence - the criterion, 
consequently, of the substantiality of appearances.67 
86 
Kant suggests here that something empirical is criterial of the transcendental 
principle of pennanent substance. Some element of appearance must be viewed as 
substantial; the empirical criterion is, presumably, that in experience which we 
take to indicate that substantial element. This empirical criterion cannot justify the 
transcendental principle, since the principle is pure and a priori; it simply provides 
a posteriori backup for the objective validity of the principle. Kant returns to this 
notion of empirical criteria in the second analogy where, first, he notes that the 
sequence of happenings in time is the "sole empirical criterion of an effect in 
relation to the causality of the cause which precedes it".68 The second analogy 
states that our perception of succession is only objective experience if there is an 
underlying rule which compels us to observe this order of perceptions and no other 
- the rule that the condition under which an event necessarily follows is to be 
found in what precedes the event. 69 So the empirical criterion of causality is 
precisely that experience which is made possible by the law of causality. After 
giving an example of empirical succession, Kant returns to a discussion of the 
empirical criterion of substance: 
I must not leave unconsidered the empirical criterion of a 
substance, in so far as substance appears to manifest itself not 
through pennanence of appearance, but more adequately and easily 
through action. 
67 CPR A189 / 8232. 
hX CPR A203 /8249. 
hI} CPR A193-201 /8238-47. 
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Wherever there is action - and therefore activity and force -
there is also substance, and it is in substance alone that the seat of 
this fruitful source of appearances must be sought. 70 
87 
This passage is potentially problematic as it appears to imply that substance, as 
discussed in the first analogy, is the "source" of the existence of appearances. 
Such an interpretation, if correct, would go directly against my argument for the 
strictly transcendental and formal character of the principle of substance. It is this 
interpretation which leads commentators such as Strawson to believe that Kant 
was "confused" and "uneasy" about his doctrine of substance.71 
I believe, however, that there is another explanation, which also provides an 
important link between the analogies and Metaphysical Foundations. At A204 / 
B249 Kant's discussion has shifted subtly from a transcendental to an empirical 
context. While generally in the analogies he is concerned with the fonnal 
conditions of experience as such, he pauses here to consider the empirical criteria 
of his principles. He discusses and gives an example of the empirical criterion of 
causality: a glass being filled with water. He then asks about the empirical 
criterion of substance. Kant's point in the paragraph that follows is that since we 
do not directly perceive permanent substance, an "'experience of permanence" 
cannot be the empirical criterion of the principle of pennanence. Instead, the 
empirical criterion is action, since action consists in the transitory, and thus can 
only be attributed to that which is pennanent.72 The experience of action "is a 
sufficient empirical criterion to establish the substantiality of a subject" and leads 
to "the concept of a substance as appearance".73 In other words, Kant is saying that 
the experience of action is criterial of both the transcendental principle of 
pennanence, and the existence of material substance (i.e. matter). While the 
experience of action does not justify the principle of pennanence (which is 
justified a priori), it does justify our inference to the existence of a pennanent 
material substance, i.e. matter. 
70 CPR A204 / 8249-50. 
71 Strawson 131. 
n CPR A205 /8250. This point is repeated frequently in Kant's lectures on metaphysics. 
73 CPR A205-6! B250-1. 
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The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science confirms this position. 
Metaphysical Foundations tells us that the empirical concept of substance is 
equivalent to that of matter; it "signifies the ultimate subject of existence".74 This 
phrase should be contrasted with the description at A 183 / B226 of the 
transcendental principle of substance as the correlate of existence. Kant 
sometimes uses the term "material substance" to differentiate empirical substance 
from the transcendental concept of substance.75 Material substance, matter, cannot 
be experienced as such. Its concept is indeed empirical, but this concept must be 
constructed such that a non-empirical intuition is generated. The construction of 
the concept of matter - material substance, the ultimate subject of existence - is 
the primary concern of Metaphysical Foundations. Kant wants to find the 
conditions of possibility of generating an a priori intuition of matter, so that the 
foundational concepts of natural science might be brought into hannony with the a 
priori elements of experience. 
Heidegger's description of Newtonian science, as demanding a fundamental 
representation of things which cannot be experienced, has resonance through 
Metaphysical Foundations. Matter cannot be experienced; nor can the 
fundamental forces which allow for the construction of the concept of matter and 
which are thought to allow for matter's real spatial extension. In the second 
chapter of Metaphysical Foundations, the Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics, 
Kant defines matter as "the movable insofar as it fills a space".76 To fill a space 
implies the resistance of a special moving force, that of repulsion. But the 
possibility of matter equally requires a force of attraction, for without it matter 
"would disperse itself to infinity" and would not be held within any extensional 
74 MFNS Ak. 502-3. 
75 Despite Kant's obvious differentiation of these tenns, and despite the absence of any 
argumentation for their identity in Kant, Allison (Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 209) claims that 
pemlanent substance (as set out in the first analogy) and matter can be identified. This position 
allows Allison to claim that Kant argues for the absolute pennanence of substance, thus responding 
to commentators such as Bennett and Strawson who charge Kant with an illegitimate substitution of 
absolute for relative pemlanence of substance. However, I can see no textual justification for 
Allison's claim. Guyer (Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 233-5), by contrast, suggests that 
substance need not necessarily be correlated with matter, but can be correlated with whatever 
empirical science detemlines to be enduring. While this position is more accurate than Allison's, 
Guyer maintains that Kant's argument for transcendental substance is effectively an unsuccessful 
argument for the pemmnence of matter - an position the fundamental premises of which I 
disagree with. 
76 MFNS Ak. 496. 
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1· . 77 Th lmlts. ese two forces, the repulsive and the attractive, are the two 
fundamental forces which constitute matter, and to which all lesser forces are 
reduced. The fundamental forces are the conditions of possibility of matter as 
filling a space in a determinate degree; "the possibility of matter itself rests upon 
these two foundations".78 
In Kant's special metaphysics the concept of matter is reduced to these forces 
and the ongoing conflict between them. The fundamental forces, like matter itself, 
cannot be experienced as such. Now if the concept of matter or material substance 
is ultimately reducible to fundamental forces, none of which can be experienced 
directly, it might be that matter is empirically characterized by observable forces 
that operate in nature. 79 This is why Kant can say, in the second analogy -
assuming my interpretation of "substance" at this point in the text as empirical 
(material) substance is correct - "wherever there is action - and therefore 
activity and force - there is also substance". Kant is saying that activity and 
force, as experienced in nature, indicate the existence of material substance, which 
itself cannot be experienced.80 Now with regard to the transcendental principle of 
substance, material substance cannot be criterial, for it cannot be experienced. So 
empirically observed action, which is criteria I for material substance, also 
becomes the empirical criterion of transcendental substance. With this, Kant also 
draws a contrast with the empirical criterion of the principle of causality: 
causality's empirical criterion is simply the experience of irreversible succession. 
But the empirical criterion of the principle of pennanent substance is not the 
experience of that which is pennanent (i.e. material substance); it is, rather, the 
experience of action. These empirical criteria provide a posteriori backup for the 
objective validity of the transcendental principles of substance and causality, but 
such backup does not have justificatory status: as Kant suggests, the experience of 
77 MFNS Ak. 508. 
78 MFNS Ak. 518. Although Kant e\'idently got the idea of the fundamental forces of matter from 
Newton, he diverges from a strictly Newtonian account by insisting on original gravitational force. 
as Buchdahl emphasizes (KDR, ch. 13). 
79 These lesser forces can, of course, be reduced to attraction and repUlsion: see MF/\'S Ak. 534. 
110 See also CPR A265 / B321: "We are acquainted with substance in space only through forces 
which are active in this and that space, either bringing other objects to it (attraction), or preventing 
them from penetrating into it (repulsion and impenetrability). We are not acquainted with any other 
properties constituting the concept of the substance which appears in space and which we call 
matter. " 
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action and succession help us to gain "logical clearness" concerning the rules we 
must have employed a priori in order to have such experience.81 
Now we are in a position to understand the passage quoted above in which 
Kant says "it is in substance alone that the seat of this fruitful source of 
appearances must be sought". It is in material substance, or matter, that we may 
seek the source of appearances. Yet we can only reach this empirical concept of 
substance through the principle of causality. For the principle of causality tells us 
that appearances change through action, and action cannot be found in a subject 
which itself changes. When we experience a change of state - wax melting by the 
action of fire, to return to the Cartesian example - the same rule by which we 
attribute causality to the fire leads us to attribute pennanence to something in the 
wax, as the unchanging subject on which the fire acts. The experience of causality 
involves an experience of action, and action is both the empirical criterion of the 
principle of pennanent substance, and the mark of the material substance 
constituting all appearances and their changes of state. The experience of action 
indicates the transcendental necessity of the a priori principle of pennanent 
substance, without which the experience would be fonnally impossible; but it also 
indicates the empirical necessity of material substance, without which existence 
itself would be materially impossible. The transcendental principles of substance 
and causality are foundational for those empirical principles of material existence 
which Kant will develop in Metaphysical Foundations. Only through these 
principles can we understand matter, and investigate nature as to its material 
possibility. 
To summarize: III the first analogy, Kant argues for the transcendental 
necessity of the principle of pennanence of substance. Our experience of alteration 
and duration is possible only on the presupposition of this principle. Kant does not 
argue that a material substratum is found in objects of perception, but rather that 
our experience is constituted by the transcendental presupposition that 
appearances include pennanent substance. Kant then indicates that the 
transcendental principle of pennanence of substance has an empirical criterion, 
which is not justificatory but correlative of the principle. The empirical criterion 
81 The need for these empirical criteria is demonstrated with the Refutation of Idealism, as I will 
show later. 
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cannot be material substance (i.e. matter), for we do not experience "matter" as 
such. Instead, the empirical criterion is action, from which we infer an unchanging 
material subject of action, which provides a posteriori backup for the objective 
validity of the principle. Action is criterial of both the principle and of the 
unperceived material substance (matter). The specific laws of matter will come 
from the transcendental principles which make possible "nature in general". 
As if to confirm this, Kant says at the end of the analogies that nature in the 
empirical sense is to be understood as 
the connection of appearances as regards their existence according 
to necessary rules, that is, according to laws. There are certain laws 
which first make a nature possible, and these laws are a priori. 
Empirical laws can exist and be discovered only through 
experience, and indeed in consequence of those original laws 
through which experience itself first becomes possible.82 
Empirical nature must be understood as that "mathematical" connection of 
appearances which has always already been determined to be lawlike by the 
principles of understanding. It is only because the transcendental principle of 
pennanence is necessary for experience that we are able to arrive at an empirical 
concept of material substance, and it is only because there is a formal nature in 
general that a material nature can be available to experience. Only through this 
epistemic framework can we arrive at nature's material basis, its existential 
ground. The ground of all existence appears to be the conflict between the forces 
of attraction and repulsion. To this conflict of fundamental forces we now turn. 
2.4 The conflict of fundamental forces 
In the analogies we see that as we analyze the a priori framework through 
which nature is experienced, the unexperienceable material conditions of nature 
X~ CPR A216 / 8263. 
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are indicated. We never experience matter as such. Rather, we experience things 
as substantial, causal, and coexistent. Through these transcendental determinations 
we are able to characterize what we experience as material substance or matter. 
And in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant goes one step 
further and states that we can characterize the empirical concept of matter in terms 
of fundamental forces. Things are thought through the empirical concept of matter, 
and matter is thought through the empirical concept of force. "All that is real in 
the objects of our external senses [ ... ] must be regarded as moving force".83 
The concept of matter, for Kant, is reducible to the concept of the conflict of 
the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion. It is crucial to recognize within 
the Newtonian context that for Kant, matter is not something in addition to these 
forces: it is these forces. 84 Kant's theory of matter is not atomistic but dynamic, 
anticipating later developments in the theory of forces and fields. 85 Furthennore, 
matter is characterized as the ongoing conflict of forces for Kant, which 
distinguishes his matter theory from other contemporary accounts. While 
Boscovich, for instance, assumed that the forces of attraction and repulsion 
alternate in their activity, Kant seems to have been unique in believing the activity 
of the two forces to be simultaneous.86 Matter is the ongoing interaction of the 
forces of attraction and repulsion, which are co-original - that is, neither force 
makes the other possible.87 
83 MFNS Ak. 523. 
84 See MFNS Ak. 523-5, where Kant contrasts his own system to that of Newton's "mathematico-
mechanical mode of explication". Newton held that matter consists of simple atoms bound together 
by inter-atomic forces (the action of which was later explained by the medium of ether). See 
Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield, The Architecture of Matter (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), 187-200. For an argument that Newton is not the object of Kant's criticism, see 
Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, 137-41. Kant argues against the assumption that matter 
consists of simple parts both at MFNS 506-8, and in his discussion of the second antinomy, CPR 
A523-7 /8551-5. 
85 So suggests Ian Hacking, who also argues that this scientific development accompanied Kant's 
rejection of knowable noumena (Representing and Intervening [Cambridge: CUP, 1983], 100). 
Kant's dynamic physics is considered to have played an important role in the history of science, 
inspiring nineteenth-century field theorists including Faraday to view forces rather than fluids as 
the active principles of matter. L. Pearce Williams gives an account of Kant's scientific influence 
in his Michael Faradal' (London: Chapman and Hall, 1965). According to Williams (63), Kant's 
matter theory was intr~duced to British scientists largely through the influence of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, who believed that in reducing the essence of matter to the action of force, "Kant had 
removed the last obstacle to the creation of a truly universal science embracing both the material 
universe and God". 
Nt> Forster, Kant's Final Synthesis, 38-9. 
X7 MFA'S Ak. 511-3. 
Chapter 2 93 
There is a problem, however, in determining the actuality of the fundamental 
forces, due to their very fundamentality. The concepts of the fundamental forces 
are, like the concept of matter, empirical concepts that are not taken directly from 
experience. But unlike the concept of matter, the concepts of the forces cannot be 
constructed or "conceived". The concepts of the forces are fundamental and 
cannot be derived from any other concepts. This, as Kant says, is the meaning of 
their "inconceivability": "they are called fundamental forces precisely because 
they cannot be derived from any other force, i.e. they cannot be conceived".88 
They can be neither experienced nor constructed. This means that we cannot 
determine how the fundamental forces are possible, and this prevents us from 
asserting their actuality. In this sense the possibility of the fundamental forces is 
incomprehensible: 
Who claims to comprehend the possibility of fundamental forces? 
They can only be assumed, if they inevitably belong to a concept 
concerning which there can be proved that it is a fundamental 
concept not further derivable from any other. [ ... ] We can indeed 
judge well enough a priori concerning their connection and 
consequences; one may think of whatever relations of these forces 
among one another he wants to, provided he does not contradict 
himself. But he must not, therefore, presume to assume either of 
them as actual, because the authorization to set up a hypothesis 
irremissibly requires that the possibility of what is assumed be 
entirely certain. But in the case of fundamental forces, their 
possibility can never be comprehended. 89 
We can make judgments about the relations of the forces based on their concepts, 
but we cannot assume that these relations are actual. Our inability to construct 
these concepts, due to their fundamentality, means that we are unable to 
comprehend the possibility of the forces. We can relate the concepts of the forces 
88 MFNS Ak. 513. For a position that situates the inconceivability of the fundamental forces in 
Kant's rejection of mathematico-mechanical explanations of matter, see Daniel Warren, "Kant's 
Dynamics", in Watkins (ed.), 93-110. 
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to the data of experience - particularly the sensation of impenetrability90 - but 
we can neither experience the forces as objects, nor construct a non-empirical 
intuition of them. They are concepts that have been found to work towards the 
construction of a non-empirical intuition of matter, and, like two unknown 
algebraic quantities, must be assumed in order that the construction should work. 
The concepts of the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion work 
towards the construction of the concept of matter; only through assuming these 
concepts can we understand how matter fills a space. Despite the impossibility of 
"conceiving" them (i.e. deriving them from other concepts), we can determine 
certain things about the forces. They must, first, be spatio-temporal: the forces 
must be thought as filling space and as acting (conflicting with one another) in 
time. Furthermore, in their concepts, the forces fulfill the presence condition of the 
axioms and anticipations: they can be anticipated a priori to have some degree of 
spatio-temporal reality. (If they could not be thus anticipated, they could not be 
thought to have a "detenninate degree", which Kant clearly says they are.)91 The 
concepts of the forces are also determined by other schematized categories: as 
ongoing, interacting forces that cause material effects, they must be thought under 
the principles of permanence, causality and reciprocity.92 The applicability of the 
categories to the concepts of the forces suggests that they are objects of possible 
experience. The problem is that in also determining them to be fundamental, Kant 
precludes their real possibility. As long as we think that the concepts of the forces 
cannot be derived from any others, we will be prevented from admitting that they 
are really possible, and prevented from determining laws of their activity.93 
The fundamental forces seem to be concepts of the unconditioned. Kant 
suggests just such a view of them in the first Critique. He refers to "certain new 
89 MFNS Ak. 524. 
90 MFNS Ak. 510. Impenetrability relates to the concept of repulsive force, but the force of 
attraction is more problematic, giving us no analogous sensation whatsoever. 
91 See, e.g., MFNS Ak. 518. 
92 I am grateful to Dr. Gary Banham for drawing my attention to this. 
93 Kant frequently states that we cannot understand the possibility of the fundamental forces. 
Schelling aims to get beyond this limitation in his 1797 Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (trans. 
Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath [Cambridge: CUP, 1988]). While he conceives of matter as a 
product of these same original forces and agrees with Kant that they cannot be experienced, he 
finds that they are possible only as the expression of the corresponding original activities of the 
understanding (171-92). Kant himself arrives at a comparable position in the Opus Postumum. a 
development I will address in chapter 5. 
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fundamental forces" as examples of ens rationis, empty concepts without objects, 
and likens them to noumena.94 In the Critique, Kant clearly assigns these concepts 
to the faculty of reason: the concept of gravity has the same regulative status as the 
idea of a divine author, "assumed simply in order that we may have an 
explanation".95 Kant had clearly changed his mind about the fundamental forces 
by the time he wrote Metaphysical Foundations, for in this text they are 
determinate concepts of understanding, concepts of that which comprises matter 
and makes up appearances. Yet the forces retain their problematic fundamentality. 
Since they are thought to make possible all determinations of matter - all the 
qualities we experience things to have - the forces have a similarity to Kant's 
idea of the sum-total of all reality. In moving from reason to understanding, this 
idea becomes the concept of that which makes all existent things and qualities 
possible. The fundamental forces are not ideas of reason in Metaphysical 
Foundations, but are concepts of understanding, based on the a priori analysis of 
the concept of matter. They are concepts of the very basis of matter, concepts of 
the ground of all that is real in the objects of our external senses. It remains the 
case, however, that we are not entitled to think that an object exists that 
corresponds to this concept; we must simply entertain this concept if we are to 
have a coherent explanation of the possibility of matter and existence. 
The fundamental forces seem to emerge from the analysis of matter as 
concepts of the ground of all existence. They explain how matter fills a space, and 
how it resists and repels other matter. They explain how matter is extended; how 
bodies have some detenninate size and shape. In other words, the concepts of the 
forces explain a priori how matter in general fills space, and how bodies in 
general fill space to a detenninate degree. The forces are thought as dynamical 
productivity, as they are thought to produce the extension, shape, and qualities of 
bodies. But if we take the forces to be the ground or origin of existence, it will be 
a problem for Kant's existential theory that the fundamental forces cannot be 
assumed to exist; existence, ultimately, would be explained by the concept of 
94 CPR A290-1 / B347. 
95 CPR A 773 / 880 I. Friedman. in Kant and the Exact Sciences (I), claims that Kant was 
sympathetic to Newtonian attraction as action at a distance throughout his career. If this is true, 
Kant evidently found it difficult to square gravitation with the transcendental conditions of natural 
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conflicting forces. It may be more charitable to Kant to consider the existence of 
conflicting forces a hypothesis to be tested, on the basis that the concept of 
conflicting forces emerges from an analysis of the concept of matter. To 
hypothesize the existence of something from its concept, however, would run 
contrary to Kant's thesis about being, and given Kant's denial at Ak. 524 of the 
validity of hypotheses based on uncertain possibilities, it does not seem likely that 
this is Kant's position. The fundamental forces are only concepts, which cannot be 
thought to produce existence. 
Indeed, one consequence of our not being able to ascribe actuality to the 
fundamental forces is that Kant cannot explain how the conflict of the forces 
produces any specific body. Such an explanation would require determinate 
dynamical laws, and thus the real possibility of the forces. Kant concedes that 
mechanical-atomistic theories of matter such as Newton's have an advantage over 
his dynamical theory for the reason that they are able to derive, "from a completely 
homogeneous material, [ ... J a great specific multiplicity of matters, according to 
their density as well as their mode of action". If, on the other hand, we "transform" 
the material itself (i.e. atoms) into fundamental forces, 
then all means are wanting for the construction of this concept and 
for presenting as possible in intuition what we thought universally. 
[ ... J I am unable to furnish an adequate explication of the 
possibility of matter and its specific variety from the fundamental 
forces.96 
The concept of the conflict of the fundamental forces is adequate to explain the 
concept of matter, but is inadequate to explain the real production of bodies, their 
specific densities and modes of action. 
However we should consider what Kant has achieved with the concept of the , 
conflict of forces. A "complete analysis of the concept of matter in general" was 
all that Kant set out to provide in Metaphysical Foundations, an analysis he hoped 
science as set out in 1781; presumably this was an impetus to his grounding physical laws in their 
metaphysical foundations with MFNS. 
96 MFNS Ak. 525. 
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would eventually found a more complete doctrine of body.97 He did not intend to 
explain the production or diversity of bodies; nor did he set out to determine the 
ground of all existence. From the concept of matter Kant has arrived at the concept 
of conflicting forces, which, even if its objective reality cannot be assumed, 
specifies the way we conceptualize existence. Existence is not thought to be 
caused or produced by the conflict of fundamental forces; it is thought as this 
conflict. As I argued in chapter one, the ground of existence, for Kant, can only be 
other existence, within the realm of appearances; Kant's theory of forces gives us 
a more specific way to consider the interaction of existence and the impossibility 
of arriving at an absolute ground. It is precisely the advantage of Kant's 
"metaphysico-dynamical" method that, rather than blindly positing some 
"unconditioned original position" from which to derive existence, existence is 
shown to have no ground beyond or outside of itself. 
Weare entitled, then, to think existence as ongoing dynamical production, 
even if we cannot assume the actuality of the dynamical constituents or explain 
how production of specific bodies takes place. That is, existence is not thought as 
static, homogeneous presence, as Heidegger claims it is, but rather as dynamical, 
conflicting productivity. What entitles us to think this is not the character of matter 
as it is experienced, but the analysis of the empirical concept of matter determined 
according to transcendental principles. The concept of existence as dynamical 
productivity emerges from the epistemic structure of the principles of spatio-
temporal reality, of permanence, of causality, and of reciprocity. Through our 
epistemic comportment towards it, existence is "mathematically" determined as 
dynamical productivity, and detennining existence in this way allows us to explain 
the possibility of matter. The "mathematical" determination of nature that 
Heidegger identifies results in a concept of nature as dynamical productivity, and 
not as produced presence. Dynamical productivity is thus the character of the 
existential side of Kant's ontology, and of the "object" side of the subject-object 
relation of being. It is the analysis of epistemic concepts that leads us to a concept 
of dynamical productivity that must be thought to characterize the existence of 
97 MFNS Ak. 472. Kant returns to the doctrine of body in his Opus Postumum, which I discuss in 
chapter 5. 
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nature. And thus Kant's existential ontology emerges from, and is only possible 
within, his epistemological ontology. 
At the same time, however, epistemological ontology relies upon existence, in 
that epistemology relies upon outer experience. In its reliance on outer experience, 
epistemology relies specifically upon dynamical productivity. This can be seen in 
the Refutation of Idealism, where Kant returns to the question of the empirical 
correlate of the transcendental principle of permanence. He suggests that what we 
experience as permanent in appearance is impenetrability, that sensation to which 
we relate the fundamental force of repulsion. Note that it is still action that is 
criterial of the principle of permanence, for impenetrability is the repulsive 
"action" of a body. Only because we experience impenetrability as the action of an 
inferred permanent material substrate - an experience made possible by the 
principle of the first analogy - do we have outer experience of material things; 
and only through such outer experience do we have inner experience.98 
Impenetrability, thought as the fundamental force of repulsion, is a condition for 
the possibility of outer and inner experience. 
The necessity of impenetrability to experience is clear in the Refutation. The 
intellectual representation of the I does not involve impenetrability, so there is 
nothing experienced as pennanent in this representation. The pennanence we 
require for inner experience must be sought in outer experience instead. Now this 
suggests that impenetrability, as the empirical correlate of pennanence, is 
necessary to the experience of pennanence - just as necessary as the 
transcendental principle of pennanence. For, as the case of the self shows, when 
there is no predicate of intuition that can serve as correlate for transcendental 
pennanence, there is no determination of existence in time. The relevant passage 
from the Refutation is as follows: 
With this thesis [the Refutation] all employment of our cognitive 
faculty in experience, in the detennination of time, entirely agrees. 
Not only are we unable to perceive any detennination of time save 
through change in outer relations (motion) relatively to the 
9R CPR 8275-9. 
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permanent in space (for instance, the motion of the sun relatively to 
objects on the earth), we have nothing permanent on which, as 
intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only matter, 
and even this permanence is not obtained from outer experience, 
but is presupposed a priori as a necessary condition of 
determination of time, and therefore also as a determination of 
inner sense in respect of [the determination of] our own existence 
through the existence of outer things. The consciousness of myself 
in the representation'!' is not an intuition, but a merely intellectual 
representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. This 'r has 
not, therefore, the least predicate of intuition, which, as permanent, 
might serve as correlate for the determination of time in inner 
sense - in the manner in which, for instance, impenetrability 
serves in our empirical intuition of matter. 99 
99 
In other words, the transcendental principle of permanence alone is not enough: 
experience determined by time also requires an empirical correlate, something 
experienced as "the permanent in space". The appropriate empirical correlate 
would be matter, but as we have seen, the permanence of matter is not intuited; 
rather, action is intuited, and specifically the "action" of repulsive force, or 
impenetrability. The intuition of impenetrability is required for experience, as 
empirical correlate to the principle of pennanence. It is only insofar as we intuit 
impenetrability, through our encounter with things in the world, that the a priori 
principle of pennanence becomes relevant in determining our perceptions in time. 
The categories and principles, then, become relevant only through outer 
intuitions of existence, specifically existence as active. This point is made explicit 
in the General Note on the System of the Principles (added in B), where Kant calls 
it "noteworthy" that 
in order to understand the possibility of things in conformity with 
the categories, and so to demonstrate the objective reality of the 
99 CPR 8277-8. 
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latter, we need, not merely intuitions, but intuitions that are in all 
cases outer intuitions. When, for instance, we take the pure 
concepts of relation, we find, firstly, that in order to obtain 
something permanent in intuition corresponding to the concept of 
substance, and so to demonstrate the objective reality of this 
concept, we require an intuition in space (of matter). 100 
100 
Similarly, Kant says, in order to exhibit alteration as the intuition corresponding to 
the concept of causality, we require the example of motion, for alteration "not only 
cannot be conceived by reason without an example, but is actually 
incomprehensible to reason without intuition". 101 The objective reality of the 
categories relies on outer intuitions - the experience of matter which gives us 
examples from which we see how the categories operate objectively. And as 
matter is always experienced as active, the objective reality of the categories relies 
on outer intuition of active, dynamical existence. The objective reality of the 
categories of substance and causality requires that matter be experienced as 
impenetrable and in motion. As we have seen, matter can only be detennined in 
these ways through the analysis of matter given in Metaphysical Foundations. 
Metaphysical Foundations gives us matter as motion, and as constituted by 
repulsive and attractive forces. In other words, Metaphysical Foundations 
furnishes us with those examples of active existence which are necessary for 
establishing the objective reality of the categories. Its function is not only to show 
that physical laws are compatible with the system of categories, but also to 
establish more finnly the objective reality of those categories. As Eckart Forster 
argues, 
precisely by laying out the principles of external intuition in their 
entirety does [Metaphysical Foundations] prevent the Critique 
from groping "uncertain and trembling, among mere meaningless 
concepts". [ ... Metaphysical Foundations] is nothing less than the 
belated demonstration of the real applicability and objective 
IO() CPR B291. 
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validity of the pure categories and principles of the 
understanding. 1 02 
101 
The point about the importance of outer intuition is a variant on Kant's general 
doctrine that there can be neither fonn without content nor content without fonn: 
experience is nothing other than their co-detennination. But as Forster notes, there 
is a shift in emphasis from Kant's discussion of the need for intuition generally, to 
his B-edition insistence - after the publication of Metaphysical Foundations -
on the need for outer intuition. 103 The significance of outer intuition is that it must 
be intuition of matter in space: particularly of matter as motion and 
impenetrability, and thus of matter as essentially constituted actively and 
dynamically by the fundamental forces. We must think about the objects of our 
outer experience as constituted by dynamical productivity if the categories are to 
have objective validity; and thus existence, thought as dynamical productivity, is a 
requirement of the epistemic system. The relation of the categories to existence is 
the condition of possibility of knowledge, as Kant says in closing the B-edition 
System of Principles: 
The final outcome of this whole section IS therefore this: all 
principles of the pure understanding are nothing more than 
principles a prIOn of the possibility of experience, and to 
experience alone do all a priori synthetic propositions relate -
indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this relation. 104 
Neither existence nor the epistemic framework is relevant outside of their 
relation. Existence, thought as dynamical productivity, is a necessary condition for 
the objective reality of the epistemic framework, and it is only within the 
epistemic framework that existence as dynamical productivity becomes manifest. 
Where existence and epistemic conditions overlap, I have suggested, is where 
I()~ Forster, Kant '.'I Final Synthesis, 58-9, quoting MFNS Ak. 478. For a different interpretation of 
the "examples" of MFNS, see Friedman, "Matter and Motion in the Metaphysical Foundations and 
the First Critique". 
103 Ftirster, Kant's Final Synthesis. 57-9. 
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Kant's ontology is located, and the relation between them is the subject-object 
relation of being. Furthermore, if existence is determined as dynamical 
productivity, then from the existential side at least, Kant's ontology relies on a 
notion of production. Neither existence nor being can be reduced to Heidegger's 
"produced presence", but both must be thought in terms of productivity. In the 
next chapter I will focus on the epistemic side of this relation, determining the 
extent to which that side too is productive, and finally characterizing being as a 
productive relation. 
Chapter 2 Summary 
In this chapter I have focused on the existential side of the relation of being, 
stressing that existence for Kant cannot be approached outside of the epistemic 
framework of concepts and principles. I examined some of the principles of the 
Analytic in detail, showing that the detennination of existence as spatio-temporal 
reality through the axioms and anticipations leads us to experience existence as 
presence. I looked at Heidegger's contention that things are determined as 
"mathematical" for Kant, and that to anticipate things as present indicates a 
mathematical comportment. I suggested that even if Kant's system is 
"mathematical", Kant's understanding of existence and being are not therefore 
based on produced presence. Rather, I argued, it is precisely through the 
determination of nature as "mathematical" through concepts and principles that it 
emerges as dynamical productivity. 
I then went on to look at how the concept of matter is detennined for Kant. I 
gave an interpretation of the first analogy, arguing that permanence of substance 
must be understood as a transcendental principle and not as a material description. 
I showed how the concept of matter is analyzed in Kant's Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science such that it is redescribed in terms of concepts of 
the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion. While these forces cannot be 
assumed to exist, and thus cannot be known to be the origin or ground of 
existence, they are the specific way we must think existence in order to have a 
coherent theory of matter. Furthennore, I suggested that we must think existence 
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in terms of dynamical productivity if the categories are to have objective reality. 
The claim I have made in this chapter is that the relation between existence and 
epistemic conditions is crucial to the relevance of both. Existence, thought as 
dynamical productivity, is a necessary condition for the objective reality of the 
epistemic framework, and it is only within the epistemic framework that existence 
as dynamical productivity becomes manifest. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 
The ground of knowledge: the transcendental object, 
apperception, and the relation of being 
How can the force, which can only give rise to motions, generate 
representations and ideas? The latter are a kind of thing so different 
than the former that it is inconceivable how one should be the 
source of the other.! 
3.1 The transcendental conditions of materialism 
104 
In chapter two I argued that for Kant, matter is reducible to the concept of the 
conflict of the fundamental forces of repulsion and attraction. The existence and 
activities of matter are thought in terms of this concept of dynamical productivity. 
For Kant's pure natural science, existence is thought as this dynamical 
productivity, with individual existents produced only by other existents. We are 
now faced with the question: if the existence of matter can be described in terms 
of the fundamental forces, why do we need any further explanations for the 
appearing of appearances? If the forces are sufficient explanation for the activities 
and qualities of matter, why do we seek noumena, intelligible causes, or 
transcendental objects? 
The answer, perhaps un surprisingly, is that despite Kant's materialism at the 
level of pure natural science, Kant is not and cannot be a materialist when it comes 
to a theory of the knowledge of nature. Kant is, I venture, a materialist at the level 
of pure natural science. He insists on eradicating all "occult qualities" from his 
1 Immanuel Kant, Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces, Ak. 1 :20, trans. and qtd. 
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dynamic physiology, particularly the notion of impenetrable simple parts separated 
by empty spaces. The aim of metaphysics in natural science, he says, is to regard 
the properties of matter "as dynamical and not as unconditioned original 
positions".2 All of corporeal nature must be explained by dynamical principles and 
reduced to the fundamental forces. The forces cannot be further reduced to any 
other concept, material or immaterial; in Langton's fonnulation, the relational 
properties of the forces cannot be reduced to any unknowable intrinsic properties.3 
But as lean-Michel Salanskis points out, "the assertion that everything that is 
is matter is not yet materialist; one still requires the nothing but".4 While Kant is 
prepared to say that everything that exists - everything that fulfills the actuality-
condition of being materially available to perception - is matter, he is not 
prepared to say that everything that exists is nothing but matter. For according to 
the definition of actuality, everything actual must be bound up with sensation, and 
the sensation-relatedness of actuality cannot be reduced to matter or to the 
fundamental forces. While we must think existence in terms of the forces to 
explain how matter fills space, the forces cannot explain or ground the fact that 
existent matter relates to sensation. The forces cannot explain how it is that our 
senses are affected in the first place, since the concepts of the forces are 
detennined within experienced nature. That is, if the concepts of matter and its 
forces are based on sensations and categories, they cannot be understood as the 
source of the sensations themselves. Whatever it is on the side of matter that 
causes it to appear to us as matter cannot be explained through our own material 
principles. Similarly, material principles cannot explain whatever it is on the side 
of thought that enables it to apprehend nature in its more basic form and then 
interpret it as matter. Materialism can explain our interpretation of nature, but not 
the material condition of affection required for any such interpretation to come 
about. Our experience of a material world presupposes that we are affected and 
cannot itself explain such affection, just as it cannot explain the spontaneity of 
thought. We need to look both at the problem of affection in Kant, and at Kant's 
concept of what it is that makes knowledge relations possible. This requires us to 
2 MFNS Ak. 532-4. 
J Langton 120. 
4 Jean-Michel Salanskis, "Some Figures of Matter", trans. Ray Brassier, Pli 12 (2001), 5-13, p. 5. 
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examine the original subject-object relation which I have equated with Kant's 
notion of being, and the conditions of possibility for that relation. 
Let us look first, briefly, at why knowledge cannot be explained through a 
material principle. Were Kant a materialist, the concept of the forces would be 
adequate to such an explanation, for the forces would be thought to constitute the 
mind and its thoughts just as they are thought to constitute matter and its activities. 
The thinking self, as a variety of organized matter, would be reducible to the 
fundamental forces and not further. The same forces would be thought responsible 
for both subject and object, such that the thinking mind and matter would be two 
varieties of the same stuff, relatable insofar as they are interchangeable. Variants 
on this position were advocated by various strands of eighteenth-century 
materialism, which Kant was familiar with and critical of. The radical materialist 
Julien de la Mettrie, for example, writes: 
I believe thought to be so little incompatible with organised matter 
that it seems to be one of its properties, like electricity, motive 
power, impenetrability, extension, etc. [ ... ] Let us then assume that 
man is a machine and that there is in the whole universe only one 
diversely modified substance.5 
For la Mettrie, thought is an empirically observable activity of organised matter, 
pertaining to animals as well as to men, emerging from the organization of matter 
and not from a soul that is imagined to underlie it. Thinking and matter are 
entirely compatible because thinking is nothing other than a certain organization 
of matter in dynamic relation to other organised systems. The "one diversely 
modified substance" (clearly a misplaced reference to Spinoza) emerges as 
thinking in man just as it emerges as motion in matter. 6 
Now there are certain passages in the Critique, most of them in the A edition 
Paralogisms, that might be used to contend that Kant held a similar position to La 
5 Julien Offray de la Mettrie, "Machine Man" (I 747), in Machine Man and Other Writings. ed. and 
trans. Ann Thomson (Cambridge: CUP, 1996),35.39. . . . 
6 La Mettrie 33. La Mettrie proclaimed himself variously to be a Spinozist and an antl-Spmo~lst; 
Israel (707) points out that La Mettrie's idea of Spinoza was based more on contemporary notIOns 
of "Spinozism" than on any actual acquaintance with Spinoza's texts. 
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Mettrie's. In both the first and third Critiques though, Kant is highly critical of this 
sort of materialism, calling the causalistic interpretation of nature (which refers 
even the purposive form of matter solely to its physical basis) "so manifestly 
absurd, if taken literally, that we must not let it detain US".7 He makes the case 
against materialism in the Critique by claiming that soul and matter are not 
comparable on the empirical level. The materialist mistake is to take both soul and 
matter as things in themselves - as two atomic centres of organization, for 
instance - and then to assert that they are of the same nature.8 For Kant, by 
contrast, the thinking self (not as empirical, but as pure self-consciousness) is not 
represented in the same mode as matter is: as we have seen, the thinking self lacks 
all predicates of intuition, whereas matter is apprehended through predicates of 
intuition. We find that our representations of self and matter are indeed distinct, 
for the thinking self is represented as the mere thought "I think" while matter is 
represented as appearance. The "I think" is not, like matter, the sort of thing that is 
reducible to the fundamental forces. Nor can the "I think" be thought to be of the 
same nature as the forces themselves. The forces, while they do not conform to the 
conditions of possible experience, are on the level of appearances: 
Neither bodies nor motions are anything outside us; both alike are 
mere representations in us; and it is not, therefore, the motion of 
matter that produces representations in us; the motion itself is 
representation only, as also is the matter which makes itself known 
in this way.9 
Matter and motion are appearances, meaning that the fundamental forces which 
are thought to constitute them must also be taken to be appearances, belonging to 
the realm of experience. By contrast, the "1 think" is "not itself an experience, but 
d ." 10 W the fonn of apperception, which belongs to and prece es every expenence . e 
can only say that it is a subjecfiw! condition of knowledge; we are not justified in 
7 CJ ~72. Ak. 391. 
R CPR A379. See also A383 where Kant speaks of "the danger of materialism". The materialist 
mistake is, of course, the same mistake that leads to mind-body dualism. 
Q CPR A387. 
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transforming it into "a concept of a thinking being in general" .11 No existent being 
can be inferred from this merely logical unity of subject. Thus the "I think" cannot 
be thought to be existentially productive (as the fundamental forces are at least 
thought to be), but can only be thought to be able to accompany the process of 
epistemological reproduction. Materialism cannot account for the thinking self: 
the "I think" cannot be an object of study for pure natural science, but is only that 
unity of self-consciousness that is able to accompany all representations of 
thought. 12 
But this only says that the I cannot be reduced to the same empirical grounds 
as matter. It does not mean that mind and matter do not share a common 
intelligible ground. Ifwe distinguish appearances from intelligible objects, we find 
that our mode of representing the two types of objects is distinct, but we are not 
therefore able to affirm or deny their underlying identity or difference. Our 
thinking self, "the transcendental object of inner sense", cannot be an object of 
outer sense, and similarly, we can never find thinking beings as such among outer 
appearances. 13 This argument is so natural and popular, Kant says, that the 
common understanding has always relied upon it to distinguish souls from bodies. 
But although the properties of matter as reported by outer sense cannot be seen to 
contain thoughts, 
nevertheless the something which underlies the outer appearances 
and which so affects our sense that it obtains the representations of 
space, matter, shape, etc., may yet, when viewed as noumenon (or 
better, as transcendental object), be at the same time the subject of 
our thoughts. That the mode in which our outer sense is thereby 
affected gives us no intuition of representations, will, etc., but only 
of space and its detenninations, proves nothing to the contrary. 14 
In other words, it is misguided to compare the "I think" with matter as appearance. 
The proper comparison is between the thinking self - often called the 
II CPR A354. 
I~ See MFNS Ak. 47 I. 
13 CPR A357-61. 
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transcendental subject - and the transcendental object of matter. On that level, 
Kant says, we cannot know that soul and body are in any way distinct. Kant's 
point is not that matter and the thinking self do share a common empirical ground, 
but only that, when viewed as appearances, there is nothing to prevent our 
consideration that they may share a common intelligible ground. That common 
intelligible ground cannot be material, but, as an underlying unifying ground, it 
may be thought to be the source of the suitability of mind and world to one 
another. 
The true question of psychology, then, is not how representations of matter and 
representations of the self should associate with one another, but rather how 
representation is possible at all. How is it that a non-intuitive, non-creative 
thinking subject, the I think, has intuition of appearances in space? What is the 
initial relation that makes outer intuition possible for the I think? The question, 
which in his famous letter to Herz Kant called "the key to the whole secret of 
hitherto obscure metaphysics", is "what is the ground of the relation of that in us 
which we call 'representation' to the object", given that our intellectual faculty 
neither creates nor is passively affected by the object?15 
The much discussed question of the commUnIon between the 
thinking and the extended, if we leave aside all that is merely 
fictitious, comes then simply to this: how in a thinking subject 
outer intuition, namely, that of space, with its filling-in of shape 
and motion, is possible. And this is a question which no man can 
possibly answer. This gap in our knowledge can never be filled; all 
that can be done is to indicate it through the ascription of outer 
appearances to that transcendental object which is the cause of this 
species of representations, but of which we can have no knowledge 
. 16 
whatsoever and of which we shall never acqUIre any concept. 
14 CPR A358. 
15 Letter to Marcus Herz, 21 February 1772. Correspondence, trans. and ed. Arnulf Zweig 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1999), Ak. 10:129-35, pp. 132-7. 
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Kant tells us here that we will never know how a thinking subject is ultimately 
able to relate to spatial beings. As we have seen, a material concept cannot help us 
to bridge the gap between matter and an intelligible self. In order to accommodate 
the I think and to account for its suitability to the world, we will require a concept 
of something that underlies both the I and the world. All we can do, Kant says, is 
point to a transcendental object of which we can have no knowledge whatsoever. 
This transcendental object may be the cause of the representations we call matter. 
and, as we have seen, may be identical in nature to our transcendental subject. 
That a subject-object relation is possible seems to be attributable only to a 
transcendental object of which we know nothing. Numerous other passages from 
the Paralogisms attest to this: 
For matter, the communion of which with the soul arouses so much 
questioning, is nothing but a mere form, or a particular way of 
representing an unknown object by means of that intuition which is 
called outer sense. There may well be something outside us to 
which this appearance, which we call matter, corresponds. 
We ought [ ... J to bear in mind that bodies are not objects in 
themselves which are present to us, but a mere appearance of we 
know not what unknown object. 
The transcendental substratum of outer appearances [ ... J is just as 
unknown to me as is the thinking self. 
Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer 
appearances nor that which underlies inner intuition, is in itself 
either matter or a thinking being, but a ground (to us unknown) of 
the appearances which supply to us the empirical concept of the 
d f · 17 fonner as well as of the latter mo e 0 eXIstence. 
17 CPR A385, A387, AJ~3, A379-80. 
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This last passage is perhaps the most important, for Kant is unequivocal that the 
transcendental object is neither matter nor a thinking being, but is merely an 
unknown ground of the appearances of both. An intelligible ground, some 
substratum underlying appearances, is thought to be the cause of the realm of 
appearance itself. It is striking that in all these cases Kant speaks of one 
transcendental object that is the singular and unifying ground of appearances. 
While existence, thought in terms of the fundamental forces, has no ground 
beyond itself within the realm of appearances, this singular supersensible 
substratum is thought to underlie existence as a totality, or the realm of 
appearances in general. 
If we continue to assert that being for Kant is equivalent to the subject-object 
relation, and that existence has no ground outside of itself, there is a question as to 
the ontological status of this substratum which is thought to make being and 
existence possible. This is the question I will address in this chapter. I will 
maintain my position that being is a relation between subject and object, and will 
argue that the intelligible ground, as an idea of reason, has no status in terms of 
existential ontology. In order to reach this position I will need to provide a fuller 
explanation of the original subject-object relation that I am equating with being, 
and discuss how that relation provides a transcendental ground for appearances 
that is not the same as the postulated intelligible ground. I will look at the two 
Deductions, the Phenomena and Noumena chapter, and the Amphiboly of 
Concepts of Reflection to draw these points out. 
The entire argument rests upon Kant's use of the tenn "transcendental object". 
As we have just seen, Kant uses the tenn "transcendental object" to refer to the 
intelligible ground or supersensible substrate (the latter is the tenn he will use in 
the Critique of Judgment). However, this is complicated by the fact that Kant uses 
the tenn "transcendental object" in a different but related way in the A edition 
Transcendental Deduction and Phenomena and Noumena chapter. In those 
sections, the transcendental object is the concept of objectivity in general, which is 
closely linked to SUbject-object relatedness. The transcendental object seems to be 
used to answer both our questions in this chapter: first, what the subject-object 
relation consists in, and second, what the ground of appearance and affection is. 
But because in the first case (as I will show) the transcendental object is thought to 
Chapter 3 112 
be a product of the subject-object relation, whereas it is thought to be the 
condition of possibility of such a relation in the second case, we cannot conflate 
Kant's two uses of the tenn "transcendental object". 
I will argue that Kant uses the tenn "transcendental object" in two ways: first 
as a concept of understanding, and second as an idea of reason. I will distinguish 
the concept of the transcendental object as objectivity in general, from the idea of 
the transcendental object as the intelligible cause of appearances. While the 
concept is used to explain the possibility of knowledge, the idea is used to explain 
the possibility of affection. I will start with a discussion of the concept of the 
transcendental object, the possibility of knowledge and the subject-object relation 
of being. This will be the topic of section 3.3, which takes as its textual basis the 
two versions of the transcendental deduction. In this section we will arrive at a 
fuller understanding of how being operates as subject-object relatedness. In 
section 3.4 I will look at how this concept of the transcendental object is thought 
to be the ground of appearances, in the sense of being their condition of 
possibility. Finally, in 3.5, I will look at the idea of the transcendental object as the 
intelligible cause of appearances, which allows us to think how subject-object 
relatedness is possible, though not actually to explain it. This argument will lead 
us, finally, to a coherent understanding of how being, existence, knowledge, and 
production are related in Kant's first Critique as a productive ontology. We will 
see that being is nothing other than the productive relation of material and 
transcendental production: the original subject-object relation that operates 
through the synthetic unity of apperception. There is a unifying basis underlying 
the relation of being, which can never be known, but which must be assumed 
through ideas in order that we have a systematic idea of nature and our place in it. 
3.2 Affection and objectivity 
To begin with, I will assess some recent interpretive strategies towards Kant's 
transcendental object. We need to detennine what the transcendental object is, and 
to distinguish it from the noumenon and the thing in itself. In order to do this it is 
important that we take a view on the relation of appearance to thing in itself. This, 
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of course, is no easy task. We need to decide whether the tenns thing in itself, 
noumenon, and transcendental object refer to the same "something" or not, and 
whether this "something" is another reality underlying appearances or another 
interpretation of the thing as appearance. There are three major lines of 
interpretation one might take here. 18 
The first, sometimes called the "two worlds" view, I will call ontological (Of. 
to be more precise, existential) dualism. Appearance and thing in itself are thought 
to be two distinct types or realms of reality: the phenomenon/noumenon 
distinction is thought to manifest itself as appearance/reality and effect/cause. 19 
This view, held by Guyer and Findlay amongst others, tends to cast Kant as a 
Leibnizian thinker who assumes there are non-phenomenal substances with a non-
phenomenal causal power underlying appearances. Related interpretations see the 
fundamental forces of Metaphysical Foundations as relational properties of these 
unknown non-phenomenal substances, or, worse, as the inherent forces of 
monads.20 Such positions, to which I am strongly opposed, pay insufficient 
attention to the transcendental nature of Kantian experience, and are led to the 
conclusions that Kant's logical concept of substance has objective reality, and that 
matter is a phenomenal property of this "absolute subject". (In fact, as I discussed 
in chapter two, the pure concept of substance as absolute subject is merely a 
logical concept, and has no object. Similarly, the transcendental concept of 
substance as pennanence has no object, but serves only as a principle constitutive 
of experience. Only the empirical concept of substance as matter has an object 
corresponding to it, and this is the only substance that can be said to exist.) 
18 This topic has been extensively covered in the literature and I will not discuss in detail the 
advantages and shortcomings of the different interpretations. Allison, Guyer, Strawson, Bennett, 
Langton, and Rescher all give extensive treatments of the debates at large. For a concise summary, 
see Hoke Robinson, "Two Perspectives on Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves", 
Journal of the HistOJ)' 0.( Philosophy 32:3 (1994), 411-41. 
19 Guyer holds that Kant argues for "things which are actually not in space and time" (Kant and the 
Claims (?( Knowledge, 334). For another recent ontological dualist view, one that responds 
specifically to Heidegger, see William F. Valli cella, "Kant, Heidegger and the Problem of the 
Thing in Itself', International Philosophical Quarterly 23: I (1983),35-43. 
20 I refer particularly to Findlay and Langton. Findlay takes ontological dualism so far as to 
promote the theory that there are Leibnizian monads causing appearances (190-1) and that these 
monads or simple substances manifest themselves through the "primary phenomena" of force (246-
8). Langton takes a more moderate ~iew that the world is one se~ of thin~s wit~ both intrinsic a~d 
relational properties, the fomler bemg the unknowable propertIes of thmgs m themselves (1_). 
Unfortunately, by identifying things in themselves with a notion of non-phenomenal substance (59), 
Langton, like Findlay, gives us a very Leibnizian Kant. 
Chapter 3 114 
I believe that we should hold to the second line of interpretation, championed 
by Allison and Rescher, which takes Kant to be advocating not an existential 
dualism but an epistemological dualism: "thing as appearance" and "thing in 
itself' are two possible interpretations of a thing, epistemically filtered in different 
ways. On this view, often called the "two aspects" view, the distinction between 
appearance and thing in itself is not between two types of entity, but between two 
considerations of the same entity.21 But even if we take this view, we remain stuck 
with a type of dualism: that between the given and its epistemic interpretations. 
What is this given that can be viewed as appearance or thing in itself? Whether we 
think of noumena (wrongly) as underlying entities or (rightly) as epistemic 
functions, we are left with the question of what first affects sensibility, and what 
that affecting something might be were the fonns of intuition absent. While 
existential dualism purports to answer that question by stating that noumena are 
causally responsible for affecting the senses, it is clear from Kant's treatment of 
noumena that, as mere thought-entities postulated after experience, they can have 
no such function. As Strawson famously showed, explaining the world as an effect 
of the "causality" of a real yet non-phenomenal substance would be 
unintelligible.22 
This problem leads to the third line of interpretation, which is really an 
extension of the second. This line, which we might call the heuristic cause 
interpretation, suggests that the understanding must postulate the idea of a thing in 
itself, noumenon, or transcendental object as being the cause of appearances, 
without claiming that such a cause exists or has any reality. In order to explain the 
possibility of affection, the understanding must assume an underlying intelligible 
cause of affection, but does not assume it could ever have knowledge of this cause 
21 Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 248. See also ch. I of Nicholas Rescher, Kant and the 
Reach (~r Reason (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). Kant seems to express this view directly in his Opus 
Postumum: the difference between an object in appearance and the same object as thing in itself 
"does not lie in the objects, but merely in the difference of the relation in which the subject 
apprehending the sense-object is affected for the production of the representation in itself'. (Ak. 
22:44, p. 179). As I will suggest in chapter five, however, we cannot take what Kant says 111 the 
Opus Postumum as a guide to the transcendental idealism of the fi~st Critiqll~.. ., 
22 Strawson's critique, therefore. highlights a major problem WIth the eXIstentIal dualIst lIne of 
interpretation. and not a problem inherent to Kant's text. Langton shows that Strawson's charge 
that Kant "violates any acceptable requirement of intelligibility" (Strawson 41-2) disappears if. for 
instance. we interpret Kant as offering "one world. one set of things. but two kinds of properties". 
intrinsic and relational. See Langton. ch. 1. 
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or of the type of causality through which it affects human sensibility. This third 
line of interpretation, as I suggested, is compatible with the second, and many 
commentators sympathetic to the second view take this third view to be its 
adjunct. I will end up endorsing a variant of this view, though not the variant that 
Allison and Rescher endorse. While they claim that Kant's concept of the 
transcendental object is straightforwardly thought to be this intelligible cause, I 
will argue that, under the assumption of a distinction between the concept of the 
transcendental object and the idea thereof, the idea is postulated by reason as the 
idea of an intelligible cause, to give us a systematic explanation for the cause of 
affection. 
In order to reach that position, as I have said, I will need to look at the 
transcendental object. The best way to understand the function of the 
transcendental object is to start with Kant's concept of it in the Deductions, where 
(as I will show) it is associated with the concept of "objectivity in general". There 
are two particular interpretive strategies that take this concept seriously: that of 
Heidegger, and that of philosopher of science Gerd Buchdahl. Heidegger, in Kant 
and the Problem of Metaphysics, argues that objectivity is established as an 
ontological horizon of experience. This is accomplished with the transcendental 
object, the "something = X" which is "known in ontological knowledge".23 By 
ontological knowledge, Heidegger does not mean knowledge in the Kantian sense 
of intuition plus thought, but rather that which makes such knowledge possible: 
the initial intentional relatedness of subject to object that occurs a priori, and is 
described in the Transcendental Deductions. We saw Heidegger arguing 
something similar in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: in the initial 
relation, the subject was said already to "grasp" the being of things, where being 
(on Heidegger's account) was detennined as pennanent presence. 
In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger's assessment comes from 
a different angle. He does not focus on the "being of things" that is grasped by the 
subject, but on the relational horizon within which this grasping takes place. In 
Heidegger's analysis of the A Deduction in this text, the initial subject-object 
relation [onns the horizon within which things first become experienceable?~ The 
23 KPM 84. 
24 KPM 10. 
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forming of the ontological horizon is the relation to a transcendental object prior 
to experience, but this is not the same as the grasping of the "being of things" 
described in Basic Problems. Heidegger claimed that the being of things, for Kant, 
was equivalent to the permanent presence of things. The transcendental object, by 
contrast, is not a feature belonging to or characterizing things, but is the horizon of 
objectivity in general that makes possible the determinate experience and real 
knowledge of things. On Heidegger's account of Kant, the human subject relates 
itself to objectivity, within which relation the subject is able to grasp the being of 
things as permanent presence. This grasping of being makes experiential 
knowledge possible. The transcendental object is not an object of knowledge, 
since it is the "pure horizon" for the possibility of knowledge in general. As 
Heidegger says: 
The X is a "Something" of which we can know nothing at all. But 
it is not therefore not knowable, because as a being this X lies 
hidden "behind" a layer of appearances. Rather, it is not knowable 
because it simply cannot become a possible object of knowing, i.e., 
the possession of a knowledge of beings. It can never become such 
because it is a Nothing. 
Nothing means: not a being, but nevertheless "Something." It 
"serves only as a correlatum," i.e. according to its essence it is pure 
horizon. [ ... ] The X is "object in general." This does not mean: a 
universal, indetenninate being which stands against. On the 
contrary, this expression refers to that which makes up in advance 
the rough sizing up of all possible objects as standing-against 
[Gegen-stehen], the horizon of a standing-against.25 
The transcendental object is not a thing that lies behind appearances, but is the 
horizon of objectivity in general. This horizon of objectivity, which is "known" in 
ontological knowledge, makes it possible, on Heidegger's account, that the being 
of things is disclosed as pennanent presence: "ontological knowledge [ ... ] is 
2S KPM 83-4, quoting CPR A250. Ileidegger uses the term Gegcl1-stehell to echo Kant's use of 
Gegenstand for the object in general. 
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nothing other than the holding-open of the horizon within which the Being of the 
being becomes discemable in a preliminary way".26 Heidegger's interpretation of 
the transcendental object as objectivity in general is thus in accord with his 
assessment of being as presence for Kant, for objectivity is the relational horizon 
in which being is disclosed. Objectivity is thus also the horizon in which beings, 
as objects of experience, can be uncovered and known. Appearances exist as 
objects of experience only because objectivity has already been established as 
horizon. In this sense, the transcendental object, objectivity in general, makes 
appearances possible. For Heidegger, the question of affection by the 
transcendental object is replaced with the question of the horizon of objectivity 
that makes experience possible. 
Gerd Buchdahl has also made some interesting comments on the 
transcendental object with his unique interpretation of the "dynamic flow" of the 
Kantian object.27 Buchdahl's interpretation is remarkably similar to Heidegger's in 
some respects, without any apparent awareness of Heidegger's project. On 
Buchdahl's interpretation of Kant, an object is a single item that is "realized" as 
appearance, thing in itself, thing in general, noumenon, and so on, by way of 
different epistemic strategies. The multi-faceted nature of the Kantian thing is the 
outcome of the different realizational strategies taken: 
Instead of vIewmg, m synchronic fashion, the different 
interpretations of the Kantian "object" as so many different quasi-
independent entities (e.g. appearances, things-in-themselves, things 
in general, etc.), we propose to view these diachronically as so 
many "stations" in the realizational process.28 
Buchdahl proposes that what Kant describes in the Transcendental Aesthetic and 
Analytic is a "reduction-realization process" in which the thing is taken up and 
detennined according to the various components of the transcendental framework. 
26 KPM84. 
27 In chapters 1-3 of KDR, which includes a magnificent diagram. Makkreel .takes a. similar 
approach. arguing that the imagination produces meaning by "reading" ,and. m~erpretm.g the 
manifold of the world. See Rudolf A. Makkreel, Imagination and IntelpretatlOn In I\.ant (Chicago: 
U of Chicago P. 1990). 
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When we open our eyes on the world we are met not yet with a manifold of 
appearances, but rather with the "life-world" of the things and people with which 
we interact.29 Such a world would be the pre-philosophical, non-transcendental 
world of everyday experience, which is taken up through empirical concepts: a 
sort of Humean world of experiential impressions and ideas. The life-world must 
be epistemically "neutralized", or (to use the Husserlian tenninology, as Buchdahl 
does) "bracketed", becoming what Kant calls the thing in general. The need for 
this suspension is explained by the need for an a priori, and not merely empirical, 
conceptual structure: a pre-given, mind-independent life-world would not, as 
Hume so convincingly pointed out, have any necessary connection to that 
conceptual structure.30 
Buchdahl goes on to explain that the "thing in general" is interpreted in 
various ways: as appearance and as thing in itself, for instance. But in order to 
reach these interpretations, or "realizations" as Buchdahl tenns them, the thing in 
general must be reduced to objectivity taken in the transcendental sense, and in its 
reduced state it is the transcendental object. The transcendental object is what is 
thought to pre-exist the perceptual encounter, what is thought to be there before 
the thing is taken to be appearance.3) It is "transcendental" in the sense that "its 
conditions for realization are as yet held in abeyance [ ... ;] the categories cannot as 
yet be 'employed,,,.32 We reduce the thing in general to objectivity in general, to a 
"colourless" something available for detennination. The transcendental object 
signifies that there is something that is fonnally determinable but, because of its 
status as objectivity in general, the transcendental object also determines the 
appearances that will result. The transcendental object will be realized through 
(i.e. detennined by) the fonns of intuition and the categories as appearance.33 And 
this stage is necessary to the subsequent generation of category-governed 
cognition: "only if something can be the case [ ... ] can cognitions be 'about' 
2X KDR 6. 
2'-1 KDR 8. Buchdahl borrows the teml "life-world" from Husser\. 
30 KDR 8-9. 
JI KDR 11. 
32 KDR 12. Buchdahl makes a useful distinction between this sense of "transcendental"' and the 
more usual sense. as a condition of possible experience. 
3.~ KDR 13-14. 
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something".34 The transcendental object, the establishment of objectivity in 
general, is a necessary stage in the process of realizing the world as a world of 
qualitatively determined appearances. 
It is in this sense (the same sense as Heidegger's) that the transcendental object 
can be said to make the appearance possible: the transcendental object provides 
the general objectivity which grounds any possible realizational outcome. The 
transcendental object for Buchdahl is nothing other than the thing stripped of the 
apparatus of everyday experience in the life-world, in order that the formal 
apparatus of the categories may be applied in the realizational process. What is left 
over, after reduction and before realization, is the formal concept of objectivity in 
general. This objectivity will determine the appearance that arises with intuition, 
and in this move it will also be determined by the forms of intuition and the 
categories. Realization of the thing as appearance determines the qualitative 
manifestation of the transcendental object, while the transcendental object 
determines that there will be a realizational outcome.35 Though Buchdahl's 
argument is somewhat more complex, his point is that while the appearance-aspect 
of the thing detennines the transcendental object-aspect materially, the 
transcendental object-aspect detennines the appearance-aspect fonnally. The use 
of "aspect" here highlights Buchdahl' s insistence that we are talking about one 
object at its different realizational stages: "under the description [transcendental 
object] it is as yet unrealized - 'colourless', so to speak; [ ... ] we are as yet lacking 
the transcendental framework which first renders any object discussible 
meaningfully in tenns of qualities and relations".36 
Buchdahl's interpretation of Kant is original and noteworthy, if uncreditable at 
times. There seems to be scant evidence for some of his points, particularly for his 
claim that the Kantian subject encounters a life-world that is not yet ordered by the 
formal constraints of experience.37 Is it not Kant's point that it is precisely because 
we do open our eyes onto an always already ordered world that experience must 
always involve an a priori fonnal framework? Even Heidegger places the "pre-
34 KDR 13. 
35 KDR 15. 
36 KDR 15-17. Buchdahl borrows the notion of the "colourless object" from Wittgenstein' s 
Troctalus. 
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knowledge" relation of subject and object at the stage of establishing objectivity in 
general; in claiming that this relation is ontological, he precisely would not allow 
that Kantian experience could be possible before and without its ontological 
horizon. Buchdahl goes one step further than Heidegger by suggesting that before 
the establishment of objectivity we encounter the world in the non-categoriaL 
everyday way of Husserl' s "natural attitude" (much in the way that "ontic" 
experience operates in Heidegger's Being and Time). While it is true that Kant 
suggests at various points that a certain kind of experience would be possible 
without the categories, this experience would be so impoverished as not to deserve 
the name: it would, perhaps, be the experience of infants or animals who lack 
spontaneity of thought. The suggestion that we have a non-categorial, non-
spontaneous "experience" of things before reducing and re-formalizing them into 
appearances simply runs counter to Kant's general notion of experience. 
Buchdahl's claim for a Kantian pre-categoriallife-world is hard to accept, but 
its acceptance is, I think, unnecessary to adopting his interpretation in general. 
There is much to be gained from Buchdahl' s "realizational" view of the 
phenomenalnoumena distinction and his interpretation of the transcendental 
object. We can reject his belief in a pre-categorial life-world and begin the 
dynamic process with the transcendental object. Buchdahl and Heidegger agree 
that as objectivity in general, the transcendental object is the ground of all 
appearing in general. I will agree that the concept of the transcendental object is 
the concept of objectivity in general that is determined in its realization as 
appearance. The concept of the transcendental object is the ground of objective 
appearances, and thus whatever brings that concept about is the ground of 
knowledge and of Kant's epistemological ontology. What brings the concept about 
will be seen to be the synthetic unity of apperception. The relation of 
transcendental apperception, in which the synthetic unity of apperception and the 
objectivity of things is established, will also be found to be the relation of being. I 
agree, then, with Heidegger's claim that the being of things is disclosed with the 
establishment of objectivity. But I reject his claim that the being of things is their 
37 For a thorough if uncharitable critique of BuchdahL see Kenneth R. Westphal, "Buchdahl's 
'Phenomenological' View of Kant: a Critique", Kanl-Studien 89 (1998),335-52. 
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pennanent presence, arguing instead that being is the relation in which objectivity 
is established. 
3.3 The concept of the transcendental object and the relation of being 
I will now look at how objectivity in general is produced by the spontaneity of 
the understanding, and how the concept of the transcendental object is bound up 
with the fonnal requirement of objectivity for experience. We will see that in 
establishing the objectivity of objects, transcendental apperception establishes the 
subject-object relation of being. 
Kant's clearest expression of the provenance and function of the concept of the 
transcendental object is found in his first Transcendental Deduction. Although the 
Deduction was entirely rewritten for the B edition, and the concept of the 
transcendental object almost entirely omitted from the B Deduction, the B 
Phenomena and Noumena chapter, and the B Paralogisms, it is retained in the 
Amphiboly appendix (written in A and largely unchanged in B). Despite Kant's 
omissions, this concept of the transcendental object has resonance throughout the 
Critique and is not incompatible with the rewritten Deduction. In discussing how 
knowledge arises in the Deductions, we will arrive at an understanding of the 
concept of the transcendental object. While Kant's introduction of a 
transcendental object often seems to be a claim for an underlying reality, it is, in 
almost all cases in the Analytic, the deployment of a concept of fonnal objectivity 
in general referring to the unity of apperception. 
i) The A Deduction 
In the Transition to the Deduction, the first half of which is the same in A and 
B, Kant says that there are only two possible ways in which representations can 
obtain necessary relation to objects: either the object alone makes the 
representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible.38 
38 CPR A92 / B124. 
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The first option, the empiricist answer, is merely an empirical relation, and is true 
of appearances as regards their sensible element. Only with the second option is 
the representation possible a priori: 
In the latter case, representation in itself does not produce its object 
[GegenstandJ in so far as existence is concerned, for we are not 
here speaking of its causality by means of the will. None the less 
the representation is a priori determinant of the object, if it be the 
case that only through the representation is it possible to know 
anything as an object.39 
Representation makes the object possible, not in terms of producing its existence, 
but in terms of determining it a priori as an object. Here Kant subtly makes the 
distinction between existential production - the work of God - and 
epistemological reproduction, the work of a spontaneous understanding. It is 
because the human understanding does not create what it intuits that an inquiry 
into the objective validity of representation is necessary. Knowledge is possible 
under the conditions of intuition, in which an already-created appearance is given 
through the fonnal condition of sensibility, and under the conditions of a concept, 
through which an object is thought corresponding to the intuition. The necessary 
agreement of appearances with the fonnal condition of sensibility having already 
been shown, "the question now arises whether a priori concepts do not also serve 
as antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be, if not intuited, yet 
thought as object in general".4o All experience does contain a concept of an object 
appearing, in addition to what is given in intuition, and thus concepts of objects in 
general underlie all empirical knowledge as its a priori conditions.41 These 
"concepts of objects in general" are part of the structure of representations that 
make objects of experience possible. 
Concepts of objects in general must be produced by the spontaneous faculty of 
understanding, for the receptive faculty only performs a synopsis through which 
39 CPR A92 / BI~5. 
40 CPR A93 / B1~5. 
41 CPR A93 / B126. 
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sense obtains a spatio-temporal manifold in its intuition. To this receptive 
synopsis a spontaneous synthesis must correspond, and spontaneity is the ground 
of a threefold synthesis "which must necessarily be found in all knowledge".42 
These three syntheses are the apprehension of representations as modifications of 
the mind in intuition, their reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in a 
concept. The synthesis of apprehension is directed immediately upon the intuitions 
received through the initial synopsis, running them through and binding them 
together into a manifold of intuition. Only by virtue of this synthesis does intuition 
offer a manifold contained in a single representation.43 
Kant goes on to say that experience presupposes the reproducibility of 
appearances, for it is an empirical law that we are able to recall a representation 
even in the absence of its object. Appearances themselves must be the sorts of 
things that can be reproduced in representation. There must then be something 
which makes possible the empirical synthesis of reproduction a priori, and we 
must assume this to be the transcendental synthesis of imagination.44 This is what 
Kant calls the "productive imagination", for in bringing about the synthesis of 
reproduction a priori, it produces unity in the synthesis of what is manifold in 
appearance.45 Without this second synthesis, we could never obtain a complete 
representation in experience, for we would never be able to hold on to the part of 
the representation that came before the current part. "The synthesis of 
apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis ofreproduction.,,46 
The synthesis of reproduction points to the third, for our purposes most 
important, synthesis. If in experience we must reproduce representations in order 
to be conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment 
before, these reproductions of representations must be unified in one 
conSCIOusness. The unitary consciousness "is what combines the manifold, 
successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation" .47 
4~ CPR A97. 
4.1 CPR A99. 
44 CPR A JO 1. Heidegger has famously drawn attention to the importance of the faculty of 
imagination to the A Deduction, and to Kant's ontology, in Kant and the P~·ob/~m ~r Metaphysics. 
Makkreel gives a critique of Heidegger, and an invaluable study of the ImagmatIOn throughout 
Kant's corpus, in his Imagination and Intelpretation in Kant. 
45 CPR A 118-23. 
46 CPR AJ02. 
47 CPR AI03. 
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Without this unity of consciousness, concepts and thus knowledge of objects 
would be impossible. In fact, the unity of consciousness gives us those "concepts 
of objects" we require for experience. 
Kant now gives one of his clearest explanations of the relation between 
appearance and object. "At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we 
mean by the expression 'an object of representations' [eines Gegenstandes der 
VorstellungenJ". If appearances are nothing but sensible representations which are 
not to be taken for independent objects, 
what is to be understood when we speak of an object 
corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from, our 
knowledge? It is easily seen that this object must be thought only 
as something in general = X, since outside our knowledge we have 
nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as 
d· . 48 correspon mg to It. 
We find that our thought of the relation of knowledge to its object carries with it 
an element of necessity, and it is the object that is viewed as that which prevents 
our knowledge from relating merely to contingent representations. "The object is 
viewed as that which [ ... J detennines [our modes of know ledge J a priori in some 
definite fashion".49 Kant says that we continue to view objects as determining our 
modes of knowledge, as giving them the objectivity that makes them agree with 
one another and that makes our judgments applicable. Yet the view that objects 
make representations possible has been rejected. All we apprehend is the manifold 
of representations; the "something in general = X", the "object", must necessarily 
be distinct from our representations, "set over against" and outside our knowledge. 
So how is it that this object is both thought to detennine knowledge and is 
unavailable to knowledge? 
Kant's answer is that our thought of this object is the concept of a unity in the 
man~rold. This concept of an object is required in order that our knowledge not be 
arbitrary, but the objective unity is in fact a projection of the unity of self-
4~ CPR AI04. 
4'1 CPR Al 0'+. 
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consCIOusness. In this way, thought makes the object possible (detennines it a 
priori), while viewing this object as the source of objective unity. 
It is clear that [ ... J the unity which the object makes necessary can 
be nothing else than the fonnal unity of consciousness in the 
synthesis of the manifold of representations. It is only when we 
have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that 
we are in a position to say that we know the object. 50 
This "objective" unity can come from nowhere other than our own productive 
understanding. The fonnal unity of consciousness combines the manifold into one 
representation, and in so doing finds an objective unity in the manifold. Only 
when this synthetic unity has been produced can we say we know an object, rather 
than merely intuiting a representation. It is at this point that the subject-object 
relation comes about, for in producing synthetic unity, the subject establishes that 
there is an object.51 What is produced is not the existence of an object as such, but 
the concept of an object in general: the concept of objective unity. Establishing 
that there is an object in general, which happens through the relation of producing 
synthetic unity, is the establishment of the being of the thing. This is not to say 
that being is equivalent to objectivity, but rather that being is equivalent to the 
subject-object relation in which objectivity is produced. 
Thus in order to think a triangle as an object, Kant says, we are conscious of 
the combination of three straight lines according to a rule by which an intuition of 
a triangle can always be represented. This unity of rule (applying to each 
successive moment of intuiting this triangle) detennines and limits the manifold, 
thus making possible the unity of apperception: the unity of rule makes it the case 
that the manifold is the sort of thing that a unitary consciousness combines into 
one representation that is of an object. Thus the function of applying the unity of 
rule gives us a single representation of a triangle and a concept of an object in 
general, the objectivity of the representation. Having a concept of objectivity 
50 CPR Al 05, emphasis added. 
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means that I think of my representation as a representation of an object = X, and it 
means that I have a relation to such an object. Although not directly intuited, this 
object = X is thought through those predicates that are intuited. "The concept of 
this unity is the representation of the object = X, which I think through the 
predicates, above mentioned, of a triangle".52 Having established the being of the 
triangle by bringing it into relation, I can now say that the triangle is scalene or 
simply that the triangle is. 
The unity of consciousness, or transcendental apperception, connects modes of 
knowledge with each other, precedes all data of intuitions, and makes possible the 
representation of objects: it precedes experience and makes it possible. 
Transcendental apperception is the transcendental ground of the unity of 
consciousness, and thus also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of all 
objects of experience.53 It is "a ground without which it would be impossible to 
think any object for our intuitions, for this object is no more than that something, 
the concept of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis".54 Transcendental 
apperception produces the concept of an object in general due to its identity of 
function, and the consciousness of this self-identical functioning is also 
consciousness of the objectivity of appearances: 
This transcendental unity of apperception fonus out of all possible 
appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one 
experience, a connection of all these representations according to 
laws. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the 
mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of 
51 To my knowledge, Sebastian Gardner is the only other commentator that has characterized the 
Deduction specifically in terms of a subject-object relation. See his Kant and the Critique of Pure 
Reason (London: Routledge, 1999). 135ff. 
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53 Wolfgang Carl argues that Kant developed this line of argument in his early drafts of the 
Deduction. He quotes Kant as saying: "an appearance will be made objective by bringing it about 
that it is contained under a title of self-perception"; "the conditions a priori under which [a given 
representation] can refer to an object [ ... ] can be discovered in the subject.. This object can ~nlybe 
represented according to the relations [of the subject] and is nothm~ .but the subJ.ectl\~~ 
representation [of the subject] itself. but generalized, because I am the ongmal of all. objects . 
Kant, Reflections 4677 and 4674. qtd. Wolfgang Carl. "Kant's First Drafts of the DeductIOn of the 
Categories", in Eckart Forster (ed.), Kant's Transcendental Deductions (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1989), 3-20, here at pp. 15-16. 
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the identity of function [i.e. unity of rule] whereby it synthetically 
combines [the manifold] in one knowledge. The original and 
necessary consciousness of the identity of self is thus at the same 
time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis 
of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, 
which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so 
doing determine an object for their intuition, that is, the concept of 
something wherein they are necessarily interconnected. 55 
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The unity of consciousness requires the mind to be conscious of the identity of its 
synthesizing function. The mind's synthesizing function is the application of the 
unity of rule over each successive intuition of a specific representation, and it is an 
identity of function because a numerically identical consciousness performs the 
synthesis. What is so important here is that in order for the subject to be conscious 
of its identity, it must be conscious of its productive, synthesizing activity amongst 
the manifold. 56 Thus the subject-object relation establishes not only objectivity, 
but also subjectivity (if we take subjectivity to be equivalent to self-
consciousness); the relation of being establishes both a subject and an object. In 
applying unity of rule - as we saw with the triangle - we generate a unified 
representation of the thing as attached to an object: the concept of something = X. 
So the object, which Kant will now call the transcendental object, is a 
transcendental product of the relation of being, in which a "productive" self 
synthesizes the manifold and gives it unity. 
Kant is now in a position to say more about the transcendental object. The 
transcendental object is, of course, not an "object" at all, but is the concept of an 
object in general that accompanies our unified representations. It prevents 
knowledge from being arbitrary by grounding the representation, thus giving 
objective reality to empirical concepts in their relation to an object. Kant notes 
also that the concept of the transcendental object is "always one and the same'" 
<,<, CPR A I 08, interpolations mine. 
56 As Heidegger suggests, the "} think" may be better characterized as "} am able" ["ich vermag", 
literally"} have the power"] (KPM 53). Kant sometimes describes apperception as a p~wer or 
faculty, e.g. at CPR A 117n. The ability of the productive understanding, it seems to me. IS much 
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throughout our knowledge. The objective reality of empirical concepts in general 
is assured by the pure concept of a transcendental object that is bound up with 
appearances in general. 
The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality 
throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what 
can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation 
to an object, that is, objective reality. This concept cannot contain 
any determinate intuition, and therefore refers only to that unity 
which must be met with in any manifold of knowledge which 
stands in relation to an object. This relation is nothing but the 
necessary unity of consciousness, and therefore also of the 
synthesis of the manifold, through a common function of the mind, 
which combines it in one representation. 57 
Kant's claim that the transcendental object "is always one and the same" 
throughout all knowledge suggests that there is no one-to-one relation between 
appearances and transcendental objects: transcendental objects are not Leibnizian 
monads. 58 Rather, the pure concept of one unified transcendental object is bound 
up with appearances in general, corresponding to the unity of consciousness 
synthesizing the manifold. We do not generate this "object in general" and then 
that "object in general" and so on; rather, for every appearance we employ the 
same pure concept "object in general", making all appearances objective in exactly 
the same way. Thus the concept of the transcendental object should not be thought 
as the concept of an object as such. It is, rather, the concept of objective unity in 
the manifold, and is thus the concept of the "objectness" or objectivity of 
appearances. 
The concept of the singular unity of the transcendental object is what identifies 
it with the "objective ground of all association of appearances", which Kant calls 
more important at this stage than that of the productive imagination celebrated by Heidegger in 
KPM. 
57 CPR AI09. 
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their affinity. 59 Appearances have an affinity by virtue of the unity of 
apperception, whose principle states that appearances must confonn to this unity 
- i.e. they must be thought to have a unified transcendental object underlying 
them. The concept of the transcendental object ensures that appearances are, in 
principle, unifiable and confonnable to one another. Without the unity of 
consciousness, knowledge would be without an object, for it is the concept of the 
unity of the thinking, functioning, self that produces the concept of this objective 
unity. Knowledge is only possible if appearances stand under the conditions of the 
necessary unity of apperception, and thereby become objects.6o 
Thus Kant's well-known phrase becomes clearer: "the a priori conditions of a 
possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of 
objects of experience".61 By "objects" Kant means intuitions unified into 
representations by transcendental apperception, and thereby given the objective 
unity of an underlying transcendental object. While it is true that in this phrase 
Kant is referring to the categories, he is also, on a more general level, referring to 
transcendental apperception as an a priori condition of possible experience, and 
condition of possibility of objects, rather than merely intuitions, of experience. 
Nature, as object of knowledge in an experience, with everything 
which it may contain, is only possible in the unity of apperception. 
The unity of apperception is thus the transcendental ground of the 
. . 6") 
necessary confonnity to law of all appearances III one experIence. -
ii) The B Deduction 
Kant entirely rewrote the Deduction for the B edition, and made a number of 
changes which are significant to aspects of the Critique with which I am not 
directly concerned. I will not address those changes here. Instead, I will suggest 
5R I disagree entirely with Findlay, who claims that transcendental objects "are to be conceived .as 
Leibniz and Wolff concieved them, as Kant conceived them in his early days, that is, as dynamIC, 
monadic simples underlying complex spatio-temporal appearances" (190-1 ). 
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that Kant's accounts of objectivity and of the grounds of knowledge in B, although 
described in different tenns, are not significantly different from those in A. This 
means that Kant's account of the subject-object relation, the relation of being, is 
quite consistent between the two versions; indeed, the B Deduction gives a much 
clearer account of this relation. 
In the B Deduction, Kant describes how the character of appearances and 
objects comes about with the character of thought. It must be possible, Kant says, 
for the "I think" to accompany all my representations, for otherwise there could be 
representations that could not be thought.63 While there can be no unthinkable 
representations, there are representations that can be given before thought, and 
these are called intuitions; the manifold of intuitions has a necessary relatabili~v to 
the "I think" in the same subject in which the manifold is found. This relating of 
the manifold of intuitions to the "I think" is an act of spontaneity and not of 
receptivity. It is pure apperception, constantly and solely concerned with 
generating the representation "I think". Pure apperception must be unified, for 
representations given in an intuition "would not be one and all my representations, 
if they did not belong to one self-consciousness".64 The unity of apperception is 
the transcendental unity of self-consciousness; it perfonns the "original 
combination" of the manifold. 
The identity of the apperception of the manifold contains a synthesis of 
representations, "and is possible only through the consciousness of this 
synthesis".65 For the relation of the percipient empirical consciousness to the 
identity of the subject comes about not merely through accompanying every 
representation with the "I think", "but only insofar as I conjoin one representation 
with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them".66 In order for 
experience to relate to one self-consciousness, I must not only be able to generate 
the representation "I think" to accompany every other representation, I must also 
connect the representations and be aware of this connection. Only through this 
consciousness of unification can 1 represent the identity of self-consciousness. 
h3 CPR B I 3 1-2. 
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Only insofar as I can unite a manifold of given representations in 
one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the 
identity of the consciousness In [i. e. throughout] these 
representations. In other words, the analytic unity of apperception 
is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic 
unity. [ ... ] Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as 
produced [hervorgebracht] a priori, is thus the ground of the 
identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my 
determinate thought. 67 
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The B edition account of the synthetic unity of apperception preceding the analytic 
unity makes much clearer its relation to Kant's claim, in the Refutation of 
Idealism, that inner sense in general is possible only through outer sense III 
general. The numerical identity of consciousness is revealed to me through my 
ability to unite the manifold of intuition in one consciousness. The "I think" must 
be accompanied by an "I act" in order to say "I know myself as one 
consciousness". In order to reach consciousness of the identity of the self and the 
determinate thoughts pertaining to it, we must already be amongst the manifold of 
spatio-temporal intuitions, able to produce synthetic unity a priori. Heidegger 
expresses a similar thought when he states that "world is essentially disclosed with 
the being of Da-sein". 68 The world is available to the subject, at this pre-categorial 
stage, only as a spatio-temporal manifold of intuitions. Nevertheless, a pre-
categorial relation to this world is a necessary presupposition of the representation 
of the identity of the self and of detenninate thought in general. The relation of the 
subject to the world is a productive one in which a synthetic unity is generated. 
Consciousness of the identity of our thinking self is grounded upon a productive 
relation to the world. 
The original synthetic unity of apperception is this initial relation between 
mind and world which makes possible the identity of self-consciousness and all 
detenninate thought. The productive activity of understanding gives unity to the 
M CPR B133. 
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manifold, and by unifying the manifold in its own consciousness, establishes its 
own subjectivity. This activity must precede all experience and is the ground of 
the possibility of knowledge: "the principle of apperception is [thus] the highest 
principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge".69 This activity of synthetic 
apperception, just as it was in the A Deduction, is the initial subject-object relation 
that both constitutes the subject as a self-identical subject of possible knowledge, 
and constitutes the object as a unified object of possible knowledge. In the B 
Deduction it is even more clear how the understanding produces unity, and 
establishes both sUbjectivity and objectivity with the act of giving that unity to the 
manifold and drawing that unity into its own consciousness. The relation is 
produced by the understanding alone, "which is nothing but the faculty of 
combining a priori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under 
the unity of apperception". 70 
Here we have the original subject-object relation that is equivalent to the 
relation of being. It is the relation that takes place before experience and before 
self-consciousness, which establishes that a world is suitable for knowing and that 
a mind is suitable for knowing it. Through the synthetic unity of apperception, the 
understanding, in its original spontaneous activity, "posits" a knowable world; it is 
the productive understanding, and not God, that accomplishes this positing, and 
that brings about the relation of being. Just as we saw in the A Deduction, being is 
the relation between a productive understanding and a world. It is through the 
productive activity of spontaneity that the being of beings - their relatedness to a 
subject, as objects - is established before the beings themselves are known. The 
understanding must produce synthetic unity in order to know anything, including 
its own self-identity. Beings are established as knowable through the initial 
productive relation of subject to world. It is worth noting, in response to the 
discussion of productive comportment in chapter one, that if our initial and 
overriding comportment towards the world is one of producedness, that is because 
69 CPR B 135. interpolation mine. 
70 CPR B 134-5. We can align productive spontaneity with Beatrice Longuenesse's definition of 
Kantian understanding as the capacity to judge. In establishing a relation to the object, the 
understanding sets up the conditions of possibility of judgment. See Longuenesse, Kant and the 
Capacity to Judge. trans. Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton: Princeton UP. 1998), 7. 
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the synthetic unity, on which all knowledge is based, is itself produced. (I will 
return to this later.) 
I believe that the A and B Deductions are very close on the topic of the 
original relation of being. One difference between them is that Kant does not 
discuss the transcendental object in B. He does, however, assert that an object is 
one result of the synthetic unifying activity of apperception: 
an object [Objekt] is that in the concept of which the manifold of a 
given intuition is united. Now all unification of representations 
demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. 
Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes 
the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their 
objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; 
and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the 
understanding.71 
Kant's notion of an object here appears to be quite different from that of the A 
Deduction, and may reflect a terminological difference between Gegenstand and 
Objekt. Allison suggests that Objekt refers to the broad, logical conception of an 
object associated with objective validity, while Gegenstand refers to a "real" 
object of possible experience, associated with objective reality.72 Indeed, Kant 
characterizes "an object [GegenstandJ of representations" (transcendental object) 
in A as that which confers objective reality on empirical concepts, although it is 
not itself an object of possible experience. In B, an object [Objekt] is whatever can 
be represented by means of the unification of a manifold of intuition under a 
concept. 73 But if this is a correct description, then a B-object is not so different 
from an A-object: in A, a transcendental object is the conceptual objectivity 
associated with the unification of a manifold in general. In B, the object is the 
71 CPR B137. 
n Allison, Kant '51 Transcendental Idealism, 135. Makkreel proposes that the contrast between 
Ohjekt and Gegenstand is not only that between logical and real objects, but also between what is 
gi\'en as mere material, and what is given as schematized object. 'Thus anything either merely 
thought or merely sensed would be an Ohjekt and becomes a Gegenstand - an object of 
experience - only through the mediation [ ... J by the schemata of the imagination" (Makkreel 40-
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formal notion of a concept-governed unified manifold in general. Kant simply uses 
less onto logically committed language here: whereas in A we had the concept of a 
transcendental object, in B we have merely a formal requirement. Both indicate 
the necessity of the concept of objectivity in general to experience. 
What the object is in B can be seen somewhat better from Kant's example of 
what it is to know something in space. 
To know anything in space (for instance, aline), I must draw it, 
and thus synthetically bring into being a determinate combination 
of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same 
time the unity of consciousness (as in the concept of a line); and it 
is through this unity of consciousness that an object (a detenninate 
space) is first known.74 
Knowledge reqUIres the understanding first to combine the manifold through 
synthesis, thus bringing into being a particular combination. This act of synthesis 
is what gives the subject consciousness of its own identity or unity. The unity of 
the act of combining is thus also the unity of consciousness, and this unity of act 
- detenninate combining by a single consciousness - is the fonnal condition of 
knowing any concept-governed unified manifold, an o~iect in general. It is 
through the unity of consciousness, and through the initial subject-object relation 
of being, that the conditions of possibility of objectivity in general are brought 
about. So the unity of consciousness, by virtue of providing the conditions of 
possibility of objectivity in general, constitutes the relation of representations to 
an object: the unity of consciousness makes it possible that representations relate 
to objects at all. 
The understanding provides the conditions of possibility of objectivity, which 
include the spontaneous production of a synthetic unity of apperception and a self-
identical consciousness in which representations may be un(fied under a concept. 
The objective validity of knowledge - its capacity to be true or false in relating 
73 Allison, Kant's Trans('endenlalldealism, 145. 
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representations to an object - rests upon this objective unity of self-
conSCIOusness. 
The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective 
condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition that I 
myself require in knowing an object, but is a condition under 
which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for 
75 
me. 
Every intuition must stand under the synthetic unity of consciousness in order to 
become a knowable, judgeable object. Thus the transcendental unity of 
apperception allows us to make objectively valid judgments, that is, to assert that 
something is the case in the object, and is not merely a relation of representations 
connected according to subjective laws of association.76 The objective unity of 
consciousness gives the copula "is" its meaning: it connects two concepts in a way 
that denotes the objective validity of the relation regardless of the objective reality 
of the content of the judgment. 77 As we saw in chapter one, Kant demonstrates 
with the concept of God that actuality is not a predicate that can be inferred from 
the objective validity of a statement; the copula "is" has epistemic significance 
without necessarily having existential significance. But as epistemically 
significant, the "is" relates to being: it indicates the relation of given 
representations to the synthetic unity of apperception. The assertion, with the "is", 
of objectivity in general, has an original connection to being as the initial subject-
object relation. The relation of being is implicit in the "is", whether it be used 
logically ("the triangle is scalene") or existentially ("the triangle is"). 
There is much important material in the Deductions that I have not discussed. 
But I have found that in both A and B, the production of a concept of objectivity is 
crucial to the establishment not only of the object but also of the subject. The 
production of this concept happens through the synthetic unity of apperception, 
and because both subject and object are established in and through this relation, I 
75 CPR B138. 
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have equated it with the relation of being. This is supported by the fact that Kant 
suggests that, along with experience, judgments (of the forms P is Q and P is) are 
possible only when objectivity has been established. We can see that before this 
relation of being comes about, there is other activity going on: the syntheses of 
apprehension and reproduction in A, and straightforward receptivity in B. It seems 
that what is crucial to the relation which establishes objectivity and subjectivity, is 
spontaneity - spontaneity that is productive. The relation of being involves the 
activity of productive spontaneity on a manifold which, perhaps inevitably, we 
interpret to be a productive nature. The relation of being is an ongoing one, 
constantly upheld by the productive activity of human understanding reaching out 
to a world. Being, for Kant, is no static self-identical unity created by God; it is, 
rather, a constant activity which both unifies and differentiates disparate elements, 
a constant productive activity that is tied to human understanding. 
This differs markedly from Heidegger's interpretation. For Heidegger, the 
original relation between subject and object established an ontological horizon of 
objectivity, within which the being of things was grasped and disclosed as 
produced permanent presence. I am arguing, by contrast, that the original relation 
produces both subjectivity and objectivity, and that this productive relation is 
being. The relation to the manifold is initiated by spontaneity in its productive 
activity. Because spontaneity relates to the manifold with a view to producing 
synthesis and objectivity, it does indeed perceive the manifold as a product; but it 
is the product of the intersection of fonnal and material conditions, a product of 
being itself. Being is the productive relation making beings possible, and not the 
mere producedness of beings. 
3.4 The transcendental object as the ground of appearances 
I will now move on to consider how the concept of the transcendental object, 
in the later sections of the Analytic, is thought to be the ground of appearances. To 
understand the type of grounding at issue here, it may be helpful to use Buchdahl's 
77 The judgment "unicorns are white" has objective validity (capacity to be true or false) without 
having objective reality (actuality), See Allison. Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 135ff. 
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model of blank objectivity in general that is "coloured in" through the data of 
sensibility. 
It seems clear from the A Deduction that the concept of the transcendental 
object is not that of an underlying thing, but rather the concept of an object in 
general that must accompany all intuitions. It is a singular, unified concept of an 
object in general that is thought to correspond to appearances in general; it is not a 
monad corresponding to individual appearances. It is a concept that necessarily 
accompanies intuitions in experience, and not one that is intellectually envisioned 
after experience. On the basis of the A Deduction, the transcendental object 
should be strongly distinguished from the thing in itself and the noumenon. 
This is borne out in the A edition Phenomena and Noumena chapter. The 
concept of the transcendental object here is the same as the one from the A 
Deduction. In other words, Kant is not yet claiming that the transcendental object 
is the cause of appearances, but only that the concept of an object in general is 
necessary to objective representation. 
All our representations are, it is true, referred by the understanding 
to some object; [ ... J a something, as the object of sensible intuition. 
But this something, thus conceived, is only the transcendental 
object; and by that is meant a something = X, of which we know, 
and with the present constitution of our understanding can know, 
nothing whatsoever, but which, as a correlate of the unity of 
apperception, can serve only for the unity of the manifold III 
sensible intuition. By means of this unity the understanding 
combines the manifold into the concept of an object. This 
transcendental object cannot be separated from the sensible data, 
for nothing is then left through which it might be thought. 
Consequently it is not in itself an object of knowledge, but only the 
representation of appearances under the concept of an object in 
general - a concept which is determinable through the manifold 
78 
of these appearances. 
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Later in the chapter I will return to the question of whether and how the 
transcendental object is thought to be the cause of appearances. But this passage is 
not claiming anything as strong as that. Kant simply says that our representations 
are referred to the transcendental object as the object of sensible intuition. The 
transcendental object is not an object of knowledge, but is the concept of an object 
in general, or (put otherwise) the concept of "objectness". Just as we saw in the A 
Deduction, this concept is a correlate of the unity of apperception, and serves to 
objectify the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition. By means of the unity of 
the manifold, the understanding combines the manifold into the concept of an 
object. The transcendental object is simply the concept of objectness which 
necessarily accompanies the sensible intuition, and which is determined through 
sensible intuition. This is why Kant says that it "cannot be separated from the 
sensible data": without sensible data, the concept of objectness cannot be brought 
into play. There can be no "object in general" that lacks sensible data: without 
sensible data to unify, the unity itself would vanish. Similarly~ every 
representation is referred to "the object of sensible intuition" because every 
representation includes the concept of an object accompanying the sensible data. 
Kant goes on to say that the categories do not represent any special object 
given to the understanding alone, but only serve to determine the transcendental 
object - the concept of an object in general - through that which is given in 
sensibility.79 Only in this way are appearances empirically known as objects. The 
categories, then, are not concepts that correspond to intelligible objects; rather, 
they fonnally detennine the concept of an object in general through the data of 
sensibility. This is where Buchdahl's realizational interpretation of Kant becomes 
particularly useful: the categories "realize" the transcendental object as this or that 
appearance by "colouring in" the blank concept of an object in general with 
properties such as reality, substantiality, and existence, through that which is 
given in sensibility. The concept of an object in general is realized as a particular 
phenomenon by virtue of its sensible data and this conceptual colouring-in. 
79 CPR A251. 
Chapter 3 139 
By contrast with the transcendental object, the noumenon would be that 
"special object given to the understanding alone" which is thought to be 
determined by the categories without reference to sensibility. Noumena would be 
mere objects of understanding that could nevertheless be given to an intuition, 
though not a sensible intuition: they could be given only to that intuition which 
creates what it intuits.80 We might think that we are justified in dividing objects 
into phenomena and noumena, and the world into a world of the senses and a 
world of the understanding, based on the thought that the object that appears to the 
senses must also be non-sensibly intuitable by the understanding.81 If we were to 
think that, Kant says, we could not assert that the categories of understanding 
apply only to possible experience; rather, we would have to recognize a "pure and 
yet objectively valid employment" of the categories in addition to their empirical 
employment. 82 But because human understanding is finite and non-creative, and it 
lacks the absolutely objective reality of intellectual intuition, it apprehends 
appearances only, and only through sensibility; it is not affected by objects but 
must produce the concept of an object in general to accompany representations. 
As we have seen, it is that produced concept of an object, and not any special 
intellectual object, that the categories determine (through sensibility). 
Nevertheless, we continue to posit noumena along with the phenomena of 
experience - largely due, says Kant, to our insistence that appearances must be 
appearances of something. 
The word appearance must be recognized as already indicating a 
relation to something, the immediate representation of which is, 
indeed, sensible, but which, even apart from the constitution of our 
sensibility [ ... ], must be something in itself, that is, an object 
independent of sensibility. 83 
80 CPR A248-9. Kant does not distinguish between the negati\e and positive senses of the 
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We require that an appearance refer to something in itself, apart from sensibility. 
The noumenon signifies the thought of this something in itself, reached by 
abstracting from everything that belongs to the form of sensible intuition, and 
assuming a non-sensible intuition to which this something could be objectively 
given. Only for a creative intellectual intuition could the noumenon be object: the 
assertion of the latter requires the assumption of the former. But we cannot 
establish whether such an intuition is possible. The noumenon then cannot be 
established as object; rather, it remains "a mere form of a concept" which does not 
refer to a "true object, distinguishable from all phenomena".84 
The difference in A between the noumenon and the transcendental object is 
principally that of their place in Kant's dynamic process of the objectification of 
the world. The transcendental object is the concept of an object in general 
produced by transcendental apperception in unifying the manifold; this concept of 
an object is then "coloured in" by the categories through the data of sensibility. 
The concept of the transcendental object, while not itself sensibly intuitable, is 
inextricably bound up with sensible intuition. The concept of the noumenon, by 
contrast, is thought after experience, as an abstraction from all sensible intuition 
associated with a creative intellectual intuition. The concept of the noumenon is, 
in Buchdahl's terms, an illegitimate realization of the transcendental object, for it 
attempts to "colour in" the concept of an object in general without sensible data, to 
be the object of a non-sensible intuition. This passage from the Amphiboly 
supports Buchdahl' s interpretation: 
what we do is to think something in general; and while on the one 
hand we detennine it in sensible fashion, on the other hand we 
distinguish from this mode of intuiting it the universal object 
represented in abstracto. What we are then left with is a mode of 
detennining the object by thought alone - a merely logical fonn 
without content, but which yet seems to us to be a mode in which 
the object exists in itself (noumenon) without regard to intuition, 
which is limited to our senses.85 
~4 CPR A252-3. 
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When we think "something in general", the transcendental object, either we 
sensibly determine it to generate an appearance or we attempt to detennine it 
through thought alone, abstracted from sensibility, resulting in a merely logical 
form without content. Kant himself tells us that the indeterminate thought of 
"something in general" cannot be thought of as an illegitimately-determined 
noumenon: 
The object to which I relate appearance in general is the 
transcendental object, that is, the completely indeterminate thought 
of something in general. This cannot be entitled noumenon; for I 
know nothing of what it [i.e. the transcendental object] is in itself, 
and have no concept of it save as merely the object of a sensible 
intuition in general, and so as being one and the same for all 
appearances.86 
The fact that the transcendental object is thought to be one and the same for all 
appearances, in the above passage, helps us to understand how the transcendental 
object is distinguished from the thing in itself, which I have not discussed here. 
There is considerable scholarly debate over whether the transcendental object and 
the thing in itself refer to the same concept, as Kant suggests at A366, for 
example. However, because I believe that A366 refers to the idea of the 
transcendental object (to which I will return), I think that a simple equation of the 
concept of the transcendental object and the thing in itself would be misguided. 
The strongest case against this equation is the singularity of the transcendental 
object as opposed to a potentially infinite number of things in themselves. While 
the transcendental object is thought to be a single underlying unity relating to all 
appearances, things in themselves are thought to be individual items 
corresponding to each individual appearance. The transcendental object is general 
unified objectivity, "the object of a sensible intuition in general", and not the 
being-in-itself of any particular appearance. In Buchdahl's sense, it is 
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"transcendental" in that its conditions for realization are as yet held in abeyance; 
when these conditions are applied, the object is intuitable only through its sensible 
data, as appearance. 
While the concept of the transcendental object is omitted from much of the B 
edition, we will see it retained in some sections of the Amphiboly that are the 
same in A and B. In the B edition of the Phenomena and Noumena chapter, only 
one reference to the transcendental object is retained: 
Thought is the act which relates given intuition to an object. If the 
mode of this intuition is not in any way given, the object is merely 
transcendental, and the concept of understanding has only 
transcendental employment, namely, as the unity of the thought of 
a manifold in general. 87 
In this passage Kant says that in the absence of intuition, the understanding works 
with a merely transcendental object, referring its concepts to the unity of the 
thought of a manifold in general. This suggests that the concept of the 
transcendental object here is the same as that of the A Deduction and earlier 
passages of the A Phenomena and Noumena chapter: the transcendental object is 
the concept of the objectivity in general of the manifold. The passage goes on to 
argue that no object is determined through a pure category, and thus makes a case 
against the assumption of noumena in the positive sense (which I will discuss 
shortly). 
Some commentators hold that in the B Phenomena and Noumena chapter Kant 
simply replaces the transcendental object with the noumenon in the negative 
sense.88 However, the function of the latter does not correspond to that of the 
fonner, and this interpretation cannot, in any case, account for Kant's retention of 
the transcendental object later in the text. Instead, I suggest that the concept of the 
transcendental object. as the concept of objectivity that makes appearances 
transcendentally possible, means it no longer has immediate relevance to the B 
edition Phenomena and Noumena chapter. Since the chapter is intended to show 
1\7 CPR A247 18304. 
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that objects of experience must be represented as appearances and not as 
intelligible, and is therefore concerned with the limitations of sensibility and 
understanding to experience, it would be out of place to include a claim here about 
the concept of objectivity produced by spontaneity before experience. Indeed, if 
Kant wants to make clear that the object of this concept is in no way to be 
conceived as an intelligible entity abstracted from experience, he does well to 
remove discussion of it from this chapter; for in the context of denying our access 
to intelligible entities, it would be all too easy for the reader to assume that the 
ground of appearances is such an entity, and thus to assume that the existence of 
appearances is based on noumena or even Leibnizian monads.89 The concept of 
the transcendental object is omitted from the Phenomena and Noumena chapter 
because it has nothing to do with speculation about intelligible entities. Rather, as 
I will show, this concept retains its A edition identity as the concept of the 
objectivity of appearances; only when it is thought as an idea is it thought 
heuristically to be an intelligible entity with causal power. 
Kant's general notion of the noumenon in the B edition is quite similar to that 
in the A edition. When the understanding entitles an object phenomenon, it also 
generates a representation of an object in itself, and mistakenly forms a concept of 
this object which is thought to be knowable through the categories alone. The 
understanding 
is misled into treating the entirely indeterminate concept of an 
intelligible entity, namely, of a something in general outside our 
sensibility, as being a determinate concept of an entity that allows 
of being known in a certain [purely intelligible] manner by means 
of the understanding.90 
The generation of an indetenninate concept of a "something in general" outside 
our sensibility is, Kant suggests, a natural tendency of the understanding. But to 
treat this indetenninate concept as a detenninate concept of an object is 
R9 Findlay, in fact, falls into this very trap! The entirety of his peculiar book. Kant and the 
Transcendental Object, rests on this mistake. 
90 CPR B307. 
Chapter 3 144 
illegitimate, for such a treatment assumes an intellectual intuition for whom the 
object is determined. In this "positive" sense, the noumenon is thought to be "an 
object of a non-sensible intuition". The merely "problematic" treatment of this 
concept, where we think of a thing "so far as it is not an object of our sensible 
intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it", gives us the noumenon in 
the negative sense.91 We are justified in using the tenn noumenon only in the 
negative sense, as a concept which limits sensibility and the categories to things 
regarded as appearances.92 
The noumenon taken in the negative sense is the legitimate thought of the 
thing in itself: the thing not as it is for sensible intuition. But this does not 
correspond to the A edition transcendental object. Just like noumena in A, 
noumena in the negative sense in B are thought to be numerically plural or 
infinite, each noumenon corresponding to one thing in appearance. The noumenon 
in the negative sense is thought as the particular thing when it is not an object of 
sensible intuition; the A edition transcendental object is thought to be the singular, 
general, non-intuitable object of sensible intuition. That is, the noumenon in the 
negative sense is the appearance with its conditions of sensibility abstracted from 
it; the transcendental object is the concept of the unity underlying all appearances, 
and only manifesting itself through sensibility as individuated appearances. 
Implicit in each of these points of distinction is the fact that the transcendental 
object operates "earlier" in the dynamic of objective experience than does the 
noumenon in the negative sense. The latter requires an already experienced object 
from which to abstract; the fonner is thought to allow for objective experience. 
While the noumenon in the negative sense has certain characteristics in common 
with the transcendental object (such as inaccessibility to experience), it is thought 
in quite a different way and certainly does not replace it. 
This claim is strengthened by looking at the Amphiboly of Concepts of 
Reflection, written in A and retained in B.93 In this appendix to the Analytic, Kant 
91 CPR B307. 
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rejects Leibniz's monadology on the basis of its treatment of things as objects of 
pure understanding, but also introduces the important notion of transcendental 
reflection. Without the reflection that decides that things are to be treated as 
appearances, we fall into the error of "confounding an object of pure 
understanding with appearance".94 To avoid this error Kant introduces the 
concepts of reflection here: concepts that are imagined to have the same objective 
validity as the categories, but which are, in fact, "only concepts of a mere 
comparison of concepts already given, and therefore are of quite another nature 
and use".95 The concepts of reflection are those which can be used to compare 
concepts logically, but which require transcendental reflection if they are to be 
applied to objects: concepts such as identity and difference and inner and outer 
cannot be established of sensible things by means of their concepts, and so require 
the specification of the cognitive faculty (i.e. sensibility) to which they belong.96 
Leibniz applied these concepts to things without this specification, and thus 
failed to see that their application to the logical comparison of concepts does not 
guarantee application to the objective comparison of representations. The 
Amphiboly, then, is noteworthy for its subtle focus on matter: Leibniz's system 
fails, Kant says, partly because Leibniz does not recognize that material nature 
exceeds the logical laws that are suitable only to concepts. Leibniz's principle that 
realities never logically conflict with each other, for instance, cannot be extended 
beyond application to concepts, for we constantly experience the effects of 
material conflict among appearances - a conflict which (according to an a priori 
rule of material nature) has the original conflict of fundamental forces as its 
empirical condition.97 Kant also points out that Leibniz' s insistence on the 
absolutely internal nature of substances is hopeless, for we can know things in 
space only through their outer relations - in particular, "only through forces 
defines the thing as a set of relations rather than as an existent entity (36, 108-9). For Heidegger's 
view of the Amphiboly, see "Kant's Thesis about Being", Pathmarks, 357-63. 
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which are active ill this and that space ... 48 Kant identifies Leibniz' s "inward 
nature" with the thing in itself. 
In this context Kant refers to the concept of the transcendental obj ect as the 
possible ground of matter. and not as its inward nature. With this. Kant clearly 
rejects the notion that the transcendental object is the thing in itself or any kind of 
intelligible inner nature of things. While for Leibniz the inward nature of things is 
intelligible. for Kant, seek as we might. \ve will only ever fmd "comparati\ely 
inward" appearances of outer sense at the heart of matter.99 That is. matter is made 
up of nothing but matter. We should not. then. chase after phantom things in 
themselves. but we might legitimately speculate about a transcendental object that 
grounds appearances: 
Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That which inwardly belongs to 
it I seek in all parts of the space which it occupies. and in all effects 
which it exercises. though admittedly these can only be 
appearances of outer sense. I have therefore nothing that is 
absolutely. but only what is comparatively inward and is itself 
again composed of outer relations. The absolutely inward [nature] 
of matter. as it would have to be conceived by pure understanding. 
is nothing but a phantom~ for matter is not among the l'lbjects of 
pure understanding, and the transcendental o~it!L'T which may be 
the ground of this appearance that we call matter is a mere 
something of which we should not understand \vhat it is. e\en if 
someone were in a position to tell us. For we can understand only 
that which brings with it. in intuition. something corresponding to 
our words. 100 
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There is nothing in matter other than the outer appearances that we apprehend 
through ever more precise scientific inquiry. No inward nature or thing in itself is, 
or ever will be, accessible to the pure understanding. Thus it is not the inner but 
the outer relations of matter - specifically those that are "self-subsistent and 
permanent" - that make up the "primary substratum of all outer perception".lol 
Indeed, we saw in chapter two that it is the outer intuition of matter's 
impenetrability that is crucial to experience. So the transcendental object, which 
may legitimately be thought, should not be identified with the phantom inward 
nature of things. Rather, we may think the transcendental object as the ground of 
the relations of matter - a ground which cannot be intuited on its own, but can 
only be understood when it brings with it the sensible data that "correspond to our 
ds" 102 wor . 
While this might be viewed as Kant's speculation that the transcendental 
object is the intelligible cause of appearances, I interpret Kant as making a much 
weaker and merely transcendental claim here. What we see in this passage is a 
retention of the A edition concept of the transcendental object - the concept of an 
object in general- that is "coloured in" through sensible data. Kant claims in this 
section that matter consists solely of relations; if we abstract from these relations, 
"there is nothing more left for me to think", and the possibility of a noumenal 
object detenninable through mere concepts is ruled OUt. 103 Yet this does not rule 
out the possibility of a transcendental object, "something in general" that is 
thought to accompany the relations and bind them together transcendentally. In so 
doing, the concept of the transcendental object makes it possible for an appearance 
as a whole (as opposed to a bundle of non-unified outer relations) to appear to the 
senses. This is clear from Kant's definition, in this section, of an appearance: 
It is certainly startling to hear that a thing is to be taken as 
consisting wholly of relations. Such a thing is, however, mere 
appearance, and cannot be thought through pure categories; what it 
101 CPR A284-5 /8340-1. 
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itself consists in is the mere relation of something in general to the 
senses.
104 
148 
An appearance, then, is a bundle of relations which, when objectified by means of 
the concept of something in general, can be related as a whole to the senses. In 
order for an appearance to appear, its relations must be unified into a single thing, 
which is accomplished by use of the concept of the transcendental object 
("something in general"). A thing consists of nothing but relations because the 
transcendental object is not a thing in itself or a noumenon in addition to those 
relations; it is simply the concept of an object in general that must accompany the 
relations in order for them to constitute an appearance. The concept of the 
transcendental object grounds appearances (and thus matter) in a strictly 
transcendental sense, as the condition for the possibility of there being 
appearances at all. 
If we take the concept of the transcendental object to be nothing more than the 
concept of an object in general, there is no problem in reconciling its use here with 
its exclusion from the B Deduction. Even if (as the B Deduction suggests) the 
objectivity of knowledge requires nothing more than a formal concept of 
objectivity in general, it is occasionally useful to think of this formal concept as 
the entirely indeterminate concept of a transcendental object in general. This is 
one of those occasions: Kant wishes to show that we are justified in thinking of a 
transcendental object, but not a noumenon (which would be the determinate 
concept of an intelligible entity), as the ground of appearances. And if the concept 
of the transcendental object is equivalent to the concept of the objectivity of 
appearances in general, this move is unproblematic, for the grounding here is 
merely a transcendental grounding. The transcendental object grounds the 
appeanng of the appearance because it constitutes the objectivity of the 
appearance. Objectivity is what distinguishes an appearance from a mere 
representation; the transcendental object may be said to ground appearance insofar 
as the concept of objectivity in general is a condition for the possibility of 
appearance. 
104 CPR A285 /8341, emphasis added. 
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The concept of objectivity in general is grounding because it is thought as the 
concept of an indetenninate transcendental object in general, and thus as a 
condition for the possibility of appearances in general. It is not thought as an 
intelligible object detenninable through pure categories. Nor is it thought to be 
that which affects us with sensations, for this concept is a transcendental 
condition of appearances, and not a material or noumenal one. 
3.5 The idea of the transcendental object 
I have suggested that the concept of the transcendental object is characterized 
in the Analytic as the ground of appearances, in the sense of being their condition 
of possibility. It seems to me entirely consistent with Kant's project to argue that 
objectivity in general is a condition of possibility of there being appearances; as 
long as we interpret the concept of the transcendental object in this way, there is 
no need to speculate that Kant thought that intelligible entities underlie and cause 
each individual appearance. However, it is now time to treat of those instances in 
which Kant undeniably says that a transcendental object is the cause of 
appearance, and equates this tenn with the thing in itself or noumenon in the 
negative sense. 
This is evident in a number of the passages quoted in section 3.1 above, and 
also in numerous other parts of the Dialectic. For instance: 
What matter may be as a thing in itself (transcendental object) is 
completely unknown to us [ ... J. 
The non-sensible cause of [our J representations IS completely 
unknown to us, and cannot therefore be intuited by us as object. 
[ ... J We may, however, entitle the purely intelligible cause of 
appearances in general the transcendental object, but merely in 
order to have something corresponding to sensibility viewed as 
receptivity. To this transcendental object we can ascribe the whole 
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extent and connection of our possible perceptions, and can say that 
it is given in itself prior to all experience. 
Since [appearances] are not things in themselves, they must rest 
upon a transcendental object which determines them as mere 
representations, and consequently there is nothing to prevent us 
from ascribing to this transcendental object, besides the quality in 
terms of which it appears, a causality which is not appearance, 
although its effect is to be met with in appearance. 105 
150 
These passages clearly refer to an intelligible object that causes appearances, and /J 
not to the concept of objectivity in general that is their transcendental ground. [ 
Kant seems not only to conflate the transcendental object with the thing in itself, 
but also to assert that the transcendental object is the cause of appearances. These 
claims pose significant problems to the interpretation I have developed up to now. 
However, I have a solution to propose. 
Other commentators have also noted the problem that these later passages 
appear to work with a conception of the transcendental object different from that 
of the A Deduction and Phenomena and Noumena chapter. This leads to the 
conclusion that Kant uses the tenn "transcendental object" in at least two different \ 
ways: first, as the "something = X" of the A Deduction, the concept of an object in 
general that necessarily accompanies sensible data; and second, as the thing in 
itself, the thought of an object abstracted from all sensible conditions. 106 If we 
wish to read these passages as identifying the transcendental object with the 
noumenon in the negative sense, then we must take the view that Kant sometimes 
uses the tenn "transcendental object" to mean "thing in itself'. This view, 
however, leaves us without an explanation as to why Kant sometimes makes this 
equivalence and at other times denies its validity. To resolve this problem, many 
argue that Kant alway .... ' thinks of the transcendental object as equivalent to the 
lOS CPR A366; A494 / 8522: A539 /8567. 
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noumenon m the negative sense or thing m itself, and see these passages as 
evidence for that point. 
However, I have already argued against the conflation of these two tenns, 
based on what I see to be Kant's more consistent position in the Transcendental 
Analytic. The thing in itself or negative noumenon is an individual object not as it 
is for sensible intuition. The transcendental object is the concept of objectivity in 
general. Furthennore, as I have shown, Kant specifically suggests that the concept 
of the transcendental object is not to be conflated with the Leibnizian "inward 
nature" or "in itself' of things. There is no evidence in the Analytic (aside from 
one problematic passage which I will address shortly) that Kant thinks of the 
concept of the transcendental object to be equivalent to the thing in itself or 
noumenon in the negative sense. All such evidence occurs in the Dialectic, where, 
as I shall argue, Kant uses the tenn "transcendental object" in quite a different 
way. Indeed, in order to make sense of these passages, and of Kant's use of the 
tenn "transcendental object" in the Dialectic, we need to introduce a distinction 
between the concept of the transcendental object and the idea of it. 
I would like to argue that there is a fundamental shift in Kant's use of the tenn 
when he moves from the Analytic, which deals with the faculty of understanding, 
to the Dialectic, which deals with the faculty of reason. The concept of the 
transcendental object, as we have seen, is the understanding's concept of an object 
in general and is thought as the condition of possibility of appearances; it is 
employed throughout the Analytic. The idea of the transcendental object, however, 
is an idea of reason that is based on this concept. It is the idea of an intelligible l 
cause of appearances, and is employed throughout the Dialectic. 
There is evidence to back this up both in the Antinomies and in a section that 
Kant calls "The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason".107 In 
the Dialectic, reason is applied to the concepts of the understanding, unifying and 
ordering them according to its principle to seek the unconditioned for the 
. d' 108 Th I' h conditioned knowledge obtamed by the understan mg. e so utlOn to t e 
problem (in the Paralogisms and Antinomies) that reason is unable to reach the 
which use them - understanding and reason - an interpretation which I think better solves the 
problem Allison encounters. 
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unconditioned in the sensible world, is the idea of an intelligible substrate in 
which the series of conditions may be thought to be reconciled. Now Kant 
explains that in the antinomies, "reason is applied to the objective synthesis of 
appearances".109 Reason synthesizes or brings together appearances into a series of 
conditions. But the possibility of an objective synthesis, as opposed to a merely 
subjective one, rests on the objective affinity of appearances that Kant established 
in the A Deduction, and this affinity, as we have seen, is made possible by the 
concept of objective unity that is the same for all appearances. This suggests that 
reason takes up the concept of objective unity in general - the concept of the 
transcendental object - which is already thought to underlie all appearances. 
Reason applies to this concept its demand for unconditioned unity, and thus 
establishes an idea of a transcendental object. From the understanding's concept 
of objective unity in general, employed for the sake of the possibility of 
knowledge, reason generates the idea of an unconditioned intelligible cause for the 
sake of grounding all knowledge that the understanding acquires. "We then, as it 
were, derive the object of experience from the supposed object of this idea, viewed 
as the ground or cause of the object of experience". I 10 
Kant gives an account of how we reach this idea of a transcendental object. 
Ideas in general are derived from reason, which 
free[s] a concept of understanding from the unavoidable limitations 
of possible experience, and so endeavour[ s] to extend it beyond the 
limits of the empirical, though still, indeed, in terms of its relation 
h .. 1111 to t e emplnca . 
The concept that is freed in this case is the concept of objective unity in general. 
This concept is extended beyond the bounds of possible experience and thought, 
by reason, to be the supersensible "object" underlying appearances: the idea of an 
unconditioned unity underlying all matter and thought. We can see that the 
concept of the transcendental object, as the projected objective unity of the 
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sensible manifold, is quite appropriate to be made into the idea of a projected 
supersensible unity of the entirety of the world. Furthennore, Kant tells us that 
reason's primary task is to apply a regulative principle of systematic unity to all 
empirical knowledge - a principle that comes from the unity of reason itself. I I:! 
Just as the understanding produces synthetic unity in the manifold, reason 
produces unity in empirical knowledge, and it does this by means of the idea of an 
object: 
[R ]eason cannot think this systematic unity otherwise than by 
giving to the idea of this unity an object; and since experience can 
never give an example of complete systematic unity, the object 
which we have to assign to the idea is not such as experience can 
ever supply. This object, as thus entertained by reason [ ... ], is a 
mere idea; it is not assumed as a something that is real absolutely 
and in itself, but is postulated only problematically (since we 
cannot reach it through any of the concepts of the understanding) in 
order that we may view all connection of the things of the world of 
sense as if they had their ground in such a being. II3 
On the previous page, Kant calls this object "the transcendental object of our 
idea".II4 Earlier in the text Kant says that cosmological ideas have a purely 
intelligible object, "and this object may indeed be admitted as a transcendental 
object, but only if we likewise admit that [ ... ] we have no knowledge in regard to it 
[ ... ]. It is a mere thought-entity". 115 It is to this idea of an unconditioned unity that 
the transcendent ideas of a soul, of a world-whole, and of free causality are 
attached. The idea of God, as discussed in chapters one and two, is also attached to 
this idea. 
The idea of the transcendental object, then, is the idea of an underlying 
supersensible unity which can be thought to be the intelligible cause of 
III CPR A409 / B436. 
112 CPR A680 / B708. 
113 CPR A681 / B709. 
114 CPR A679 / B707. 
115 CPR A565-6 / B593-4. 
Chapter 3 154 
appearances, but which must never be assumed to be actual. Kant says that the 
only way we can think this object is by use of analogy, employing "pure concepts 
of things in general" and extending them beyond experience. Reason extends the 
concept of the transcendental object beyond experience and uses it as a regulative 
principle. This is how we can view the transcendental object as being the non-
sensible cause of representations, and as being the source of free causality. 1 16 The 
fact that the idea of the transcendental object is regulative and not constitutive 
means that we need not worry that Kant is sneaking in non-phenomenal 
substances with non-phenomenal causality. The idea of a transcendental object is 
only a means of thinking an unconditioned ground for appearances, and has no 
ontological status. 
It should be clear that Kant does not conflate the idea of the transcendental 
object with the noumenon in the positive sense: it is not characterized as a 
determinate concept of an entity that allows of being known in an intelligible 
manner. However, Kant does explicitly relate the idea of the transcendental object 
to the concept of the thing in itself or noumenon in the negative sense, sometimes 
suggesting that they are equivalent. In the Phenomena and Noumena chapter, Kant 
defined the noumenon in the negative sense as the indetenninate concept of an 
intelligible entity not available to our sensibility. That definition also applies to the 
idea of the transcendental object. The difference is that the noumenon in the 
negative sense is an abstraction thought by the understanding in order to set limits 
to its own activity in experience, whereas the idea of the transcendental object is a 
principle employed by reason in order to seek the unconditioned cause for the 
whole of experience. That is, the concept of the noumenon in the negative sense 
makes us understand that our faculties are limited to possible experience, while 
the idea of the transcendental object allows us to think the unconditioned ground 
of that experience. The noumenon in the negative sense, or thing in itself, was also 
characterized as individuated for particular appearances, whereas the idea of the 
transcendental object, like the concept of the transcendental object, is thought to 
be a singular unified substrate. Thus while the idea of the transcendental object is 
similar to the noumenon in the negative sense in terms of its indetenninacy and 
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inaccessibility, our characterization of this idea is based not on the noumenon but 
on the concept of the transcendental object. 
I have argued that Kant distinguishes the concept of the transcendental object 
from the idea of it, and that only reason's idea of the transcendental object can be 
thought as a cause of appearance. There is one passage, however, that presents a 
problem for my interpretation, which I will discuss at some length. 
In the process of warning [ sensibility] that it must not presume to 
claim applicability to things in themselves but only to appearances, 
[the understanding] does indeed think for itself an object in itself, 
but only as transcendental object, which is the cause [Ursache] of 
appearance and therefore not itself appearance, and which can be 
thought neither as quantity nor as reality nor as substance, etc. 
(because these concepts always require sensible forms in which 
they determine an object). We are completely ignorant whether it is 
to be met with in us or outside us, whether it would be at once 
removed with the cessation of sensibility, or whether in the 
absence of sensibility it would still remain. If we are pleased to 
name this object noumenon for the reason that its representation is 
not sensible, we are free to do so. But since we can apply to it none 
of the concepts of our understanding, the representation remains 
for us empty, and is of no service except to mark the limits of our 
sensible knowledge and to leave open a space which we can fill 
neither through possible expenence nor through pure 
d d· 117 un erstan mg. 
This passage makes clear that the transcendental object is not to be conflated with 
the noumenon in the positive sense, but is rather to be thought to be related to the 
noumenon in the negative sense. However, this passage is problematic for my 
interpretation, for while Kant seems to be discussing the idea of the transcendental 
object here, the passage occurs in the Amphiboly (i.e. in the Analytic), and refers 
117 CPR A288-9 / B344-5. 
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not to reason but to the understanding. It appears, in this passage, that Kant is 
talking about the understanding's concept of the transcendental object, suggesting 
that it be conflated with the noumenon in the negative sense, and asserting that it 
is thought as the cause of appearance. 
I have argued that in the Analytic we encounter only the concept of the 
transcendental object, which is thought to ground appearances in a transcendental 
sense: the concept of an object in general is the condition of possibility of there 
being appearances at all. My first strategy, then, is to interpret this passage 
according to Kant's consistent use in the Analytic of the concept of the 
transcendental object. This means that we must read the term "transcendental 
object" in this passage as referring to the understanding's concept of an object in 
general, which "causes" appearances to appear in the sense of being the 
transcendental condition of all appearing. We might then interpret the passage as 
follows. The understanding thinks for itself the entirely indeterminate concept of a 
transcendental object in general, which is equivalent to the concept of objectivity 
in general. This concept is "the cause of appearance and therefore not itself 
appearance" because it is the condition of possibility of appearance: this concept 
brings it about that appearances appear to us. We do not know whether this 
concept is "in us or outside us" because, as the correlate of the unity of 
apperception that is thought as objectivity in general, it is in a sense both in us and 
outside us. We produce the concept of the transcendental object as the concept of 
the objectivity of objects in order that objective appearances may be brought 1 
about. And of course, we do not know if in the absence of sensibility this concept 
would still remain or have any relevance, for we do not know whether a non-
sensible faculty of intuition requires a concept of objectivity. The representation 
of the transcendental object "remains for us empty", because there is no object to 
be represented here: there is simply a concept which marks the limits of sensible 
knowledge because sensible knowledge cannot operate without this concept. 
I admit that this interpretation is somewhat tenuous, and that it requires us to 
understand Kant's use of the term "cause" here in a peculiar way: on this \ 
interpretation, the transcendental object is the "cause" of appearance in the same 
way that the categories are the "cause" of experience. This cannot be thought as 
the causality of the second analogy but would have to be taken to mean something 
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like a transcendental condition, which is not a way in which Kant uses the tenn 
Ursache. 
My second strategy is to interpret this passage on the assumption that Kant is 
referring to the idea of the transcendental object. All other passages where Kant 
refers to the transcendental object as the cause of appearance occur in the 
Dialectic, where Kant is concerned with reason and its ideas, so we can easily see 
that Kant is using the idea of the transcendental object to fulfill this role. 
However, the Amphiboly passage with which we are concerned is in the Analytic, 
not the Dialectic. As an appendix to the Analytic, it is very much a transitional 
section. It could be the case that Kant is introducing the idea of the transcendental 
object as an intelligible cause at this point in the text in order to draw out the 
contrast between this idea and the thought of a positive noumenon. Thus in the 
process of limiting sensibility to appearances, the understanding does think for 
itself an intelligible cause of appearance, but this cause, because it is merely an 
idea, is not thought to be knowable through the categories. We cannot know 
whether it is in us or outside us, or whether it would still remain in the absence of 
sensibility, because, as a mere idea, it has no detenninate object. This is also why 
"'the representation remains for us empty" and why this emptiness leaves open a 
space which cannot be filled through experience. 
The problem with this interpretation of the passage is that Kant says that it is 
the understanding that thinks this intelligible cause; if Kant were referring to the 
idea of the transcendental object here, he should ascribe that role to reason (as he 
does in the Dialectic proper). It is very clear in this passage, and in the context, 
that Kant is talking about the understanding. 
Neither of my interpretations of this Amphiboly passage is entirely 
satisfactory. However, it should be noted that there is no consensus to be found on 
this passage in the secondary literature; it poses problems for every interpretation 
of Kant that seeks to find a consistent way of understanding the tenn 
"transcendental object" in the Critique. The third possible solution - in fact, the 
most tempting one - is to decide that Kant simply made a mistake in using the 
tenn "transcendental object" at A288 / B344. We could then assert that what he is 
really talking about is the noumenon in the negative sense, to which he refers in 
the paragraphs surrounding this one. While this interpretation accounts for most of 
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what Kant says in this passage, it does throw us back on the problem of noumenal 
causality and how a negative noumenon, when thought only by the understanding 
as a limiting concept, can be thought to cause appearance. I 18 
On balance, I think that my interpretation of the transcendental object as 
concept and idea is a consistent and convincing one, and I am willing to accept the 
fact that this single passage is an odd piece that does not fit in with the puzzle 
unless we twist Kant's words or decide that he simply failed to correct his own 
text. 
What an analysis of this passage does make clear, however, is the extreme 
closeness of Kant's two uses of the term "transcendental object". The idea of the 
intelligible cause is simply the concept of the transcendental object, the concept of 
objective unity in general, moved up to the level of reason. Reason extends the 
concept of objective unity - the transcendental condition of appearances - into 
the idea of an object which is thought to be the intelligible cause of appearances. 
My suggestion that we understand the transcendental object as both concept and 
idea helps us to make some sense of the Kantian problem of affection. Once we 
view the intelligible cause of affection as a merely regulative idea posited by 
reason, we need not worry about the understanding positing determinate entities 
that "violate any acceptable requirement of intelligibility". I 19 On my 
interpretation, the intelligible cause of affection has the same status as God: an 
idea of reason, unknowable but necessarily assumed in order that we may explain 
the occurrence of sensation and thus view nature and mind as a coherent system. 
Just as the concept of the transcendental object makes possible knowledge of 
nature in general, the idea of the transcendental object makes possible an 
explanation of knowledge as part of a system of nature. 
In the B Deduction, Kant had raised the question as to how we are to think that 
an intuitable manifold is given before experience: 
In the above proof there is one feature from which I could not 
abstract, the feature, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must 
Ill! For a position on this, see Nicholas Rescher, "Noumenal Causality", in Lewis White Beck (ed.), 
Kant's Them:l' of Knowledge (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing, 1974), 175-83. 
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be given prior to the synthesis of understanding, and independently 
of it. How this takes place, remains here undetermined. 120 
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This question cannot indeed be answered with certainty, but it is answered 
speculatively by the application of reason to the understanding's concept of the 
transcendental object. In order to explain how things affect our sensibility, we may 
extend the concept of the transcendental object into an idea of the intelligible 
cause of appearances, given in itself prior to experience. This idea explains the 
possibility that matter appears to us, that spontaneity acts freely, and that on an 
intelligible level, matter and spontaneity may be one and the same. The idea of the 
transcendental object is an explanation for what may underlie the two types of 
productivity needed to generate knowledge: the productivity of existence, and the 
productivity of the spontaneity of mind. It is the relation of these two types of 
productivity that is equivalent to being; what is merely thought to underlie them is, 
as ens ration is, quite literally nothing. lll 
We can finally understand the passages from the A edition Paralogisms quoted 
III the introductory section of this chapter, where Kant speaks of "the 
transcendental object which underlies outer appearances [and] inner intuition".122 
Kant is using the idea of the transcendental object, which may be thought to be the 
cause of appearances and also the cause of our thinking selves. This idea of an 
underlying cause joining the thinking self with matter is thought to make possible 
the relation between spontaneity and nature. In fact, what makes possible the idea 
of an underlying unity is the original relation of spontaneity and the manifold, the 
synthetic unity of apperception and the concept of objectivity in general. The 
relation of being, in which the manifold is unified by a productive spontaneity, 
brings about the concept of unified objectivity, on which the idea of a unified 
underlying object is based. Just as the relation of being establishes both 
subjectivity and objectivity, the idea of an underlying unity is thought to account 
for both freedom and natural causality.123 The idea of this underlying unity comes 
120 CPR 8145. 
121 CPR A290 / 8347. 
122 CPR A379-80. 
123 See especially CPR A538-41 /8566-9. 
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from the relation of being - the fact that there is an ongoing relation between the 
manifold and our productive spontaneity. 
3.6 Conclusions on the ontology of the first Critique 
I will finish this chapter by drawing together the [mdings on the transcendental 
object with what was said about being and production in chapter one. and what 
was said about material nature in chapter two. We will be able to see how the 
ontology of the first Critique is a productive ontology. 
The B Deduction showed that it is essential for experience that spontaneity is 
already in the world, in a constant synthetic relation to what the senses have 
already "received" as spatio-temporal. The central point is that being, for Kant, is 
this relation between a spontaneous subject and the world it has received through 
the senses. In and through this relation, the objectivity of the object and the 
SUbjectivity of the subject are produced: the former through application of the 
concept of the transcendental object, and the latter as consciousness of self-
identity, through the generation of the analytic unity of apperception. Both object 
and subject acquire being through this relation: the being of an object is its 
relatedness to a subject, as an object, and the being of a subject is its relatedness to 
objects, as a self-identical subject. Being is a productive relation through which 
beings have being. 
The relation between the spontaneous subject and the received world is the 
relation of the synthetic unity of apperception. Transcendental apperception is 
what first synthesizes and gives unity to the manifold, thus producing objectivity 
and subjectivity. The relation of the apperceptive synthesis, then, is the productive 
relation of being. The concept of the transcendental object - the concept of 
objective unity in general - is integral to this relation, as it is projected by 
spontaneity onto the received manifold. As the concept of the objective unity or 
"objectness" of things, the concept of the transcendental object is the 
transcendental ground of the appearing of appearances, and thus the condition of 
possibility of there being appearances at all. Establishing the manifold as objective 
appearance - establishing the being (i.e. subject-relatedness) of the world - is 
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the necessary precursor to experience and cognition of things in the world. Only 
through the establishment of the productive relation of being can the subject go on 
to produce a formally determined "nature in general" through the categories, and 
thus to produce natural objects as "existent" and "productive". The relation of 
being makes knowledge possible, and also makes formal(v possible the existence 
of things. 
The being of a thing, then, is its relatedness to a subject, as an object; its being 
is its potential to be experienced, its formality in general. The being of a subject, 
conversely, is its relatedness to objects, its potential to experience, its materiality 
in general. (Remember that being, on Kant's definition, is not equivalent to 
essence.) This is actually the opposite of what Heidegger argues: Heidegger says 
that the being of things, for Kant, is their producedness by God to be independent 
of the subject; that is, their being is their sheer materiality. Heidegger claims 
further that the being of things is disclosed to the subject in the apperceptive 
relation. Heidegger does not recognize that for Kant, the being of things is not 
materiality in-itself, but is the relation in which materiality is formalized. The 
apperceptive relation is not simply the "horizon" or space within which the 
materiality of things is disclosed, but is the relation that first formalizes 
materiality, and gives being to things. Heidegger is wrong to say that being, for 
Kant, is equivalent to the producedness, presence, or materiality of things. Being is 
the constantly interactive and productive apperceptive relation between fonnality 
and materiality, while the being of things is their subject-relatedness, their 
formali::.ed materiality. 
It is undeniable that for Kant there is another, deeper relation underlying this 
relation of being, and that is the affective relation between the world as we can 
never know it, and sensibility. This relation is the unknowable one that can only 
be explained through the regulative ideas of reason. The idea of the transcendental 
object is the idea of an intelligible cause of representations, that is used in order 
that we may have an explanation for the possibility of freedom and for the 
common origin of matter and thinking beings. As the idea of a purely intelligible 
object, this intelligible cause has the ontological status of a mere thought-entity or 
ens rationis. It has no objective validity and cannot be thought to exist. The idea of 
the transcendental object is employed as an explanatory ground, and not as an 
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existential ground. We must entertain the idea of an intelligible cause underlying 
both matter and the self, allowing for the productivity of both, but this idea is not 
to be taken as an actually existing ground of existence. 
Kant's existential ontology in the first Critique and Metaphysical 
Foundations, then, is located purely at the level of material production: existence, 
as far as we can know it, is grounded by nothing other than itself, thought as the 
ongoing conflict of fundamental forces. Existential ontology cannot explain what 
makes existence possible, for it is necessarily circumscribed within the 
epistemological ontology that cannot approach existence outside of the relation of 
being. Indeed, the "existence" of materiality is not existence unless it can enter 
into the relation of being, the initial relation to formality, and thus become an 
object of possible experience. It is in this sense, and this sense only, that being is a 
condition for the possibility of existence. At the same time, the existence of 
materiality, before it is formally determined as such, is a condition for the 
possibility of the relation of being. There can be no being without existence, and 
no existence without being; just as there can be no epistemological ontology 
without existential ontology, and vice-versa. Existence requires epistemological 
ontology as its formal structure, while epistemology requires existential ontology 
as its material base. 
Kant's ontology, made up of existential and epistemological elements, IS a 
productive ontology. It is not based on a notion of substance, pennanent presence, 
or otherwise static being, but rather on a complex of productive relations: 
productive spontaneity in its relation to the manifold, producing a productive 
material nature. Kant's ontology is a productive ontology based on a notion of 
transcendental production, and leading to a notion of material production; it is not 
merely, as Heidegger suggests, an ontology of the extant. Being is not equivalent 
to the Greek notion of ousia as pennanent presence, but is perhaps closer to 
124 B· . h . Heidegger's own late notion of being that grants presence. emg IS t e ongomg 
productive relation of productive spontaneity and the received world. Through this 
relation the world is produced as a productive nature, characterized by motion, 
action, and force. It is, perhaps, inevitable that productive spontaneity detennines 
124 Heidegger, "Kant's Thesis About Being", Pathmarks, 362. 
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the world according to a productive comportment, by analogy with its own 
productivity; this will be addressed in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 Summary 
In this chapter I have focused on the epistemic side of Kant's ontology, 
addressing two questions: in what does the subject-object relation of being 
consist? How does Kant characterize the ground of appearance and affection? I 
considered a number of approaches commentators have taken to Kant's problem 
of affection, rejecting the standard "two worlds" and "two aspects" views. 
Buchdahl and Heidegger were found to provide useful interpretive strategies for 
approaching this problem. I found that the transcendental object can be used to 
answer both of the questions above, first as a concept, and second as an idea. As a 
concept of understanding, the transcendental object is equivalent to objectivity in 
general, and is the product of the SUbject-object relation of being. This conclusion 
followed an analysis of the Deductions in which I determined the relation of being 
to come about with the synthetic unity of apperception. I also examined the 
phenomena and noumena chapter to show that the concept of the transcendental 
object cannot be conflated with either the noumenon or the thing in itself. 
This concept of the transcendental object, of objectivity in general, was 
thought to be the ground of appearances insofar as it is their condition of 
possibility. This was both con finned and problematized by analysis of a number of 
passages from the Amphiboly. I explained that the idea of the transcendental 
object, by contrast, refers to an intelligible cause or supersensible substrate of 
appearances as a totality. This idea is used speculatively to think a ground for the 
possibility of the relation of existence and the thinking subject, and thus as a 
ground for the possibility of being. As an idea of reason, based on the concept of 
objectivity in general and extended beyond the bounds of possible experience, this 
idea cannot be thought to have any ontological status; it falls outside of the bounds 
of ontology and of being. I confirmed that being is thought as SUbject-object 
relationality for Kant, adding that we can now think the relation of being in terms 
of the relation of apperceptive synthesis. Being is the relation between a 
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spontaneous subject and the world it has received through the senses, the relation 
that produces objectivity and subjectivity, and gives things their being - their 
relatedness to a subject. Heidegger is wrong to think of being for Kant as the 
producedness or sheer materiality of things, for their being is, in fact, their 
formality in general. 
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Chapter 4 
Representation and life: the Critique of Judgment 
4.1 Purposiveness and reflective judgment 
I have argued that for Kant, being is the productive relation between 
productive spontaneity and the received world. Nature may not be in itself 
productive, but we do experience it to be an ongoing productive process, based not 
on atomic substance but on the conflict of fundamental forces. This was addressed 
in chapter two. That spontaneity is productive is shown by the synthesizing 
activity it engages in when it comes into contact with the world through outer 
sense. This was discussed in chapter three. In chapter one it was shown that being 
itself is understood by Kant to be the original relation between subject and object 
that allows both for predicative and existential positing. This relation is a 
productive relation because it constantly establishes both subjectivity and 
objectivity, and is the basis from which all knowledge develops. This was 
addressed in chapter three. Thus the major part of my argument has been 
developed in the three preceding chapters: Kant's ontology, in which being is seen 
to be the ground of knowledge and the ground of the detennination of things as 
existing, is a productive ontology. I have also suggested that Kant understands 
something like a productive comportment to belong to the nature of subjectivity 
and to predetennine the subject's relation to the world, and that this comportment 
might be based on the productive spontaneity of the subject. 
In this fourth chapter, I will show how in the Critique of Judgment, Kant 
makes explicit the two themes I have suggested are implicit in his other texts: the 
relation of being, and the subject's productive comportment. These two themes are 
discussed in tenus of aesthetic judgment and representation on the one hand, and 
teleological judgment and life on the other. Aesthetic judgment and the experience 
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of beauty are nothing other than a reflective response to the relation of being, and 
its possibility and contingency; I teleological judgment, meanwhile, is a way of 
making sense of the existence of nature in its fundamental incomprehensibility, 
through the comportment of productivity or "life". In the third Critique we see that 
we need to take a productive comportment towards the world if we are to view 
nature as a lawful system. While the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment discusses the 
productive relation that grounds knowledge, the Critique of Teleological Judgment 
discusses how nature must be interpreted to be a productive nature in order that it 
answer to the systematizing demands of reason. In the Critique of Judgment, 
productive spontaneity and productive nature are compared or "held up to" one 
another, and found to be suitable for relationality.2 
Aesthetic and teleological judgment are two species of what Kant calls the 
power of reflective judgment. In this first section, I will introduce Kant's 
conception of reflective judgment and its a priori principle of the purposiveness of 
nature. 
In chapter two, I distinguished three ways in which nature is detennined in the 
Kantian system. Those three ways were characterized as follows: 
1. Nature is transcendentally ordered as "nature in general" by the categories 
and principles of understanding, such that experience is possible. This is the 
pure natural science of the Transcendental Analytic, and is concerned with 
transcendental conditions of experience. 
2. Nature is metaphysically grounded with respect to its material conditions of 
possibility through the construction of the concept of matter, such that a 
special natural science is possible. The lawlike "nature in general" is 
specified in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science through the 
empirical concept of matter. Specific material laws can be fonnulated in 
accordance with the transcendental principles. Although these are empirical 
I Jeffrey Maitland argues along similar lines, though his stance is more strictly Heideggerian than I 
am happy with. See "An Ontology of Appreciation: Kant's Aesthetics and the Problem ~f 
Metaphysics", JOllrnalfhr the British Society 0.( Phenomenology 13: 1 (1982), 45-68. Better on th~s 
topic is Paul Crowther, "Fundamental Ontology and Transcendent Beauty: An Approach to Kant s 
Aesthetics", Kant-Studien 76: 1 (1985), 55-71. 
2 Kant describes reflective judgment as "holding representations up to [ ... J one's own cognitive 
power" in the First Introduction to CJ, Ak. 211'. (Note that page references to the First 
Introduction are indicated by a prime ['J.) 
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concepts, they are analyzed a priori, without reference to any particular 
expenence. 
3. Nature is ordered according to reason's regulative principles such that it can 
be viewed as a purposive empirical system. This third determination of 
nature operates on nature as experienced: empirical nature is ordered 
according to reason's regulative principles, its systematicity ultimately 
explained by reference to the idea of God. 
Broadly speaking, it is this third determination that Kant is concerned with in the 
Critique of Judgment. Experience in general requires that nature be subject to the 
a priori universal laws of the understanding, as laid out in the Analytic. But these 
laws (of substantiality, causality, etc.) concern only the possibility of nature in 
general; particular instances and events in nature are left undetermined by these 
general laws.3 There must be particular empirical principles governing these 
particular instances and events. The understanding views these principles as 
contingent, but without them, "there would be no way for us to proceed from the 
universal analogy of a possible experience as such to the particular one".4 So it is 
necessary for us that these principles be viewed as laws. 
Furthennore, the particular instances and events in nature must be thought to 
fonn a system. The transcendental concept of nature in general implies that nature 
as a whole is systematic, for it implies that all of nature can be known, and thus 
that empirical nature has an order that allows us to acquire empirical concepts.5 
However, from the fact that the transcendental laws of understanding require 
particulars in nature to be connected systematically, it does not follow that nature 
is a system that the human cognitive power can grasp.6 Natural instances, events, 
and fonns might be so diverse that we could never bring them under a common 
principle, and never reach any systematic unity. Not only must we regard nature as 
systematic; we must regard nature as systematic in a way that can be made 
manifest to us as a system of experience. 
3 CJ Ak. 179-80. 
4 CJ Ak. 184. 
5 CJ Ak. 180; §61, Ak. 359; and First Introduction, Ak. 208'-9'. 1 have also made use of Werner 
Pluhar's Introduction to the CJ, Ixxvi-Ixxvii. 
6 CJ First Introduction, Ak. 208'-9'. 
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[I]f we think of nature as a system (as indeed we must), then 
experience [too] must be possible [for us] as a system even in 
terms of empirical laws. Therefore it is subjectively necessary [for 
us to make the] transcendental presupposition that nature [as 
experience possible for us] does not have this disturbing boundless 
heterogeneity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of natural forms, 
but that, rather, through the affinity of its particular laws under 
more general ones it takes on the quality of experience as an 
empirical system.7 
168 
Thus our transcendental laws and the coherence of experience in general require 
that nature have a certain order in its particular empirical rules; the understanding 
must think of these contingent rules as necessary laws. These rules can only be 
regarded as necessary by virtue of "some principle of the unity of what is 
diverse".8 Understanding asserts that there is a system in terms of such a principle, 
but does not know this principle; it does not know what sort of connection there is 
among the particular things it experiences. 
In the first Critique, the task of finding coherence and systematicity III 
experience was assigned to reason: reason's regulative principle of homogeneity, 
for instance, was said to allow for the organization of experience and thus for the 
possibility of empirical concepts.9 In the Critique of Judgment, however, Kant 
treats of the faculty of reason almost solely in its practical, constitutive role, and 
not in its theoretical, regulative role; theoretical reason's task of referring 
expenence to regulative principles of coherence and systematicity has been 
reassigned to the power of reflective judgment. I 0 The power of judgment generally 
is said to mediate between the understanding, with its constitutive a prwri 
principles for cognition, and practical reason, with its constitutive a priori 
principles for the power of desire. I I The power of judgment has a principle of its 
7 CJ First Introduction, Ak. 209'; interpolations Pluhar's. 
8 CJ Ak. 180. 
9 CPR A653-4 / B681-2. 
10 I am not able to say more here about the transfer of this role from reason to judgment. BuchdahL 
for instance (Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. 495ft) claims that reflective judgment is 
just another name for theoretical regulative reason, but I think this is too strong a claim. 
II CJ Ak. 168. 
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own that "give[ s] the rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, the 
mediating link between the cognitive power and the power of desire".12 Kant 
intends the power of judgment to connect the domain of the concept of "nature in 
general" with that of the concept of freedom and moral purposes. In connecting 
"nature in general" with free purposiveness, the power of judgment will make 
possible the attribution of productivity to nature, as well as allowing us to judge 
nature as systematic and wholly suitable for cognition. 
The power of judgment, generally, is the capacity to think particulars as 
contained under universals. When the universal is given (in the form of an a priori 
rule, principle, or law), judgment subsumes the particular under it, and is called 
determinative judgment. Reflective judgment, by contrast, seeks out universal 
laws for given particulars. 13 Determinative judgment subsumes objects of nature 
under transcendental a priori laws - the principles of understanding - and does 
not require any additional principle in order to carry out this task. But as we have 
seen, these principles of understanding concern only in "nature in general". The 
"diverse forms of nature" that are left undetermined by the universal laws of 
permanence, causality, and so on, must be governed by universal empiricallaws. 14 
These laws are to be sought by reflective judgment, and a principle is required for 
this task. This principle cannot be taken from experience, for it is to be the basis of 
the unity of all empirical laws under higher ones, allowing us to subordinate 
empirical laws to one another in a systematic way. Similarly, it cannot be 
prescribed to nature, for it is a principle enabling us to ascend from particulars in 
nature to universals: our reflection upon these universals must be governed by 
experienced nature, not nature by our principle of reflection. 15 The principle, then, 
is one that judgment gives as a law, but only to itself. For if it did not assume such 
a law a priori, judgment could only "grope about among natural fonns" and would 
find the connections between particular natural events, and between such events 
and our understanding, entirely contingent. 16 
12 CJ Ak. 168. 
13 CJ Ak. 179. 
14 CJ Ak. 179-80. 
15 CJ Ak. 180. 
16 CJ First Introduction. Ak. 210'. 
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The principle is as follows. Since the universal laws of nature in general are 
prescribed to nature by our understanding, what is left undetennined in the 
particular empirical laws must be viewed "in tenns of such a unity as if they too 
had been given by an understanding (even though not ours) so as to assist our 
cognitive powers by making possible a system of experience in tenns of particular 
natural laws". 17 Since this is a law that judgment gives only to itself and not to 
nature, the existence of such an understanding is not assumed; all judgment 
assumes here is that the particular laws of nature fonn a systematic whole that can 
be cognized and systematized by our understanding. "What is presupposed is that 
nature, even in its empirical laws, has adhered to a certain parsimony suitable for 
our judgment, and adhered to a unifonnity we can grasp".18 In other words, the 
principle of the power of judgment according to which empirical natural science 
can proceed, is the principle of the purposiveness of nature for our cognitive 
powers. It is the principle that nature is wholly graspable by us. This 
transcendental concept of the purposiveness of nature attributes nothing to nature 
itself, but guides us in reflecting upon the objects of nature in order to have 
coherent experience. 19 As an a priori principle, we must think of purposiveness 
not as a property of nature, but as a function of our intentionality or comportment 
towards it. 
In reflective judgments of nature, when empirical laws are sought for 
particular events, the events are referred to this principle of purposiveness, which 
allows us to think of nature as a priori suitable for judging and classifying. In 
referring particulars to the principle of nature's purposiveness (beyond referring 
them "schematically" to the a priori principles of understanding), the power of 
judgment acts "technically" or artistically: they are not only fonnally detennined 
as objects of possible experience, but are judged to be part of an empirical system 
of nature.20 Reflective judgment is governed by the principle of a system or 
"technic" of nature: nature is regarded as art, insofar as we think of nature as 
deriving its particular fonns from more universal ones in tenns of a principle of 
17 CJ Ak. 180. 
18 CJ First Introduction. Ak. 213'. 
19 CJ Ak. 184. 
20 CJ First Introduction. Ak. 213'-14'. 
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purposiveness.21 Yet reflective judgment does not have an objective basis for 
regarding nature as a technic; "rather, judgment makes this technic its principle 
only so that it can, according to its needs, reflect in terms of its own subjective 
law, and yet in a way that also harmonizes with natural laws in general".22 
The principle of reflective judgment includes a reference to the supersensible 
substrate, or the idea of the transcendental object (as discussed in chapter three). 
First, the principle refers to an underlying unity that is thought to make it possible 
for us to experience a coherence of particular natural laws, and even though the 
principle is subjective, we are led to consider the possibility of an actual object or 
"supersensible basis" of such unity.23 More importantly, however, the principle of 
purposiveness allows us to think of nature not only as a system that is intrinsically 
coherent, but also as one that is wholly suitable for our cognitive powers. It must 
be possible for us to think that the lawfulness of nature will harmonize with 
human lawfulness, that is, the lawfulness of freedom.24 The purposiveness of 
nature allows us to think that human moral action can be hannonized with nature, 
and allows us to think that "there must after all be a basis uniting the supersensible 
that underlies nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom contains 
practically".25 Achieving a unity between the supersensible substrates of nature 
and of our final purpose, and thereby making possible a transition between the 
domains of understanding and reason, is one of the aims of the Critique of 
Judgment. While there is much to be said about Kant's idea of the supersensible 
substrate, I will not discuss it here.26 Towards the end of the chapter I will return 
briefly to the idea of a supersensible substrate in general, but only to tie this in 
with the idea of the transcendental object from chapter three, and the idea of God 
from chapter one: this idea, I will suggest, remains a projection based on our 
concepts of a productive nature and productive spontaneity. 
21 CJ First Introduction, Ak. 215'. 
22 CJ First Introduction, Ak. 214'. 
23 CJ First Introduction, Ak. 218'. 
24 CJ Ak. 176. 
2-'; CJ Ak. 176. 
26 Werner Pluhar, in his introduction to the Critique of Judgment, suggests that the Critique of Pure 
Reason gives us the indeternlinate idea of nature in itself as supersensible s~bstrat.e for theoretical 
philosophy, while the Critique of Practical Reason gives us the determmate Idea of God as 
substrate of our final purpose for practical philosophy. The Critique of Judgment, he argues. 
introduces a third substrate (a substrate of nature's purposiveness), which mediates between the 
other two, and ultimately unifies them into a single supersensible substrate. See CJ ,h·i-xlvii. 
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The Critique of Judgment, though, is centrally concerned with our power to 
judge objects according to an a priori principle of the purposiveness of nature for 
cognition. Reflective judgment, with its principle of purposiveness, makes 
possible nature as an organized system, and also makes possible our apprehension 
of certain natural objects as "hints" that nature as a whole is suitable for the 
cognitive faculties. 27 We apprehend objects as such "hints" when a feeling of 
pleasure arises from mere reflective judging - that is, from the mere reflection on 
objects in terms of the principle of purposiveness. Our pleasure, in these cases, is 
governed by the principle of purposiveness. The feeling of pleasure, Kant says, is 
connected with the attainment of an aim, and the aim in this case is the discovery 
of an order of the particular laws of nature that is commensurate with our ability to 
grasp that order.28 The condition of reaching this aim is the employment of the 
principle of the purposiveness of nature for our cognitive powers, and so the 
feeling of pleasure will also depend on the employment of this principle. This 
pleasure, Kant says, arises every time we discover the conformity of nature to our 
cognitive power, and thus every time we are able to grasp nature in terms of the 
similarities and differences that make empirical concepts possible. However, since 
"even the commonest experience would be impossible" without this discovery, we 
no longer notice the pleasure in everyday cognition.29 In order to feel this pleasure 
in response to the conformity of nature's particular laws with our cognitive power, 
we must turn to something that in our judging it "makes us pay attention to this 
purposiveness of nature for our understanding". 30 This something is the beautiful 
in nature, and so in order to analyze the principle making the discovery of 
purposiveness (and thus also the pleasure) possible, Kant turns to a specific type 
of reflective judgment, the judgment of taste. 
In reflective judgments of taste - aesthetic judgments - the object is called 
purposive because its representation is directly connected with the feeling of 
pleasure. As Kant says, "pleasure is connected with mere apprehension of the form 
of an object of intuition, and we do not refer the apprehension to a concept so as to 
give rise to detenninate cognition". Instead of being referred to an empirical 
n CJ §42. Ak. 300. 
2R CJ Ak. 187. 
~<J CJ Ak. 187-8. 
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concept, as would happen in standard reflective judgment, the apprehension is 
referred only to the subject, and the pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive 
powers that results. 3 ! Kant calls this the subjective formal purposiveness of the 
object; its purposiveness for bringing about pleasure in the harmony of the 
cognitive powers. Aesthetic judgment presupposes a priori the principle of the 
purposiveness of nature for cognition, for without this principle, and the 
presupposition that the object is able to conform to the conditions of the harmony 
of the cognitive powers, we could not judge that the object is bringing about 
pleasure. Objects can only be judged to bring about this sort of pleasure. and thus 
can only be judged to be beautiful, if this a priori principle is presupposed. 
Reflective judgments can also be teleological judgments, however, where we 
judge the objective purposiveness of nature. That is, we judge the purposiveness of 
an object not in tenns of its harmony with our cognitive faculties, but in tenns of 
its hannony with a purposive concept through which it could have been produced. 
In these cases, we detennine how well the actual fonn of the object harmonizes 
with the possibility of that object if it were produced according to a prior concept 
of it. 32 Those objects that might have been produced according to a concept are 
judged objectively purposive. Teleological judgment does not involve pleasure, 
and does not employ a priori the principle of the purposiveness of nature. There is 
no a priori basis for asserting that there are things in nature that are possible only 
as purposively produced.33 Teleological judgment 
merely contains the rule for using the concept of purposes for the 
sake of reason when cases (certain products) occur, after the former 
transcendental principle [of the fonnal purposiveness of nature] 
has already prepared the understanding to apply the concept of a 
purpose (at least in tenns of fonn) to nature.34 
30 CJ Ak. 188. 
31 CJ Ak. 189. 
32 CJ Ak. 192. 
11 CJ Ak. 193. 
14 CJ Ak. 193-4. 
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Teleological jUdgment treats certain natural objects as objectively purpOSIve, 
based not on an a priori principle, but on the fact that the understanding is already 
"'prepared" to apply the concept of a purpose to nature. Because reflective 
judgment in general operates according to the principle of the purposiveness of 
natural objects for cognition, teleological judgment views nature in tenns of the 
purposiveness of natural objects for (broadly) moral aims. 
We can see already that teleological judgment involves borrowing the concept 
of purposiveness and interpreting nature in tenns of purposes in order to explain 
its production and productivity. This amounts, as we will see, to a productive 
comportment towards nature; one that is inevitable, given the character of human 
spontaneity. Aesthetic judgment, the "'essential" part of the critique according to 
Kant/5 involves detennining things as subjectively purposive, as things that are a 
priori graspable by the cognitive faculties. Aesthetic judgment thus concerns the 
relation between the object and the cognitive faculties before experience has been 
fully constituted. We will see through an analysis of each of these types of 
reflective judgment that aesthetic judgment concerns the relation of being, while 
teleological judgment concerns existence and our productive comportment 
towards it. I have suggested that the theme of the Critique of Judgment as a whole 
is the relationality of productive spontaneity and productive nature; by looking at 
its two halves we see that an analysis of the initial relation of being must precede 
an analysis of the moral and scientific relations that are built upon that initial 
relation. 
4.2 Aesthetic judgment: being and representation 
The first half of the Critique of Judgment, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, 
is divided into an Analytic and a Dialectic. Like the division of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, this division serves to differentiate a description of the concept of 
aesthetic judgment and its use from the extension of that concept beyond 
experience. In the Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant is able to refer aesthetic 
35 CJ Ak. 193. 
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judgment to reason's idea of a supersensible substrate, and to claim that this 
supersensible is the ground of the universal necessity of jUdgments of taste.36 In 
the Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment, however, Kant gives an account of how we 
make judgments about the beauty and sublimity of things -judgments which rely 
on the principle of nature's purposiveness for our cognitive faculties. Kant also 
shows how we can justify laying claim to universal assent for judgments of taste 
without recourse to the supersensible substrate. It is the Analytic, and specifically 
the Analytic of the Beautiful, that I will discuss here?7 
In the first Critique, Kant defined the faculty of judgment as the faculty of 
subsuming objects under rules of the understanding.38 Judgment itself is 
nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are 
brought to the objective unity of apperception. This is what is 
intended by the copula "is". It is employed to distinguish the 
objective unity of given representations from the subjective. It 
indicates their relation to original apperception, and its necessary 
unitv. 39 
Judgment relates subjects and predicates to the objective unity of apperception, 
that is, the unity of the "I think". Judgment brings an objectively unified manifold 
to the unity of self-consciousness, and the pure a priori principles derived from it. 
Judgment is possible only under the condition of the analytic unity of 
apperception, and thus it is possible only under the condition of the synthetic unity 
of apperception. It relies upon the synthetic relation of spontaneity to the 
manifold; the relation of being. We saw in the previous chapter that judgment is 
related to being: in using the copula "is", and asserting the objective validity of a 
relation of representations, judgments assert that the relation of synthetic 
apperception between subject and object has been established. Judgments, in 
36 CJ §47, Ak. 339. I disagree with Pluhar, who believes Kant's Analytic/Dialectic division to be 
"artificial and unhelpful" (CJ liv). 
37 There are numerous very interesting aspects of the CJ that I will not be able to discuss here, 
including judgments of the sublime, Kant's Deduction of Aesthetic Judgments. and his discussion 
of fine art and genius . 
. 'x CPR A132 / BI71. 
39 CPR BI41-2. 
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employing the copula "is", assert the being of a thing: its relation as an object to a 
subject. The activity of subsuming objects under rules of the understanding 
belongs to what Kant now calls the power of determinative judgment. 
Determinative judgment presupposes a relation to an objectively unified manifold, 
and thus already includes the assertion of the being of the object. 
The power of reflective judgment, however, is occupied with reflecting, III 
terms of a certain principle, on a given representation in order to make an 
empirical concept possible.40 In reflecting we generally compare representations 
with one another, in reference to an empirical concept that the comparison makes 
possible, and this gives rise to some knowledge. Reflective judgment generally, 
then, must also include the assertion of being: the initial subject-object relation 
must occur in order for objectivity to be established and in order for concepts to be 
applied to representations. In the case of reflective aesthetic judgment, however, 
we compare representations to our own cognitive power. In the judgment of taste, 
representations of objects are referred not to concepts that would give rise to 
knowledge, but to a feeling in the jUdging subject. 
We do not use understanding to refer the [re ]presentation 
[Vorstellung] to the object so as to give rise to cognition; rather, we 
use imagination (perhaps in connection with understanding) to 
refer the [re ]presentation to the subject and his feeling of pleasure 
d· 1 41 or ISP easure. 
The object must have been brought into relation to the subject, and the objectivity 
of the object established, but the next step in aesthetic judgment is to hold on to 
this relationality and the feeling it brings about, ignoring the empirical concepts 
that may attach to the object. That is, in aesthetic judgment, the activities of 
searching for and applying empirical concepts are deferred in favour of reflecting 
on the initial subject-object relation, the relation of being. For it is clear that the 
40 C} First Introduction, Ak. 211'. 
41 C} § L Ak. 203. Pluhar translates Vorstellung as "pr~sen~ation" throughou~ this edition of the C}, 
according to his belief that Kant's theory of perceptIOn IS not represen~atlOnal. For the sak~ 0.: 
consistency with my other chapters, I will amend Pluhar' s "presentatIOn" to "representatIOn 
throughout, and will not indicate this in the text or notes. 
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application of empirical concepts to natural beauties such as roses and seashells is 
still possible; the process is simply deferred.42 An aesthetic judgment cannot have 
the objective validity of a determinative or cognitive reflective judgment, but in 
referring a representation only to the subject's liking, can only be subjective. 
Kant makes clear very early on that judgments of taste about beauty concern 
the subject and not the object. Beauty is shown not to be a property of objects, but 
to be a certain relation of the subject to a representation. This is why our liking for 
the beautiful must be devoid of interest in the existence of an object: to judge an 
object beautiful, our mere representation of the object must be accompanied by a 
liking, regardless of our interest in or indifference to the existence of the object.43 
By contrast, objects we judge to be agreeable are connected with interest, as are 
objects we judge to be good. In order to consider something good - either good 
for something, or good intrinsically - we must have a determinate concept of 
what the object is meant to be.44 But we do not need this determinate concept in 
the case of objects judged to be beautiful; indeed, such determinate concepts, even 
if available, must be ignored. For a liking for the beautiful does not depend upon 
the representation being given to understanding for determination by empirical 
concepts; rather, it depends on "the reflection, regarding an object, that leads to 
some concept or other (but it is indeterminate which concept this is)".45 This 
distinguishes the liking for the beautiful both from the liking for the good, which 
depends on a determinate concept, and from the liking for the agreeable, which 
depends only on sensation and does not involve reflection. 
The object judged to be beautiful is also represented as the object of a 
universal liking. In making a judgment of taste about the beautiful, Kant says, we 
require everyone to like the object, without this liking being based on a concept. 
Indeed, a claim to universal validity is part of what it means to judge something to 
be beautifuL for a claim to merely personal validity would only designate an 
object agreeable.46 The universality of judgments of taste gives them a 
42 Derrida makes much of this deferral of determination in Kant's aesthetics. and gives an analysis 
of Kantian beauty as the object which is "cut off from its goal"; see The T11Ith in Painting, trans. 
Geoff Bennington & Ian McLeod (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1987) 83ff. 
43 CJ §2, Ak. 205. 
44 CJ §4. Ak. 207. 
45 CJ §4. Ak. 207. 
46 CJ §8, Ak. 214. 
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resemblance to logical judgments, and allows us to "talk about the beautiful as if 
beauty were a characteristic of the object" .47 But the origin of this universality is 
not, as it is in the case of logical (detenninative) judgments, based on the objective 
validity of connecting an object to a concept. Rather, the judgment of taste 
involves a claim to a subjective universality. As we can see, it is a question of 
claiming universality for the activity of maintaining the state of relationality 
between subject and object, and forestalling detennination by concepts. What is 
universalized in the judgment of taste is not a procedure for representing an object 
by means of a concept, but simply the indetenninate procedure of representing. 
Kant reaches this conclusion by asking, in §9, "whether in a judgment of taste 
the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the object or the judging precedes 
the pleasure". If we felt pleasure in an object and then judged the pleasure to be 
universally communicable on the basis of our representation of its various sensory 
elements, we would run into self-contradiction. That kind of pleasure would only 
be agreeableness, a pleasure taken in mere sensation; such pleasure cannot be 
universally communicable, for by definition it has only personal validity.48 In a 
judgment of taste, we judge an object (i.e. we enter into a relation with it) and 
then feel pleasure: what is universally communicated is the mental state we are in 
during reflective judgment. This mental state is the interrelation of those 
representational powers that respond to the object-relatedness of the subject, and 
prepare the representation of the object for concept-detennination. Judgments of 
taste are not based on sensation, but on the hannony of our faculties that arises 
from the judgment itself. The sUbjective detennining basis for the universal 
communicability of the judgment of taste is "the mental state that we find in the 
relation between the representational powers [imagination and understanding] 
insofar as they refer a given representation to cognition in generaf'.49 
In their usual job of making representations into knowledge, the imagination 
combines the manifold of intuition and the understanding provides the unity of the 
concept; these two powers hannonize with one another in order to achieve 
cognition. This mental state is universally communicable, on the assumption that 
47 CJ §6, Ak. 212. 
4X CJ §9, Ak. 217. 
4'1 CJ §9,Ak.217. 
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the process of cognition is the same for everyone. In a jUdgment of taste, however, 
cognition is not the aim, for no determinate concept is presupposed; the powers 
are in "free play" rather than working towards knowledge. Nevertheless, their 
harmonious way of representing, which occurs in all types of judgment, has 
subjective universal communicability. This universal communicability 
can be nothing but the mental state in which we are when 
imagination and understanding are in free play (insofar as they 
harmonize with each other as required for cognition in general). 
For we are conscious that this subjective relation suitable for 
cognition in general must hold just as much for everyone, and 
hence be just as universally communicable, as any determinate 
cognition, since cognition always rests on that relation as its 
subjective condition. 50 
Judgments of taste are universally communicable because the hannony of the 
faculties that is suitable for cognition in general is the same for everyone. The 
universal communicability of judgments of taste, then, is based on the same 
conditions as the universal communicability of cognitive judgments: the 
subjective conditions under which any judgment of any object is possible for 
anybody. Judging the object, and thus bringing these subjective conditions into 
play, precedes the pleasure in the object, for the harmony of the cognitive powers 
is the basis of the pleasure.51 The judgment of taste has the same subjective fonn 
as cognitive judgments, and it is this subjective fonn of cognition in general that is 
universally communicable. 
It may seem that any judgment could occaSIOn this pleasure, as long as 
detenninate concepts were kept out of the way. However, a judgment of taste is 
not a merely psychological phenomenon. Although beauty is not a property of the 
object, the judgment and the pleasure must arise through relation to an object. The 
object must be purposive for bringing about this pleasure, and thus must be 
subjectively purposive. What it is to be subjectively purposive is to be a thing 
50 Cf §9, Ak. 217-18. 
51 CJ §9, Ak. 218. 
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capable of bringing about the hannony of the cognitive faculties. But since Kant 
has said that the hannony of the faculties in a judgment of taste is the same as the 
hannony in a cognitive judgment, the mere objectivity of an object - which 
would allow for cognitive judgment - seems to be enough to bring about 
hannony. The primary criterion for a beautiful object is, in fact, its objectivity. 
This is "objectivity" in the broadest sense, as suggested by the Transcendental 
Deductions, for even sounds and colours may be found beautiful insofar as they 
are thought to be regular vibrations of the ether or air. 52 Because such vibrations 
are activities of force, they are indeed objective appearances, though a sound is not 
an "object" in the narrower sense of the tenn. What is crucial is the objectivity of 
the appearance, established in the relation of being. The relation of being is the 
ground for the possibility of knowledge, and the reflection upon this possibility is 
the basis for the pleasure of the judgment of taste. The judgment of taste is a 
pleasure taken in the mere being of the object. This should not be read as a 
pleasure taken in the object's mere presence - as it would on an aestheticist 
reading - but rather, keeping in mind a Kantian understanding of being, as a 
pleasure taken in the subject-object relationality that makes knowledge possible. 
The judgment of taste is a transcendental epistemological judgment, a judgment 
about the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. 
It is in this sense that we must understand Kant's insistence that we judge the 
object's "fonn" rather than its matter or content.53 Kant's theory does require that 
we judge objects in tenns of their empirical fonnal characteristics (such as shape 
and pattern) - a requirement I will return to in a moment. When he says that we 
judge the "mere fonn" of objects, however, he does not mean empirical fonn. 
Rather, we judge their transcendental fonn: that aspect of objects that is 
constituted with their relation to a subject. Rodolphe Gasche has also argued for a 
transcendental interpretation of fonn in the third Critique, as opposed to an 
aestheticist empirical interpretation.54 Recall that for Kant, the fonn of 
appearances is provided a priori by the mind's faculties, while the matter of 
,,~ CJ § 14. Ak. 224. Kant was ambivalent at this stage on Euler's view that colours, like sounds, are 
vibrations. Eckart Forster discusses this at some length in chapter 2 of Kant's Final Synthesis. 
)3 CJ ~ll, Ak. 221. 
)4 Se~ especiaJly ch. 3 of Rodolphe Gasche, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant's Aesthetics 
(Stanford: Stanford UP. 2003). 
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appearances is obtained through the senses; it is only "on occasion of the sense-
impressions" that the formal aspects "are first brought into action and yield 
concepts".55 Form is the complex of a priori forms of intuition and concepts of 
understanding that order the material of the senses, and only through the subject-
object relation, in which objectivity is constituted, does the object acquire its form. 
Indeed, in chapter three I suggested that the being of things is their subject-
relatedness or formality. The judgment of taste is a judgment of the form of the 
object because it reflects upon the objectivity or subject-relatedness of the object. 
In the judgment of taste, we judge the subject-relatedness of an object, the 
suitability of the object for being an object of experience. 
The object thus judged has a purposiveness for the possibility of knowledge, 
and this is what Kant calls its "subjective formal purposiveness" or "form of 
purposiveness".56 The pleasure we feel in the harmony of the cognitive powers is a 
pleasure taken in the object's "subjective formal purposiveness", its suitability for 
being known. 57 There is pleasure in reflecting upon the subjective and objective 
conditions for cognition being met, without any actual cognition taking place. If "a 
given representation unintentionally brings the imagination [ ... ] into harmony with 
the understanding [ ... ], and this harmony arouses a feeling of pleasure, then the 
object must thereupon be regarded as purposive for the reflective power of 
judgment".58 This object that is purposive for the power of judgment is then 
regarded as beautiful, and is thought to be the basis of the pleasure felt. It seems 
that any judgment which relates to any object - and which does not refer the 
object to detenninate concepts - can be a judgment of beauty, bringing about the 
hannony of the cognitive powers and thus pleasure. For any such judgment will 
establish the subject-relatedness of the object and its purposiveness for the 
possibility of knowledge. 
It is a problem for Kant's theory, however, if a judgment of beauty can be 
occasioned by any object, for it is clear that he does not believe that all objects 
bring such judgments about. What I have called the transcendental fonn of the 
object - its subjective fonnal purposiveness or "form of purposiveness" - does 
55 CPR A20 / B34; A86 / B118. 
56 CJ § 1 L Ak. n I. 
<,7 CJ Ak. 189. 
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indeed belong to all objects; it can bring about a judgment of beauty, but it clearly 
does not always do so. Since, as Kant himself indicated in the introduction all 
, 
cognitive jUdgments did at one time give rise to pleasure, there must be a criterion 
distinguishing those objects that now enable us to defer conceptual detennination 
and to maintain the pleasure taken in their subjective fonnal purposiveness (and 
distinguishing them from those objects that prevent us from experiencing this 
pleasure).59 Kant thus introduces an empirical criterion of the beautiful: we judge 
beautiful only those objects that display a form of purposiveness without any 
purpose. Not only are such objects subjectively purposive (for our inner hannony); 
they have a "purposiveness of form" that is perceived in the object. 60 This fonn is 
empirical form (shape, pattern, etc.) and it pertains only to those objects displaying 
regularity and unity in their manifold.61 Where we perceive such regularity, there 
is an empirical fonn that is purposive for our SUbjective hannony, for the 
regularity encourages the faculties to linger with the representation, and to defer 
conceptual detennination. 
A purposive empirical fonn supplements the purpOSIveness inherent in the 
transcendental fonn of objects, and serves to limit the number and types of objects 
which can be designated beautiful. Kant never says this, and he does not make this 
distinction between transcendental fonn (the form of purposiveness) and empirical 
fonn (the purposiveness of fonn); unfortunately, he tends to discuss them as if 
they were interchangeable.62 But they are not interchangeable, and both are 
necessary to the judgment of beauty. The transcendental fonn of things is their 
subject-relatedness or being, the condition of their possible cognition, and is what 
actual~v gives rise to the hannony of the faculties and the resulting pleasure. The 
58 CJ Ak. 190. 
59 CJ Ak. 187-8. Into this latter category fall judgments of sublimity and judgments of ugliness, 
which I will not discuss here. It is worth noting, though, that while judgments about the beautiful 
take pleasure in the possibility of theoretical knowledge, judgments about the sublime take pleasure 
in the possibility of practical (moral) knowledge. 
60 CJ Ak. 236. 
61 CJ§14, Ak. 224; §15, Ak. 227. 
62 Paul Guyer claims that by introducing what I have called purposive empirical fo~ as a 
characteristic of beautiful objects, Kant tried to accomplish the traditional aim of aesthetiCS, to 
specify certain properties or kinds of objects which occasion judgments of tas.te. Guy~r argues th~t 
"such constraints on beautiful objects cannot be directly derived from the baSIC premises of Kant s 
theory of taste", a position with which I am inclined to agree. Guyer also points out that Kant 
confuses the foml of purposiveness with the purposiveness of foml. See chapter 6 of Paul Guyer, 
Aant and the Claims oj Taste. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 1997). 
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empirical fonn of things judged beautiful is their perceived regularity and unity, 
which maintains the faculties in their hannony and thus allows us to notice the 
pleasure. By contrast, the empirical fonn of irregular, disordered or 
contrapurposive things - things judged ugly or, in some cases, sublime 
noticeably disrupts the hannony of the faculties, resulting in displeasure. But even 
in these cases, the hannony must be there, at least minimally and initially, if the 
things are objects of possible experience, for things judged ugly and sublime, like 
all things, have the same transcendental form as things judged beautiful. 63 
Transcendental form, which pertains to all objects, is necessary for making a 
judgment of taste, while a purposive empirical form is necessary for making 
judgments specifically of beauty. 
Transcendental form is the purposiveness for the possibility of knowledge 
pertaining to all objects that have been brought into the relation of being. Beauty is 
a judgment made about objects that through their empirical form are found to be 
purposive for the possibility of knowledge, without actually bringing knowledge 
about (due to the deferral of conceptual determination). The judgment of taste is a 
reflection upon the subject-object relation, the objectivity of the object, its 
possibility for knowledge. In the case of the judgment of beauty, the mind defers 
or ignores conceptual determination in order to contemplate this possibility and 
maintain the pleasure it occasions. There is in the history of aesthetics a long 
tradition of associating beauty with being. Kant continues this tradition, but for 
him beauty and being are not linked because they are unchanging ideas that are 
found to be instantiated in the mere presence of things. Rather, the judgment of 
taste - the pleasure taken in transcendental form - is a reflective response to the 
subject-object relation of being; the judgment of beauty indicates a representation 
worthy of prompting contemplation of that relation. Beauty is a judgment made 
about products of nature in their representation, and involves the productive 
63 See, e.g., CJ §23, Ak. 244-5. There are two types of things that do not have t.his transcendental 
foml: what Kant calls "the monstrous" and "the colossal" (CJ §26, Ak. 253). Objects of both these 
types cannot be experienced in the strict sense, because they are too large or irregular to e~hibit 
concepts for. They do not lead to any harmony because their subject-relatedness cannot be firmly 
established. 
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activity of the imagination and understanding.64 In the free play of these faculties 
there is, as it were, productivity without any product. 
Through judging products of nature to be beautifuL the subject enhances the 
productivity of her own faculties. Kant calls this "a feeling of life's being 
furthered".65 As a number of recent commentators have discussed, the concept of 
"life" in Kant's critical period is a name for our inner principle of self-activity, 
particularly our ability to act according to representations.66 In the Critique of 
Judgment, the "feeling of life" is associated quite specifically with the very ability 
of the mind to represent: Kant suggests that all representations in us can be 
associated with pleasure or pain, because "all of them affect the feeling of life, and 
none of them can be indifferent insofar as it is a modification of the subject".67 
Furthermore, Kant says that "the mind taken by itself is wholly life (the very 
principle of life), [and] any obstacles or furtherance [to life] must be sought 
outside it and yet still within man himself, and hence in the [mind's] connection 
with his body".68 These passages make clear that Kant thinks of life as associated 
with a self-active mind, but a mind that is affected by the existence of the outside 
world. Only insofar as it has representations does the mind feel its life and feel its 
self-active productivity. While this feeling is possible with any object, it arises 
particularly with the object judged to be beautiful, where the mere object-
relatedness of the mind is highlighted. The reflective response to the subject-
object relation of being is a reflective response to the object's suitability for the 
subject, but also to the subject's suitability for the object. It is a reflective response 
to the productivity and "life" of the subject; productivity, activity, and life are 
enhanced by the subject's relatedness to objects in the world. It is, as Makkreel 
suggests, the transcendental feeling of spontaneity.69 
64 CJ §42, Ak. 299; §22 General Comment, Ak. 240. 
65 CJ §23, Ak. 244; cf. § I, Ak. 204. 
66 See Howard Caygi\l's article "Life and Aesthetic Pleasure" in Rehberg and Jones (eds.), 79-92, 
and his longer treatment of this topic in his book Art of Judgment (Oxford: BlackwelL 1989~. See 
also Makkreel ch. 5. and Shell chs. 8 and 9. Kant defines "life" as the ability to act accordmg to 
representations in the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason, Ak. 9n, and in The Metaphysics 
of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), Ak. 21l. 
67 CJ §29 General Comment, Ak. 277-8. 
hI' CJ §29 General Comment, Ak. 278. 
69 Makkreel 104-7. 
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Kant is about to go on to discuss how the "life" of the subject is projected back 
onto nature in order to understand nature through the template of human 
productivity. "Life" can only be thus projected if it is first made thematic through 
reflection, and this is exactly what has been accomplished in the judgment of taste. 
We have "uncovered" and lingered with the feeling of our own spontaneity, and, 
through teleological judgment, we will make it an explicit structure through which 
we describe nature. The purpose of this projection is, ultimately, to set up the 
conditions for justifying our moral and scientific relations to nature. In order to see 
nature as suitable for these "second-order" relations, we must first recognize 
nature as suitable for the "first-order" relation of being. The judgment of taste has 
accomplished that recognition, and that is why a Critique of Aesthetic Judgment 
must precede the (arguably further-reaching) Critique of Teleological Judgment. 
4.3 Teleological judgment: life and productive comportment 
Teleological judgment works at a later stage of the mind's dynamic process, 
and this is why teleological and aesthetic judgments can be and are made about the 
same objects. In the case of aesthetic judgment about a natural object, we were 
obliged to defer conceptual detennination, or ignore any empirical concepts that 
might be associated with the object. It was a judgment about the suitability of a 
particular rose or seashell for cognition in general, and its purposiveness for 
sparking the hannony of the cognitive faculties. But if, through reflective 
judgment in general, we continue to full cognition of that rose or seashell, joining 
the particular representation to empirical concepts and fonning empirical laws, we 
will be in a position to compare these empirical concepts and laws with reason's 
principle concerning the possibility of a system of experience. 70 If we then find the 
object's fonn suitably systematic, we judge the object to have objective 
purposIveness, and call the thing a natural purpose. This is a teleological 
judgment: a judgment that an object is a purpose within a purposive system. It is a 
70 CJ First Introduction, Ak. 221'. 
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judgment about the suitability of the fully cognized rose or seashell for a system of 
expenence. 
Teleological judgment is a specific type of reflective judgment. Reflective 
judgment finds empirical concepts and laws for particular objects and events, 
guided by the principle of purposiveness. Teleological judgment applies itself to 
these objects and events that have already been referred to concepts and laws, and, 
guided by the regulative principle that nature's system is a "technic" of purposes, 
determines that they are purposes. Unlike aesthetic judgment, which stops short of 
knowledge, teleological judgments are cognitive judgments, for they refer to 
determinate empirical concepts. Nevertheless, teleological judgment is reflective; 
guided by the regulative concept of a "technic" of nature, it reflects upon the 
relation of things to the power of judgment itself. "In [the] power [ of jUdgment] 
alone can we find the idea of a purposiveness of nature, and only in relation to this 
power do we attribute this purposiveness to nature".7! Put simply, teleological 
judgments say that we cannot judge empirical nature other than as a system of 
purposes that hannonizes with reason's principle of systematicity. 
Teleological judgments allow us to set up both scientific and moral (practical) 
relations to nature as a whole. For once nature has been judged teleologically, we 
are able to build the idea of "a vast system of purposes of nature" and of "the 
whole of nature [regarded] as a system that includes man as a member".72 Natural 
science acquires grounds for belief that nature is such a system that specifies itself 
according to laws. Practical reason gains justification for its belief that the world is 
an intentionally created system of purposes working towards a final cause. 
Teleological judgment sets up the conditions of possibility for these scientific and 
moral relations between subject and nature. The primary condition of possibility of 
these relations is that nature be represented as productive, but in a certain way: the 
inherent productivity of nature, inconceivable to us, must be re-interpreted as 
analogous to human productivity. The resulting similarity between natural 
productivity and human productivity justifies these "second-order"' relations 
between nature and the subject. 
71 CJ First Introduction. Ak. 221'. 
72 CJ §67, Ak. 380. 
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The primary task of teleological judgment, then, is to interpret certain objects 
of nature, those objects that exist in nature as perfectly organized and yet utterly 
contingent. Teleological judgment must interpret the radically inconceivable 
productivity of nature. It does this by using the concept of a natural purpose. A 
natural purpose is a thing whose inner possibility is only conceivable on the 
presupposition of a concept that is the underlying condition of the causality 
responsible for its production.73 Natural purposes are not merely purposive for 
some other end; they are intrinsically purposive, meaning that they are regarded 
"as directly the product of art". 74 While we saw in chapter two that the existence 
of matter in general can be explained by (i.e. reduced to) the empirical concept of 
the fundamental forces, the organization of matter into seemingly concept-driven 
forms cannot be explained dynamically or mechanistically. The existence of this 
kind of natural productivity, found mainly in organic nature, is inconceivable for 
us on the mechanistic model that was developed in the Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Science. That is, the utter difference of the organized thing from raw 
matter or from human products of art leaves us without an adequate framework for 
considering its uniqueness. 
As in Aristotle's phusis-techne distinction, the difference between nature and 
art concerns the mode ofproduction.75 For unlike an object of human art, which is 
externally created, a natural purpose produces both the fonn and the existence of 
its parts. Kant specifies that we can recognize a natural purpose as a thing that is 
both cause and effect of itself. This does not mean that the thing brings itself into 
existence from nothing. It means that the parts of the thing work towards the 
whole and "cause" the whole, while at the same time the whole (as a sort of 
governing eidos) detennines or "causes" the parts. 76 It seems that both the whole 
and the parts "cause" one another through a concept of what the thing is meant to 
be. The supposition of a governing concept is what distinguishes the reciprocal 
causality of a natural purpose from the reciprocal causality that is an a priori 
principle of "nature in general", according to the third analogy. All objects are 
73 CJ First Introduction, Ak. 232'. 
74 CJ §63, Ak. 366-7. 
75 See' Aristotle's Physics. Book II. The aims and findings of this second half of the CJ are \"ery 
close to the Physics. 
76 CJ §65, Ak. 373. 
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reciprocally causal according to the third analogy, but the natural purpose seems to 
exercise reciprocal causality guided by a concept. We judge such a thing to be 
possible only as a purpose, the cause of which must be sought in a being "whose 
ability to act is detennined by concepts" - that is, a will - and not in the 
mechanism ofnature.77 
However, if we think of the thing only in this way, as the product of a rational 
cause, we do not recognize what distinguishes it from a work of human artistry. In 
order to preserve the naturalness or materiality of the natural purpose, we must 
think it to be possible without the causality of concepts. To this end, we must 
think of the parts as producing one another (and not merely working together), so 
that the parts reciprocally bring one another into existence.78 In addition to being 
organized, a quality it shares with works of artistry, such a product is self-
organizing.79 Natural purposes are self-organizing, self-producing beings that 
appear to work towards a concept-detennined end. Thus the parts, through their 
own (and not an external) causality, produce their own fonn and combination. 
They do this in such a way that they produce a whole whose concept, if present in 
a being possessing causality in tenns of concepts, could be the cause of this same 
whole. That is, the connection of parts through efficient causes can, at the same 
time, be judged to be a causation through final causes.80 There is a balance to be 
achieved here: we must uphold the materiality and contingency of organized 
beings while recognizing that they can be judged only by reference to reason's 
idea of a purpose. While organized beings cannot be thought to be produced by a 
rational cause without being reduced to artifacts, they are entirely inscrutable on 
the assumption of a nature that works only according to efficient causes. The 
concept-driven causality inherent in an organized being cannot be connected with 
77 CJ §64, Ak. 369-70. 
7R CJ §65, Ak. 374. 
79 CJ §65, Ak. 374. According to physicist Fritjof Capra, Kant was the first to use t1~e tenn "sel:-
organization"" to define organisms, a teml to which Humberto Maturan~ .and FrancIs~o Varela s 
concept of "autopoiesis" bears direct lineage. In 1970 Maturana defines hvmg systems In m~ch the 
same terms that Kant had done in 1790, as circular causal processes the components of whIch are 
produced and maintained by the circular organization itself. See Capra, The Web of Life (New 
York: Doubleday, 1996) 22 and ch. 5. 
RO CJ §65, Ak. 373. 
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"the mere concept of nature" unless we regard nature as acting from a purpose; 
"and even then, though we can think this causality, we cannot [conceive] it".81 
The inherent concept-driven causality of organized beings is inconceivable for 
us, whether we think of nature as blind mechanism or as in itself purposive. As 
Kant makes clear, the inconceivability of the concept of this causality does not 
mean that it is unthinkable, but rather that it cannot be derived from a more basic 
concept. Recall Kant's similar use of the phrase "cannot be conceived" in relation 
to the fundamental forces in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. 82 
As I discussed in chapter two, this means that the concepts of the forces cannot be 
derived from any more basic ones, and that their conditions of possibility cannot 
be determined. The same interpretation applies to the inconceivability of an 
inherent concept-driven causality. We cannot detennine what could engender such 
causality.83 This throws the origin of the existence of natural purposes into 
question; it is the point at which teleological judgments, and consideration of 
nature as a technic, must be reconciled with mechanistic explanations. 
We must apply a structure of concepts and principles that renders the existence 
and generation of organized beings comprehensible, without losing sight of their 
existence as naturally-occurring, self-producing matter. Just as the productive 
existence of raw matter could only be approached within an epistemological 
ontology (as shown in chapters one to three), so the productive existence of 
organized matter can be understood only through a system of concepts and 
principles. But here they are not epistemic concepts and principles of 
understanding; rather, they are moral (practical) ideas and principles of reason. 
While both types of matter, raw and organized, require conceptual structures in 
order for us to approach them, the reciprocal relation is not the same. The 
existence of raw matter was required in order to make possible the very 
epistemological ontology that structured it, but the existence of organized matter 
merely affirms a kind of moral ontology - a moral ontology that would exist 
81 CJ §64, Ak. 370-1. I have substituted "conceive" for Pluhar's "grasp", where the German is 
hegr(tfen, in order to draw attention to the same inconceivability encountered in MFNS. 
~2 MFNS Ak. 513. 
~J See also The Metaphysics (~r Morals. Ak. 280-1, where, with regard to human generation, Kant 
says that it is impossible to form a concept of the physical production of a being endowed with 
freedom. See Shell, Lh. 9 for an interesting discussion of this topic. 
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whether or not we encountered organized matter in experience.84 Nature is thought 
to have an affinity with practical reason, but only in order to justify a moral 
relation that we would set up anyway. 
The conceptual structure we apply to organized matter, then, is that of final 
causes, and this structure is applied by the power of teleological judgment. Kant 
generally discusses the principle of teleological judgment as a principle of the 
technic of nature, or as a principle of nature as if it were art: we judge nature 
according to reason's idea of a purpose, and thus as if it were a work of artistry 
(art, craft, or technology) determined by a concept. But in order to maintain the 
naturalness of self-production, we also judge nature by a principle of life. This 
implies, perhaps puzzlingly, that organized beings do not really have life~ their 
"life" is thought only by analogy. Kant suggests that "life" does not pertain to 
nature: natural beings just seem to have life by virtue of their organization. This is 
because Kant's concept of matter, as we saw in Metaphysical Foundations, does 
not include the concept of life. In fact, the Newtonian principle of inertia, for 
Kant, means nothing other than the lifelessness of matter, the inability of matter to 
move itself from an internal principle.85 Nor is "life" a constitutive a priori 
concept of the understanding - if it were, it would have to apply to all objects of 
experience. So the "life" of organized beings can be only a regulative principle of 
reflective judgment. 
This position is consistent with Kant's use of the term "life" in other texts and 
in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. As we have seen, "life" for Kant generally 
means the subject's power to act according to representations; in §29, Kant 
equates ""life" with the mind [Gemiit] as such. "Life" in Kant's critical period 
denotes human productivity, and in this text refers to transcendental spontaneity; it 
cannot be attributed constitutively to natural beings.86 As his critique of Herder's 
hylozoism makes clear, Kant rejects the view that a life force is a property of 
matter~ he also declares as "contrary to reason" the presupposition that organized 
84 CJ Ak. 478-9. 
X5 MFNS Ak. 544. 
86 Again. Maturana and Varela follow Kant with their declaration that li~i~g sy~ten:s are cogniti~e 
systems - for both Kant and MaturanaIV arela this identification of cognItIOn With h.f~ processes IS 
a real description (though MaturanaiVarela employ a much broader cOl~cept of ~~gnItlOn than Kant 
does. allowing them to make claims about living systems in nature bemg cognItive systems. Kant 
can only use such a claim as a regulative principle for reflective judgment.). See Capra 97. 
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matter "could have molded itself on its own into the form of a self-presen'ing 
purposiveness".87 It is precisely self-organization that Kant does not allow to be 
explicable in solely mechanistic tenns. 88 But "life" is attributed regulatively to 
organized natural beings insofar as they seem to display concept-driven 
productivity. Indeed, our characterization of nature as acting according to purposes 
comes from an analogy with our own "life" or transcendental spontaneity. A 
passage from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science makes this even 
clearer: 
Life means the capacity of a substance to determine itself to act 
from an internal principle, of a finite substance to determine itself 
to change, and of a material substance to determine itself to motion 
or rest as change of its state. Now, we know of no other internal 
principle of a substance to change its state but desire and no other 
internal activity whatever but thought [ .. .]. But these determining 
grounds and actions do not at all belong to the representations of 
the external senses and hence also not to the determinations of 
matter as matter. Therefore, all matter as such is lifeless.89 
This passage makes two things clear. First, not just plants and animals, but any 
organized matter, when judged teleologically, is thought as the analogue of life -
a claim to which Kant's lyrical conjectures on crystallization attest.90 Second, it is 
R7 CJ §65, Ak. 374-5; §81, Ak. 424. See also MFNS Ak. 544, and Kant's review of Herder's Ideas 
on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind (in Kant, Political Writings, 201-20). On Kant's 
critique of Herder, see John Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992) and Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology. Kant may 
also have associated hylozoism with Locke, who attributes to atoms an "organizational disposition" 
that detem1ines the form and continued existence of the living being. See Locke's Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Roger Woolhouse (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997), 1I.27, 
pp.298-9. 
KR See CJ §75, Ak. 400: "It is quite certain that in terms of merely mechanical principles of nature 
we cannot even adequately become familiar with, much less explain, organized beings and how 
they are intemally possible. So certain is this that we may boldly state that it is absurd for human 
beings even to attempt it, or to hope that perhaps some day another Newton might arise who would 
explain to us, in terms of natural laws unordered by intention, how even a mere blade of grass is 
produced. " 
K9 MFNS Ak. 544, emphasis added. 
9() CJ ~58, Ak. 348-9; §80, Ak. 419. An interesting analysis of these passages can be found in 
Rachei Jones, "Crystallisation: Artful Matter and the Productive Imagination in Kant's Account of 
Genius", in Rehberg and Jones (eds.), 19-36. 
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desire and thought that provide the basis on which we judge matter to be living. 
We judge nature not only according to reason's idea of a purpose, and thus as an 
analogue of art, but also according to our "internal activity" of thought - our 
transcendental spontaneity - and thus as an analogue of life. 
Neither analogy, Kant says, is sufficient to make self-organizing beings 
intelligible. If we call natural beings analogues of art, we imagine a rational 
"artist" and deny organized productivity to nature itself. If we call them analogues 
of life, we imagine either a soul or a life force inhering in matter which for Kant , , , 
is unintelligible.91 "Strictly speaking, therefore, the organization of nature has 
nothing analogous to any causality known to US".92 But Kant makes clear that 
these analogies are the ones that we do use, for our own inner causality is the 
source of the ideas of purpose and purposiveness that we read into nature. Weare 
allowed 
to use a remote analogy with our own causality in terms of 
purposes generally, to guide our investigation of organized objects 
and to meditate regarding their supreme basis - a meditation not 
for the sake of gaining knowledge either of nature or of that 
original basis of nature, but rather for the sake of [assisting] that 
same practical power in us by analogy with which we were 
considering the cause of the purposiveness in organized objects.93 
We think of the purposiveness of organized beings in terms of our own practical 
purposiveness. Our ability to act according to moral purposes is our internal 
principle of desire that is based on the internal activity of thought or spontaneity. 
When we think nature to be self-organizing and purposive, we think it by analogy 
with our practical use of our spontaneity or "life" to achieve moral aims. We also 
think of natural beings as pUlposes, as produced by an understanding with regard 
91 In his earliest work, Thoughts on the True Estimation (?f Li\'ing Forces (1747), Kant sought to 
restate Leibniz's distinction between living and dead forces, At that point Kant identified living 
force (vis \'i\'(i) with a substance's inner principle of striving or its ability to determine itself (Li\'ing 
Forces Ak. :28-:29). In line with Kant's rejection of monads and the inward nature of substances, 
this view was later rejected, but the concept ofliving force persists into Kant's concept oflife in his 
critical period. See Shell, ch. :2. 
92 CJ §65, Ak. 375. 
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to a final cause, and in this case we think them by analogy with art. We require 
both analogies in order to reconcile the self-organization of natural beings with the 
inconceivability that matter organizes itself. In providing a descriptive framework 
for natural production, these two analogies construct a "nature" that is suitable for 
our moral activity. From the idea of purpose and the analogy with art we can judge 
nature as created by a supreme cause; from our own inner purposiveness and the 
analogy with life, we can judge nature as working towards a final purpose. 
Armed with these analogies, teleological jUdgment re-interprets nature by way 
of a productive comportment towards it, and this productive comportment derives 
from productive spontaneity itself. The principle of nature as art and the principle 
of nature as life are superimposed onto nature's own inconceivable productivity in 
order to make nature into a whole that is productive on a human scale. Judgment 
cannot but approach organized nature through its own productive framework. 94 
Yet this framework that is inevitably applied to nature is nothing other than a 
comportment: an "intentional stance" of reflective judgment itself, whereby 
organized nature is interpreted as if it had the same productive spontaneity that 
human beings have.95 Such productive spontaneity (free causality) can be referred 
to the original causality of a creator, as Kant had shown in the first and second 
Critiques. The productive spontaneity of the subject, which can only become 
thematic in the initial relation to beings in the world, now becomes a regulative 
principle by which objects are organized into "artificial" systems, and by which 
we are able to consider nature as produced by an intentional creator. Just as we 
saw in chapter one, the idea of a creator is brought in at the end of scientific 
inquiry, and is based on an initial examination of productive existence. The 
productive existence of organized matter cannot be conceived, so the productive 
existence of human spontaneity is used analogically, and on that basis we can 
speculate about a creator. Nature is not governed by this principle, and natural 
93 CJ §65, Ak. 375. 
94 Hannah Ginsborg, in a similar way, argues that judgment must approach natur~ through a 
normative framework. See her "Purposiveness and Nomlati\'ity" in Hoke Robmson (ed.), 
Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress Vol. II (Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 1995), 
453-60 and "Kant on Understanding Organisms as Natural Purposes", in Watkins (ed.), 231-58. 
95 The ~eml "intentional stance" I take from Daniel Dennett's paper "True Believers" in Dennett, 
The Intentional Stance (Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, 1987), 13-35. It would be worthwhile to 
assess Dennett's indebtedness to Kant's third Critique. 
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science "must not leap over its boundary" in order to absorb the concept of a 
supernatural cause.96 
We are quite unable to prove that organized natural products 
cannot be produced through the mere mechanism of nature. [ ... ] 
Hence our reason, [ ... ] cannot possibly tell us whether nature's 
productive ability, which is quite adequate for whatever seems to 
require merely that nature be like a machine, is not just as adequate 
for [things] that we judge to be formed or combined in terms of the 
idea of purposes (which is what we must necessarily judge them to 
be) are in fact based on a wholly different kind of original 
causality, namely, an architectonic understanding, which cannot at 
all lie in material nature nor in its intelligible substrate. On the 
other hand, it is just as indubitably certain that the mere mechanism 
of nature cannot provide our cognitive power with a basis on which 
we could explain the production of organized beings. Hence the 
following principle is entirely correct for reflective judgment, 
however rash and unprovable it would be for determinative 
judgment: that [to account] for the very manifest connection of 
things in tenns of final causes we must think a causality distinct 
from mechanism - viz. the causality of an (intelligent) world 
cause that acts according to purposes. Applied to reflection, this 
principle is a mere maxim of judgment; and the concept of that 
causality is a mere idea. We make no claim that this idea has 
reality, but only use it as a guide for reflection, which meanwhile 
continues to remain open to [the discovery of] any basis for a 
mechanical explanation and never strays from the world of sense.97 
Judging nature in tenns of final causes, and thinking an original, intelligent world 
cause, is suitable for reflective judgment as a guide to further investigation, but, as 
we saw in chapter one, we must remain open to the possibility that organization 
9l> CJ §68, Ak. 382. 
97 CJ §71, Ak. 388-9. 
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could be explained in the same way that raw matter ("nature like a machine") is: 
by nature's own productive ability. In the absence of such explanations, we use 
our own productive spontaneity to comport ourselves towards the inconceivable 
existence of organization. This is a condition that Kant says "attaches inescapably 
to the human race".98 
4.4 Nature and phusis 
Thus the Critique of Teleological Judgment detennines nothing about nature, 
but affinns something about the human subject: that its own productive 
spontaneity is essential not only for having objective experience, but also for 
having systematic experience. The relation of being, and the fact that we feel our 
"life" or productive spontaneity in that relation, makes possible the "second-order" 
relations of science and morality, in which productive spontaneity is projected 
onto nature. What is at stake in the Critique of Judgment is the suitability of both 
the object and the subject for the relation of being. This suitability indicates the 
possibility of a conjoined supersensible substrate of productive spontaneity and 
productive nature, an underlying unity of subject and object that is thought to 
make possible the relation of being. This idea of a unified substrate is idea of the 
transcendental object as identified in chapter three: it is the idea of a common 
origin for matter and freedom. As an idea, it derives from our concept of 
objectivity in general, and thus from the relation of subject and object. The 
Critique of Judgment provides justification for our thought that subject and object 
can relate to one another, and thus leads more conclusively than the Critique of 
Pure Reason did, to the idea of a unified substrate. 
Experience in general rests on a productive ontology, to which the interplay 
between productive nature and productive spontaneity is central, as we saw in 
chapters two and three. The existence of productive nature, as raw matter, was 
seen to be a requirement for the activity of productive spontaneity and thus a 
requirement for epistemological ontology. In the Critique of Judgment we see that 
98 CJ §75, Ak. 401. 
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a system of experience as a whole also emerges from this productive ontology, an 
interplay between productive organization and productive spontaneity. Productive 
spontaneity, the feeling of "life", requires the existence of matter in order to be 
active, but it does not require that existence to be organized. The organization of 
matter is a lucky bonus, an affinnation of the ultimate organization of a purposive 
universe. Unlike matter, the existence of organization is not required by the 
epistemological ontology. It remains contingent and extraneous, an aspect of 
nature that exceeds the needs of epistemology and the judging subject. It is in this 
excessive aspect of nature, this existence which is surplus to epistemic 
requirements and which is beyond our ability to explain it wholly in mechanical, 
"mathematical" tenns, that we see a remnant of something like phusis in Kant's 
system: nature as self-generating and self-organizing, and as radically different in 
its production from techne. 
Interestingly, this is another point that Heidegger misunderstands about Kant. 
Heidegger refers to the Critique of Judgment in his 1939 essay "On the Essence 
and Concept of Ph us is in Aristotle's Physics B, 1".99 He alludes only briefly to 
Kant's text, suggesting that Kant represents the height of modem metaphysics 
which misinterprets Aristotle's conception of phusis and overemphasizes its 
analogical relation to techne. In fact, as I have suggested, Kant's concept of 
organized matter is quite similar to Aristotle's phusis, and for both thinkers it is 
precisely the radical difference of phusis or organization from any other kind of 
production that makes it impossible for us to consider it on its own tenns. 
Heidegger, however, citing one of Aristotle's many analogies of phusis with 
techne, writes: 
Is this [ ... ] the only possible interpretation of phusis, namely, as a 
kind of techne? That almost seems to be the case, because modem 
metaphysics, in the impressive tenns of, for example, Kant, 
conceives of "nature" as a "technique" such that this "technique" 
that constitutes the essence of nature provides the metaphysical 
'19 Trans. Thomas Sheehan, in Heidegger, Pafhmarh, 183-230. 
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ground for the possibility, or even the necessity, of subjecting and 
mastering nature through machine technology. 100 
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For Heidegger, modem metaphysics gives undue precedence to Aristotle's analogy 
between phusis and techne, and thus fully understands nature to be technical. The 
end-point of this misinterpretation, Heidegger says, is the conclusion that techne 
constitutes the essence of nature. This claim is closely related to Heidegger's 
argument in What is a Thing? that modem science and metaphysics, with Kant as 
exemplar, anticipate nature to be "mathematical" or already fully prone to 
measurement, classification and instrumentality. It is also related to Heidegger's 
claim that the Kantian subject has a productive comportment towards the being of 
things, and is thus related to his charge that being, for Kant, is equivalent to 
producedness. 
We have seen, however, that Kant does not see the essence of nature to be 
constituted as a technic; quite the opposite, for he sees nature as having an 
inconceivable productive ability that is judged regulatively to be technical. It is 
precisely the self-generation, self-organization and growth of natural beings that 
are impossible to conceptualize. This impossibility leads to the necessity that we 
use technical principles, if- as Kant and Aristotle both hope - we are to have a 
coherent system of natural science. Heidegger fails to see, first, that technicity is a 
regulative principle for Kant, and second, that Kant recognizes - just as much as 
Heidegger himself recognizes - that a productive or technical comportment 
represents a limitation of human understanding. IOI There is, perhaps, no reason to 
argue with Heidegger's claim that Kant's use of such a model grounds and 
justifies the technological domination of nature by humans. But Heidegger makes 
this claim from the wrong angle: the point is that technological domination is 
possible in Kant's system because techne constitutes "the peculiar character of my 
cognitive powers") not because it constitutes the essence of nature. 102 
100 Heidegger, Pathmarks. 220. 
101 This is a point also made by Dennis Schmidt; see his "Economies of Production: Heidegger and 
Aristotle on Phl'sis and Techne" in Crises in Continental Philosophy, ed, Arleen B, Dallery and 
Charles E, Scott (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 147-159, 
I()~ CJ §75, Ak. 397-8. 
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Furthennore, Kant is explicit that our anticipation of nature as fully 
classifiable - i.e. as a system that the understanding can grasp - is governed by 
a principle that reflective judgment gives only to itself, and not to nature. Not only 
is Heidegger wrong to say that technicity constitutes the essence of nature for 
Kant; he is wrong to imply that nature is constituted in advance as fully 
classifiable and instrumental. "Nature in general" is indeed determined in advance 
as measurable (as we saw in chapter two), and our judgment is indeed guided by 
the principle that empirical nature can be fully grasped or classified. But Kant does 
not claim that nature as a whole can be grasped by us, for that is the unanswerable 
question posed by the Critique of Judgment. The subject does indeed have a 
productive comportment towards things, but this comportment does not result, as 
Heidegger suggests it does, in an understanding of being as producedness. Rather, 
it is the relation of being, and the fact that the subject feels its own productive 
spontaneity in that relation, that results in the projection of human productivity 
onto nature. Through this comportment, nature is not determined as produced, but 
as humanly productive, to make sense of the inconceivability and excess of 
natural production. 
The existence of productive nature, for Kant, exceeds the requirements of 
productive spontaneity, and for this reason the mind may never be able to 
encompass the world as a whole. At least, not within the critical system. In the 
next chapter, looking at the Opus Postumum, we will see Kant adopt a very 
different position. 
Chapter 4 Summary 
In this chapter I have suggested that in the Critique of Judgment, Kant makes 
explicit the two themes I have been concerned with: the relation of being, and the 
subject's productive comportment towards nature. These two themes are discussed 
in tenns of aesthetic judgment and representation on the one hand, and teleological 
judgment and life on the other. Aesthetic judgment, I argued, because it is 
concerned with the transcendental fonn of a thing, is concerned with its conditions 
for cognition in general. The judgment of taste is an epistemic judgment for Kant, 
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establishing and affinning the knowability in general of the thing represented. The 
judgment of taste and the pleasure occasioned by it thus concern the being of the 
object: its subject-relationality in general. Kant's association of beauty with being 
is not aestheticist but is epistemic and ontological. Being is located in the realm of 
representation. 
I found that "life" for Kant refers to the self-active productivity, or 
spontaneity, of the subject, and that the feeling of life is part of the judgment of 
taste in which the knowability of the thing is established. In the Critique of 
Teleological Judgment, I argued, Kant says that we use this concept of life to 
understand natural beings that are otherwise incomprehensible: organized, self-
producing beings. We base our comportment towards nature on productive 
spontaneity itself, and thus have a productive comportment towards nature. Kant 
explains that we must take this comportment if we are to understand nature as a 
system, and if we are to ground scientific and moral systems on nature. The 
subject's orientation towards nature is productive and ontological. 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 
Life, force and original relation: the Opus Postumum 
What necessarily (originally) fonns the existence of things belongs 
to transcendental philosophy.l 
5.1 Problems of production 
200 
The aim of this thesis has been to argue for a productive ontology in Kant's 
texts. Initially, I distinguished between existential and epistemological ontologies, 
the fonner being Kant's philosophy of existence, and the latter being his theory of 
the structure of concepts and principles that make knowledge possible. We can see 
that these ontologies can be characterized in tenns of matter and fonn: existential 
ontology is bound up with Kant's matter-theory, while epistemological ontology 
concerns the analysis of the fonnal element that human understanding brings to 
experience. We have seen that these ontologies are based not on static concepts of 
presence, substance, or thought, but on dynamic, productive concepts of force (on 
the existential-material side) and spontaneity (on the fonnal-epistemic side). These 
are two productive ontologies, the objects of which are thought to be in productive 
relation to one another. Spontaneity produces a relation to the ongoing productive 
process of matter, which relation constantly produces subjectivity, objectivity, and 
knowledge; it is the relation of being. Being, as the original subject-object relation, 
requires both the existence of matter and the fonnal structure of knowledge-
conditions; thus Kant's ontology requires both existential and epistemological 
I Kant, Opus PostUlnum, Ak. 21:7, p. 256. References to the Opus Postllmllm (OP) will be both to 
the Akadclllic volume and page numbers (which are not in chronological order), and to the 
Cambridge edition page numbers. 
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aspects. Indeed, as I believe I have shown in the preceding chapters, it requires 
their inseparability. 
Despite the success of using the concept of production as a framework for 
determining a Kantian ontology, however, a number of problems have arisen, 
precisely over the nature of production. First, there is the problem of original 
production, which is particularly evident in the first Critique's Paralogisms and 
Antinomies. Kant's analyses of the material and transcendental conditions of 
experience have led us to the productive grounds of both existence and 
knowledge, but have left us without a principle by which to understand the ways 
in which those grounds themselves are produced, and without a principle by which 
to understand how the productive relation between those grounds is possible. We 
are lacking principles that explain how existence is produced, how spontaneity is 
produced, and how it is that spontaneity can relate to productive nature at all. 
What we are lacking, in short, is a principle of original production. Such a 
principle has been tentatively provided by the idea of the supersensible substrate 
(and variants of it, including the idea of the transcendental object): Kant has 
suggested that the origin of matter and spontaneity might be thought to be united 
in a single underlying substrate, which would also explain the possibility of their 
original relation. Kant never assumes that this is an adequate answer, as far as 
theoretical philosophy is concerned.2 An appeal to the supersensible indicates the 
limits of human knowledge, the bounds of finite understanding constrained by its 
own fonnal conditions. Kant has been obliged to relegate original production 
outside these bounds, precisely because it makes these bounds possible. 
There is also, second, the question of material production, which is made 
thematic in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and the Critique of 
Judgment. In the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant analyzed the empirical concept 
of matter a priori and found that the fundamental forces of attraction and 
repulsion, in constant conflict, could be thought to make up its constituent 
elements. But this view, along with Kant's rejection of atomism, makes 
problematic an account of the diversity and generation of matter. If matter is to be 
understood not as bodies separated by empty spaces, but as a field of dynamical 
~ Theoretical philosophy stands opposed to practical philosophy, for which the practical idea of a 
supersensible substrate is adequate to explain the origin of the moral law. 
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conflict, what accounts for our perception of individual bodies? While the concept 
of the conflict of the forces explained how matter in general fills a space, it could 
not explain how matter is formed into determinate bodies with different shapes, 
sizes, powers, and abilities. Kant admitted that from the concepts of the 
fundamental forces, he could not explain the specific variety of matter. The case of 
organic matter in the third Critique was even more problematic, as no dynamical 
or mechanical principle could be found to account for the self-organization and 
self-production of natural purposes. Kant's rejection of hylozoism meant that the 
power of self-organization could not be attributed to matter at all, and organisms 
had to be explained through a regulative principle of reflective judgment. In both 
these texts, we lack principles of diversity and generation: principles explaining 
how matter forms distinct bodies, and how bodies organize and reproduce 
themselves. 
What we need is a Kantian analysis of the concept of production. This would 
allow us to see how original production and material production are related, and 
thus enable us to complete our exposition of Kant's productive ontology. Kant 
provides us with the beginnings of such an analysis in what is known as the Opus 
Postumum, the large collection of papers written between approximately 1796 and 
1803 and left unpublished at the time of his death.3 My diagnosis that this text 
coheres perfectly with my aims is somewhat facetious, for the thirteen fascicles of 
the Opus Postumum - comprising 527 written pages of notes, fragments, and 
sustained treatments of certain topics - are so varied and wide-ranging that any 
study of Kant could find material both to affinn and to contradict its position 
(though few studies have so far made use of it).4 The text shows Kant both at his 
most materialist and at his most idealist, and suggests a rethinking of earlier 
3 For a history of the text and speculation as to the dating of its various sections, see Eckart 
Forster's Introduction to the Cambridge edition of the Opus Postumum. Forster indicates that Kant 
prepared a number of sections for publication, including some of the ether proofs which I will 
discuss. 
4 Forster and Guyer, for instance, maintain that with the Opus Postllmllm Kant affirms and 
develops the transcendental idealism of the critical period; Edwards and Tuschling, by contrast, 
argue that Kant alters certain fundamental tenets of his critical philosophy and t~ereby overturns 
transcendental idealism. See Forster, Kant's Final Synthesis; Paul Guyer, "The Umty of Nature and 
Freedom: Kant's Conception of the System of Philosophy", in Sally Sedgwick (ed.), The Reception 
of Kant's Critical Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 19-53; Jeffrey Edwards, Substance, Force, 
~nd the Possibilitv of Knowledge; Burkhard Tuschling, "Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a 
Transcendental D"eduction of Matter in Kant's Opus Postumum'", in Forster (ed.), 193-216. 
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positions that leads us to re-assess the basic tenets of transcendental idealism. It is 
a text that is exciting, confusing, and at times frustrating. 
The Opus Postumum cannot be read as a single coherent text, but should be 
approached as a number of philosophical threads to be followed. An interpretation 
of it, as Forster has noted, is best addressed not to the text as a whole, but to a 
selection of its key threads.5 One thread is decidedly concerned with addressing 
the questions of production that Kant left unanswered in his earlier texts. This can 
be attributed to the goal towards which Kant was working: a Transition from the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics. Put simply, this 
Transition project is one from a priori analysis to systematic empirical 
investigation.6 Physics, on Kant's view, is a system of laws and principles 
concerning the specific forces of nature. For physics to be possible, philosophy 
must provide a priori principles for the systematic classification of the specific, 
empirically given, forces of matter. Furthermore, as was the case in the Critique of 
Judgment, we must have justification for assuming that nature is appropriate for 
such a classification. 
However, neither the a priori concepts of the Metaphysical Foundations nor 
the third Critique's principle of the purposiveness of nature is sufficient to ground 
physics. The analysis of the concept of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations 
resulted in very general concepts of the fundamental forces, but this analysis 
cannot supply physics with a guideline for investigating the empirical properties of 
specific (non-fundamental) forces. 7 The third Critique's principle of the formal 
purposiveness of nature assures that nature can be investigated and classified 
systematically, based on the assumption that nature does specify its laws according 
to a principle, but it does not give us specific instructions as to how nature should 
be investigated so that the systematicity of its specific forces should become 
apparent. The Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations to Physics mediates 
between the a priori concepts of the Metaphysical Foundations, and the 
systematic empirical concepts of the third Critique. It is needed "to specify a 
method of bringing about the systematic knowledge of physics by providing the 
5 Forster, Kant's Final Synthesis. x. 
6 See Forster's Introduction, OP xxxi\'-xxxv. 
7 Forster's Introduction, OP xxxi\'; cf. Ak.2:!:282. p. 100. 
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outline of a system of all objects of the outer senses".8 A system of all actual 
material objects must be anticipated a priori, in outline, and achieving this outline 
will be the Transition. 
Kant's general project is thus a new and intriguing one. It involves the search 
for a set of concepts that are neither entirely a priori nor entirely empirical, but 
which belong both to metaphysics and a priori concepts, and to physics and 
principles of experience. Kant says that these concepts must instruct us with 
regard "to the a priori principles of the possibility of experience, hence of the 
investigation of nature".9 They will determine how we anticipate the systematicity 
of the specific forces of material nature, and thus how we understand specific 
types of bodies to be formed. The Transition project is thus, in part, an attempt to 
sketch out in advance a physical system that will explain material production. 
Kant had considerable difficulty arriving at the concepts he required, but his 
attempt to find a new set of synthetic a priori principles that make specific types 
of experience possible led him to a concept he had long entertained in his 
philosophy of nature: the concept of ether. With this powerful concept, as I will 
show, Kant is able to ground a systematic physics, ground the possibility of 
experience, and explain material production. The concept of ether also has 
significance for the retrospective interpretation of transcendental apperception, 
affection, and the relation of being. 
5.2 A solution to the problem of generation 
The failure of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations to account for material 
production - for how matter produces diverse bodies - is one that Kant 
acknowledged. While Kant felt that he was able completely to "present the 
moments to which [the] specific variety [of matter] must all together admit of 
being reduced a priori", he was "unable to furnish an adequate explication of the 
8 Forster's Introduction, OP xxxv, emphasis mine; based on OP Ak. 21 :492: "bringing about a 
systematic cognition of physics [ ... ] cannot be don~ through .m~~,ely col.lected ex~eriences bec~use 
the sketch of a system is missing that must be gIven a priOri (not Included In the CambrIdge 
edition, quoted in Forster, I\.ant ·s Final Synthesis. 6). 
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possibility of matter and its specific variety from the fundamental forces".lo The 
analytic reduction of the concept of matter to its most basic elements does not lead 
directly to a synthetic determination of how those basic elements produce 
individual bodies or effects. It seems that Kant was reminded of this problem in 
1792, when Jakob Sigismund Beck, commissioned to write explanatory excerpts 
of Kant's major writings, wrote to Kant to ask how his dynamical theory could 
explain the differences of density in matter. II In reply, Kant admitted that his 
tentative solution - that universal attraction (i.e. gravitation) is the same in all 
matter and that only repulsion differs and thus accounts for differences in density 
- "leads in a way into a circle that I cannot get out Of,.12 Forster argues 
convincingly that this "circle" (which is quite difficult to see) arises from the 
problem that universal attraction (i.e. gravitation), because it is proportional to the 
mass or density of matter, depends causally on density - which is then said to be 
the effect of attraction. 13 
The problem of the diversity of material bodies also fonns the basis for 
Schelling's critique of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations in his "First Draft of a 
Philosophy of Nature" (1799) and "Universal Deduction of the Dynamical 
Process" (1800). Schelling argues that from an analysis of the empirical concept of 
matter, and the fact that matter fills a space to a determinate degree, the two 
fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion can be deduced, but an explanation 
of the production of bodies from these two forces requires some third force or 
ground. 14 This is required if the explanation of production is not to be circular: in 
order to fill a detenninate space, repulsive force must be limited to a certain 
degree by attractive force. Yet this attractive force must itself be limited to a 
certain degree. The degree of its limitation cannot, for Schelling, be explained by 
the repulsive force, for that would already have to be limited by the attractive 
9 OP Ak. 2 I :362-3, not included in Cambridge edition, quoted in Forster, Kant's Final Sl'I1thesis, 
16. 
10 MFNS Ak. 525. 
II Letter from l.S. Beck, 8 Sept. 1792, Correspondence Ak. 11:359-61, pp. 426-8. See Forster, 
Kant's Final Svnthesis, 33-35. 
12 Letter to l.S~ Beck. 16 Oct. 1792, Correspondence Ak. I 1:375-7, pp. 434-6. See also MFNS Ak. 
533-4. 
13 Kant's Final Synthesis, 34-5. See also Kant's comments on Beck's letter, Correspondence Ak. 
II :361-5, pp. 428-32. 
14 Forster, Kant's Final Synthesis, 39-41. 
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force, and so on. Schelling argues instead - suggesting that this position IS 
implicit in Kant's dynamical theory - that the degree of limitation of both forces 
is determined by a ground lying outside the two forces. This ground, for Schelling, 
is a certain original unity of all matter: "one can see that the empirical datum 
required for the construction of a determinate degree of the filling of space is the 
universal concatenation of all matter among itself'.15 
It is unlikely that Kant was influenced by these particular texts of Schelling's 
when he was thinking through the problem of material diversity, not least because 
Kant arrived at a solution several years before these texts were published. 16 In 
order to resolve the "circle" he identified, Kant began to consider different types 
of attraction, and came to the conclusion that both local cohesive attraction 
(attraction in contact) and universal gravitational attraction (attraction at a 
distance) are required to account for individual bodies of differing densities. This 
led him to posit a universal matter surrounding the cohesive-repulsive bodies, 
which is composed of universal gravitational attraction and expansive repulsion. 
This universal matter he calls the ether, not as an object of experience, but as "the 
idea of an expansive matter whose parts are not capable of any greater dissolution, 
because no attraction of cohesion is to be found in them". The force of cohesion 
does not pertain to the ether itself, but to bodies which result from the oscillating 
forces of the ether. Bodies, which necessarily include cohesion, are thus 
differentiated from the dynamical field of matter as a cosmic whole: 
To assume such a matter filling cosmIC space [i.e. ether] is an 
inevitably necessary hypothesis, for, without it, no cohesion, which 
is necessary for the fonnation of a physical body, can be thought. 
All matter, however, is originally combined in a whole of 
world-attraction through universal gravitation, and thus the ether 
itself would, however far it may extend, be in a state of 
compresSIOn, even in the absence of all other matter. Such 
15 Schelling. qtd. Forster. Kant's Final Synthesis. 41. . . ' .. 
16 See Forster. Kant's Final 5.1·nthesis. 41. Kant was probably famIliar wIth Schellmg. s early work. 
including the Ideas for a Philosophy (~f Nature of 1797. which presents,., a dynamIcal th~ory ~f 
matter strongly influenced by. and not especially critical of. Kant. See OP _74-5. n.89 for Forster s 
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compression must, however, be oscillating, because the first effect 
of this attraction in the beginning of all things must be a 
compression of all its parts toward some midpoint, with 
consequential expansion, and which, because of the elasticity [of 
the world-matter], must hence be set in continuous and everlasting 
oscillation. The secondary matter distributed in the ether is thereby 
necessitated to unify itself into bodies at certain points and so to 
form cosmic bodies. This universal attraction, which the matter of 
the ether exerts upon itself, must be thought of as a limited space (a 
sphere), consequently as the one universal cosmic body, which 
compresses itself in a certain degree through this attraction. It 
must, however, be regarded, just in virtue of this original 
compression and expansion, as eternally oscillating, and, hence, all 
cohesion can only have been produced (or be produced further) by 
the living force of impact, not the dead force of pressure. 17 
~07 
Probably written III 1796-7, this is Kant's first clear statement of a post-
Metaphysical Foundations theory of matter, and his first explanation of material 
production. Though the mechanics of cohesion may not be completely clear, we 
can nevertheless summarize Kant's general position. In order to account for "the 
formation of a physical body", Kant distinguishes between the universal attraction 
and repulsion of an ether, and the cohesive attraction and repulsion that fill a space 
to a detenninate degree. He thus distinguishes a primary, original matter from the 
"secondary matter" originally dissolved and distributed in it. The primary matter 
(ether) is composed of universal attraction, which compresses towards a midpoint 
of the universe, and repulsion, which expands outwards again. The ether is thus in 
a "continuous and everlasting oscillation" of compression and expansion that 
causes secondary matter to unify into bodies through cohesive attraction balanced 
speculation on Kant's familiarity with Schelling, and see in particular chapters -+ and 5 of Book II 
of Schelling's ideasfor a Philosophy «lNatlire for Schelling's early Kantian dynamics. 
17 OP Ak. 21:378-9, p. 12. My discussion addresses the scientific issues and problems in the OP 
only in a very limited way. For a discussion of the science behind the Opus Postllmllm. particularly 
as it relates to the emerging science of chemistry, and a diagnosis of the problems with Kant's 
matter-theory, see part two of Friedman's Kant and the Exact Sciences, and chapters 7 and 8 of 
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by repulsion. The oscillation of the ether "produces" the cohesion of secondary 
matter into bodies, not simply by compression (i.e. universal attraction), but 
through the "living force" of generating impact between repulsive forces. The 
ether is a dynamical field of reciprocal influence that produces bodies.18 
Thus Kant resolves his "circle" of 1792 by hypothesizing that cohesive 
attraction, which does not depend on the density of a given body, is what 
counterbalances repulsion, and by arguing that cohesion and repulsion depend 
upon the "living force" of the ether. As Forster puts it, 
the quantity of matter, and the differences in density, [are] thus a 
function of this universally distributed Weltstoff whose internal 
pUlsations segregate the heterogeneous materials originally 
dissolved in it, thereby causing the formation of bodies of different 
types and textures. 19 
Not only does the ether or "world-material" provide a non-corpuscular explanation 
of the production of individual bodies; it also resolves another problem from the 
Metaphysical Foundations, that of the cause of the fundamental forces. As I 
showed in chapter two, the "inconceivability" of the forces - the impossibility of 
deriving their concepts from any more basic concept - denied the forces any real 
possibility, and signaled the problem of positing a ground for existence outside of 
existence itself. It now seems that Kant has provided the concept of ether as a 
concept from which the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion (cohesion 
and impenetrability) of secondary matter can be derived, meaning that these forces 
can no longer be called "fundamental". This may be why Kant refers to them 
simply as "the moving forces" throughout the Opus Postumum. This move, of 
course, simply shifts the burden of underivability onto the "original" forces of the 
ether (gravitation and expansion): where do these original forces, and this original 
Edwards' Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge (which include a critique of 
Friedman). 
IX I will have more to say about "living force" shortly. Howard Caygill has suggested in another 
context ("Force and Productivity", a paper given at a one-day workshop on Merleau-Ponty and the 
Philosophy of Nature, University of Warwick. 30 May ::!003) that we might think of s~ch a fie.ld ~s 
energy. and that the link Kant implies between energy, heat (an effect of ether or calone) and lIfe IS 
a significant one. 
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primary matter, come from? What justifies us - aside from the need to explain 
material diversity - in positing this primary matter? If Kant does not raise this 
question immediately, it is because it is the implicit question leading to his proofs 
for the existence of this primary matter; the question necessitates what Tuschling 
calls a "transcendental deduction" of the ether. 20 What justifies us in positing this 
primary matter is the possibility of experience itself. 
Before we look at these proofs, some background on the ether is called for. As 
we have seen, the ether is characterized as a single whole, filling cosmic space 
through the oscillation of force; the ether can be described as a plenum or 
dynamical continuum. This concept was not new to Kant, nor to eighteenth-
century science: it had been invoked in Newton's Opticks as a conjecture on the 
cause of gravitation, and Boscovich in 1763 had fonnulated a theory that 
individual material bodies emerge from an oscillating dynamical continuum.2I 
Kant discusses ether in a number of his early texts, including the Universal 
Natural History and Theory of the Heavens of 1755, in which he claims that all 
bodies are generated from an elementary matter (though not a dynamical one).:!:! 
Kant develops a concept of ether as dynamical in the Physical Monadology of 
1756, and continues to entertain the notion that a theory of matter must be based 
on the concept of a dynamical cosmic ether well into the 1770s, as his Reflections 
on Physics from that decade indicate. Indeed, it appears that Kant had already 
worked out a version of his cohesion explanation for the diversity of bodies at that 
time.23 Based on this evidence, Edwards contends that Kant never ceased to 
believe that a dynamical continuum was at the basis of matter and that it fonned 
an essential part of the transcendental theory of experience. 
It may be true that Kant never ceased to believe that ether was at the basis of 
matter. But in the critical period he makes the presupposition of a dynamical 
continuum a transcendental principle for the possibility of experience, and 
marginalizes the question of whether dynamical ether actually causes the 
19 Kant's Final Synthesis. 45; see also 70-1. 
20 Tuschling 200-1. 
21 Edwards, Substance. Force. and the Possibility of Knowledge. 101-5. 
22 See Edwards, Substance. Force. and the Possibility of Knowledge. 112-17; Kant, Unin'1"Sal 
Natural HistOl:r and Theory (~r the Heavens. trans. W. Hastie (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1969). 
23 Edwards, Substance. Force. and the Possibility (~r Knowledge, 123-32. 
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generation of diverse material bodies (which may explain his "forgetting" the 
cohesion explanation in the Metaphysical Foundations). Instead of holding to his 
pre-critical position that a dynamical continuum accounts materially for bodies, in 
the first Critique Kant makes the principle of a dynamical continuum a 
transcendental condition of possibility for objects of experience generally. Two 
transcendental principles from the first Critique are relevant here. The first is the 
principle of the Anticipations of Perception, as discussed in chapter two, which 
states that all objects of sensation must have some degree of reality; that is, they 
must not be qualitatively nothing. This shows that empty space could not be an 
object of perception or experience, for empty space would have no degree of 
reality.24 Kant does not prove the impossibility of empty space here, but the 
impossibility of its perception - he shows that evelything we perceive. including 
the space between objects, has some degree of reality and therefore presence. 
Everything we perceive and experience is qualitatively "full" of presence. 
This already suggests that experience is of a full field, and the second 
transcendental principle relevant to our concerns here states that this field is 
detennined as one of dynamical community. The principle of the third analogy 
states that experience of coexistence is possible only on the transcendental 
assumption of the thoroughgoing reciprocity or community of all substances.25 We 
experience things as objectively existing at the same time and as following one 
another reciprocally in our perception. If each of these things were isolated (i.e. 
separated by empty space), Kant says, then our perception could not advance from 
the one to the other and back again; because empty space cannot be perceived, we 
would have only isolated individual perceptions and not one experience of 
multiple coexisting things. In other words, our experience of things as existing at 
the same time presupposes that they exist as part of the same space. Furthennore, 
it presupposes that they exist in reciprocal interaction, for in order for us to 
represent the coexistence as objective, the things must be experienced as 
detennining one another reciprocally, just as our perceptions of them follow one 
another reciprocally.26 We must be employing a transcendental principle of the 
24 CPR A 172 / B214. 
~5 CPR A211 / B257. 
26 CPR B257. 
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reciprocal interaction of all objects of experience in a single, full space. The 
transcendental principle of reciprocity can thus be restated in terms of dynamical 
community: 
Each substance [ ... ] must therefore contain in itself the causality of 
certain determinations in the other substance, and at the same time 
the effects of the causality of that other; that is, the substances must 
stand, immediately or mediately, in dynamical community, if their 
coexistence is to be known in any possible experience.27 
It is a condition of the possibility of our expenence of coexistence that we 
experience things as standing in dynamical community; that is, as mutually 
interacting in a continuum without the intervention of empty spaces. This is, of 
course, a transcendental principle constitutive of experience; it does not prove or 
suggest that the material world really is a dynamical continuum.28 If it did prove 
that, Kant would have no problem asserting the actuality of the fundamental 
forces, but it is clear in Metaphysical Foundations that the actuality of the forces 
cannot even be assumed. Just as he did in the first and second Analogies, however, 
Kant provides the empirical criterion through which we recognize the validity of 
this principle: he speaks of the "continuous influences" that invariably lead our 
senses from one object to another, such as the light that produces a community 
between our eyes and the celestial bodies.29 He also notes that reason's idea of the 
unity of the world-whole, in which all appearances are connected, is a 
consequence of the transcendental principle of community.30 
27 CPR A212-3 / B259. 
2X I disagree wholeheartedly with Edwards on this. Edwards (in his otherwise excellent book) 
argues that the dynamic continuum of the third analogy is an a priori necessary material condition 
of possible experience. Aside from the lack of textual evidence to support this position and its 
inconsistency with Kant's general argument, this interpretation would raise serious problems for 
the Metaphysical Foundations, where Kant argues that the concept of matter is rcdllci?~e to that ~f 
a dynamical continuum. The existence of a dynamical field is not a necessary condItion for thIS 
reduction or for the experience of coexistence, but the transcendental principle of dynamical 
community is. See Edwards, Suhstance, Force, and the Possibility of K/1(Jl\'lcdge. Introduction and 
chapters 1-3. Of course, Kant's helief in an existing dynamical continuum would not have 
contradicted the transcendental principle, as Eric Watkins argues in "Kant on Rational Cosmology" 
(Watkins (ed.). 83-6). 
24 CPR A2l3 / B260. 
30 Footnote to CPR A218 / B265. 
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On the basis of these transcendental principles, Kant is able to say in the 
Metaphysical Foundations that it is a consequence of his dynamical theory that we 
can think of a matter, such as the ether, that entirely fills its space without any 
void. He suggests that we may consider the ether a priori along with attractive and 
repulsive force. 31 At the end of the Metaphysical Foundations Kant even 
conjectures that ether may be thought to be "the ground of the possibility of the 
composition of a matter in general", a supposition that is "supported by many 
reasons" but remains "quite hypothetical".32 In the Metaphysical Foundations, 
Kant postulates that matter, insofar as it fills a determinate space, is reducible to 
the concept of the conflict of attractive and repulsive force, hypothetically 
dispersed within a dynamical continuum, the consideration of which is made 
possible by a transcendental principle, but the real possibility of which cannot be 
established. 
In the above-quoted passage from the 1796-7 section of the Opus Postumum, 
Kant postulates ether as a mere hypothesis, though it is "indispensably necessary" 
for his new theory of material diversity. This is already more committed to the real 
possibility of the forces than Kant had been in Metaphysical Foundations, and this 
commitment is strengthened. In the sections of the text called "Ubergang 1-14" 
(called the Ether Proofs in the English translation), probably written in 1799, Kant 
clearly thinks of ether as a categorically given material without which outer 
experience would be impossible. 
There exists a matter, distributed in the whole umverse as a 
continuum, unifonnly penetrating all bodies, and filling all spaces 
(thus not subject to displacement). Be it called ether, or caloric, or 
whatever, it is no hypothetical material (for the purpose of 
explaining certain phenomena, and more or less obviously 
conjuring up causes for given effects); [ ... J Its actuality can be 
postulated prior to experience (a priori) for the sake of possible 
. 33 
experIence. 
31 MFNS Ak. 534. 
32 MFNS Ak. 563-4. 
33 OP Ak. 21 :218-19, pp. 69-70. 
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This clearly marks a development, not only for Kant's theory of matter, but for his 
transcendental philosophy as a whole. For Kant now claims not simply that ether 
is a useful hypothesis for explaining individual bodies, but that the ether exists, 
and that this existence can be postulated prior to experience, for the sake of 
experience. A dynamical continuum is no longer a transcendental principle 
without which experience would not be possible; it is now a material condition 
without which experience would not be possible. In addition to accounting for the 
material possibility of diverse bodies, ether is made to account for the possibility 
of the experience of diverse bodies. Kant needs to establish the existence of ether 
a priori, since ether cannot be experienced as such. This goal suggests, peculiarly, 
that Kant will have recourse to a type of ontological proof. 
5.3 The ether proofs 
The first Critique gives us the principles (1) that there can be no experience of, 
or inference to, empty space; (2) that the existence of matter can be known to us 
only through its influence on our senses; and (3) that matter cannot be thought as 
atoms separated by empty spaces, but must be thought as a continuum of force. In 
the Opus Postumum this continuum is conceived in a much more detenninate way: 
as the "primary matter" in which all bodies are originally dissolved, distributed, 
and fonned by dynamic oscillation, it is the totality of the reciprocal interactions 
of material bodies. As the original totality of all matter, it is the original totality of 
all motion, producing and sustaining the motion and generation of bodies. But 
whereas existent beings were previously thought to be grounded only by other 
existent beings, Kant now suggests that existent beings are grounded by the 
totality of existence itself. This suggests a return to the idea of the sum-total of all 
reality, not only as the ground of the qualities of things, but as the ground of their 
existence. The ether is a sum-total of all matter and force, but the totality is clearly 
f · 14 more than the sum 0 Its parts.-
34 For a similar argument, see Mark Wollman, "The Development of Kant's Notion of the 'Sum 
Total of All Possibilities' and its Application to Science", in Robinson (ed.), 341-8. 
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The totality is thought to be self-active. Kant asserts that the infinite regress of 
"mechanically produced motion" must be explained by "a matter in space and 
time, which moves and is moved without beginning or end, and which, infinitely 
divided, conserves all matter in motion".35 Ether is thus characterized as the 
continuous and all-pervasive dynamical activity of keeping bodies in motion and 
interaction: it is "a self-subsistent matter, penetrating all bodies, and unceasingly 
and unifonnly agitating all their parts".36 The proposition that there are physical 
bodies presupposes that there is some matter whose moving forces are able to 
generate bodies spontaneously.37 But Kant's ongoing insistence that spontaneity 
cannot be attributed to matter (it would "contradict the concept of matter") means 
that this spontaneity cannot be exhibited by matter as we know it. 38 Rather, 
generation must have a first beginning in some original self-activity 
whose possibility is indeed incomprehensible, but whose 
originality (as self-activity) is not to be doubted. Thus there must 
exist a matter which, as internal, penetrates all bodies, and, at the 
same time, moves them continually.39 
With this, Kant suggests that we must at least think of the ether as being the 
original self-active ground of physical bodies and their motion. Since matter 
cannot be thought to be spontaneous, and since the ether is characterized as the 
original self-subsistent, self-active ground of nature, the ether must be thought of 
as more than the sum of all material forces. But to avoid attributing an immaterial 
principle of a "world-soul" or an understanding to the totality of matter, Kant 
concedes that matter as a totality includes a power of self-activity that is not an 
understanding. Ether includes a l'is viva or "living force" that works by impact and 
is sufficient to move and produce inorganic bodies through cohesion, but not a l'is 
l'i1'ijlca or "vivifying force" that would be sufficient to produce organi:=ed 
35 OP Ak. 21 :227, p. 75. 
36 OP Ak. 21 :215-6, p. 67. 
37 OP Ak. 21 :216, p. 68. 
3R OP Ak. 21 :227, p. 75. 
39 OP Ak. 21 :216, p. 68. 
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bodies.40 (Confusingly, Kant also calls the vis vivifica "vital force", i.e. a force that 
produces life; "living force", by contrast, is a thing's inner impetus to motion.) 
The ether is characterized as the inner dynamic activity of nature that can produce 
inorganic bodies through cohesion, but that cannot produce organic bodies, since 
their production is presumed to involve concepts. The generation of organized 
beings remains a problem within Kant's new system. 
As the complex of forces immanent to inorganic bodies, the ether is not a 
productive thing external to the bodies it produces. The ether moves things 
internally: it does not set matter in motion from the outside, but rather sets each of 
the parts of matter in motion relative to every other part. The ether is not external 
to the bodies we experience, but is the totality of force, the dynamical "horizon", 
within which bodies can arise and move. As this "horizon", ether is the concept of 
the spontaneous system of forces that materially grounds all of nature and 
experience. But this cannot be just a hypothesis: Kant needs to demonstrate the 
existence of this self-subsistent matter ("ether, or caloric, or whatever,,41), for the 
physical possibility of the diversity of bodies is otherwise thrown into doubt. We 
must assume the existence of ether if experience of detenninate spaces, and thus 
of individual bodies, is to be possible. 
Kant's transcendental argument for the existence of ether starts from the fact 
that we do have experience of detenninate spaces. Space is thus an object of 
experience. But the Transcendental Aesthetic states that we have only a pure a 
priori intuition of space; this alone does not amount to experience. Experience of 
a detenninate space requires the unity of consciousness synthetically to bring 
about a detenninate combination of the manifold.42 In other words, we must have 
exercised the synthetic unity of apperception upon some material: 
40 OP Ak. 22:210, p. 30. For an argument that Kant's theory of the ether as "livi~g force': doe~,n?t 
allow his anti-hylozoism to be upheld, see Paul Guyer, "Organisms and the. Umty of SCience , 111 
Watkins (ed.), 259-81. Kant does speculate that a "world-soul" may be pOSSible external to matter, 
making organized bodies possible; see, e.g., OP Ak. 22:547-8, p. ~5. Forster (OP p. 274) suggests 
that Kant's use of the ternl "world-soul" here derives from Sche1l1l1g, for whom the ternl refers to 
the unconsciously producing principle that underlies the continuity of organic and inorganic nature; 
Schelling associates the world-soul with ether. . . . .' 
41 Kant uses the terms "caloric" and "ether" interchangeably, except 111 contexts where he .IS talk~ng 
specifically about heat, none of which 1 refer to here. As Edwards indicates, Kant had IdentIfIed 
ether with caloric as early as his 1756 Physical Monadology. 
4~ CPR B 137-8. 
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The ground for this assertion [of the existence of ether] is: 
Intuitions in space and time are mere forms, and, lacking 
something which renders them knowable for the senses, furnish no 
real objects whatsoever to make possible an existence in general 
(and, above all, that of magnitude). Consequently, space and time 
would be left completely empty for experience. This material, 
therefore, which underlies this generally possible experience a 
priori, cannot be regarded as merely hypothetical, but as a given, 
originally moving, world-material; it cannot be assumed merely 
problematically, for it first signifies intuition (which would 
otherwise be empty and without perception).43 
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Just as Kant argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time as the forms 
of outer and inner sense do not on their own give us experience of space and time 
as objects; for that, some material is required, and this material must actually exist 
if we are to have experience of space and thus experience of detenninate bodies. 
Without this material, apperception would have nothing to unify, and space as 
pure intuition would be "empty" as far as experience is concerned. We do, 
however, have experience of detenninate spaces. So we can assert a priori that 
some material exists prior to experience, and that this material makes experience 
materially possible. 
With this Kant has not yet shown that this material must be the ether, which he 
has characterized as space-filling and all-pervasive. For this step of the argument 
Kant reminds us that space must be materially full if we are to have experience of 
a plurality of appearances. This follows from the third analogy: appearances must 
be viewed as a dynamical continuum without empty spaces if we are to experience 
their simultaneity. Furthennore, we can only discern a plurality of appearances if 
they have difference of location.44 But before difference of location can be 
assigned to individual objects, Kant says, the space that those individuals are in 
must be an object of experience. Taken on a cosmic scale, it must be possible for 
43 OP Ak. ~1 :217, p. 68, emphases added. 
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space as a whole to be an object of experience, if a plurality of appearances can be 
experienced in it, and space as a whole must therefore be full. Space as an object 
of experience, as we have seen, relies on some existing material; if space as a 
whole is to be an object of experience, it must rely on some existing material that 
fills space completely. This material is the self-subsistent, originally moving, all-
pervasive ether, "space thought hypostatically".45 
There must first be a matter filling space, ceaselessly self-moving 
by agitating forces, [ ... ] before the location in space of every 
particle can be determined. This is the basis for any matter as 
object of possible experience. For the latter is what first makes 
experience possible. This space cannot be filled with bodies, unless 
matter has previously filled a sensible space by self-activity. For 
space must first be an object of experience; otherwise no position 
can be assigned to [bodies]. The all-penetrating caloric is the first 
condition of the possibility of all outer experience. Empty space 
d . 46 oes not eXIst. 
Kant states that bodies cannot be dispersed in space, and that we cannot 
experience bodies as spatial and positional, unless the self-activity of ether fills 
that space. It actually exists prior to experience and can be known to exist a priori, 
for its existence is a condition of the possibility of experience. Kant has used a 
transcendental argument to prove the existence of something material: not the 
existence of some material in general, but the existence of a self-active, self-
subsistent, all-pervasive and dynamical material. 
At first glance, it appears that Kant has merely specified what he had already 
shown in the first Critique: namely, that the existence of some material is a 
transcendental condition for the possibility of experience. The fact that the 
44 CPR A272 / B328. For an argument that Kant replaces the problem of individuation with a 
problem of diversity, see Eric M. Rubenstein, "Rethinking Kant on Individuation", Kantian Review 
5 (2001). 73-89. . . 
45 OP Ak. 21 :.221, p. 71.Kant says only that the ether is space thought hypostatlcally. But It must 
also indicate the material fullness of time, for it is permanent and constantly active; see his one 
brief remark about this at OP Ak 21 :220. p. 70. 
46 OP Ak. 21 :550-1, p. 81. 
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material existence required for experience is characterized as ether does however , , 
mean that Kant's doctrines of apperception and affection are altered.47 Ether is the 
unified basis of the whole of all the moving forces of matter, and as such, it is "the 
principle of the possibility of the unity of the whole of possible experience".48 The 
existence of ether as a single unified totality now provides a material supplement 
to the formal unity provided by transcendental apperception. In the first Critique, 
the manifold lacked unity of its own. Transcendental apperception forged an 
original synthetic unity, which made possible the analytic unity of apperception -
the identity of a self-consciousness in possession of one continuous experience. 
Although material existence was necessary to the analytic unity of apperception, 
material existence had no independent unity that could influence self-
consciousness. Here in the Opus Postumum, however, Kant argues that the 
existence of ether - a single, unified, material totality - is a condition of the 
synthetic unity of apperception doing its job. It is now explicit, therefore, that the 
synthetic unity of apperception and the material unity of the manifold are requisite 
for the analytic unity of apperception. The dynamical continuum of ether provides 
the material unity of the whole of possible experience; this unity of all possible 
experience is the condition of possibility of transcendental apperception (both 
synthetic and analytic) providing the fonnal unity of individual experiences. 
This results in the position that the systematicity of all experience is the 
condition of possibility of our experiences. It also results in Kant's claim that the 
material unity is the single object of perception, the one and only material thought 
to affect the senses. We must look at a few passages together to make sense of 
Kant's position: 
Just as there is only one space and only one time (as objects of pure 
intuition), there is likewise only one object of possible outer 
experience in the field of the causality of perception of outer 
things. For all so-called experiences are always only parts of one 
experience, in virtue of the universally distributed, unbounded 
47 See Tuschling 208. 
4X OP Ak. 21 :224. p. 73. 
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caloric which connects alI celestial bodies in one system and sets 
them into a community of reciprocity.49 
[The proof for the existence of ether] concerns an individual 
object, which carries with it real (not logical) universality. There is 
to be found here a collective unity of the objects of a single 
experience [ ... ]; the object of this concept contains the One and All 
of outer sense-objects.5o 
[T]he concept of the whole of outer experience presupposes [ ... ] a 
constant motion of all matter, by which the subject, as an object of 
sense, is affected. For without this motion, that is, without the 
stimulation of the sense organs, which is its effect, no perception of 
any object of the senses, and hence no experience, takes place.51 
The goal of [the concept of caloric] is to have a material principle 
of the unity of possible experience; one which combines all 
experiences into a single experience. Without this combination 
(and its fonn) there would be no coherent whole of experience; it 
would, in that case, only be an aggregate of perceptions, not 
experience as a system. 
Thus caloric exists [ ... ]. That is, we can only achieve the 
SUbjective unity of experience through the moving forces of matter 
in us, which produce sensible representations of their objects. It is 
not possible except by the existence of the moving forces, which 
49 OP Ak. 22:554n, p. 89. 
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50 OP Ak. 21:586, p. 93. In calling the ether the One and All of outer sense-objects - a phrase 
adopted by German neo-Spinozists in the late eighteenth-century - Kant aligns ether with 
Spinoza's substance, the unity and totality of all being; see OP p. 269, Forster's note 58. Kant 
refers increasingly to Spinoza in the later sections of the OP, particularly in his late reflections on 
God. See, e.g., OP Ak. 22:54-6, pp. 213-4; Ak. 21:12-15, pp. 220-2; Ak. 21:99, p. 255. On Kant's 
late Spinozism, see Edwards, "Spinozism, Freedom, and Transcendental Dynamics in Kant's Final 
System of Transcendental Idealism", in Sedgwick (ed.l. 54-77. For an argument that with these 
remarks Kant expresses not his admiration but his disdain for Spinoza, see Guyer, "The Unity of 
Nature and Freedom: Kant's Conception of the System of Philosophy", 19-53 in the same volume. 
51 OP Ak. 22:550- L p. 87. 
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experience.52 
220 
In these passages we can see an altered doctrine of experience in which a material 
unity is thought to affect the senses and to supplement the synthetic unity of 
apperception. First, all our experiences are part of one experience, and this is due 
to the ether, as the collective unity of objects of possible experience. The ether 
provides a material principle for the unity of possible experience, without which 
we would have only an aggregate of perceptions without systematic coherence. 
The ether makes it possible that experience is a connected and unified system. 
Secondly, the material unity of possible experience is a condition for the 
possibility of the subjective unity of expenence; that is, the attribution of 
perceptions to one self-consciousness. Kant says that we can only achieve 
subjective unity of experience if a material unity of forces exists as the single 
object of experience; when this single object is perceived, it "activates" the 
combination of forces toward a single experience. Thirdly, then, the material unity 
of forces is the single object responsible for affecting the senses and "producing 
sensible representations". The material unity of the manifold makes a single, 
unified experience materially possible, as the synthetic unity of apperception 
makes it fonnally possible. The synthetic unity of apperception is supplemented 
by material unity in being the ground of possible experience. 
Two major problems emerge from Kant's ether proofs. The first is that Kant 
appears to employ an ontological proof for the existence of ether. 53 The second is 
that it is unclear exactly what the status of ether is. If Kant claims that the material 
existing prior to experience and affecting the senses can be detennined to be a 
collective unity of interacting material forces, has he not committed the fallacy of 
detenllining transcendentally something that exists prior to and independent of 
experience? Or has he mistakenly attributed actual existence to something that can 
only be thought as an idea of reason? In other words, is the ether an absolute, 
transcendent reality - in which case its detennination in tenns of categories is 
52 OP Ak. 21 :585-6, pp. 92-3, emphasis added on "a material principle". 
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invalid - or is it a transcendental ideal, in which case its actuality is 
problematic?54 Both of these problems can be addressed by looking at how the 
ether follows "analytically" from the concept of the unity of experience. 
Let us look first at the claim that Kant employs an ontological proof. Kant 
claims that the existence of ether follows analytically from the concept of 
experience as a unity, and thus it is the concept of the unity of experience that is 
said to prove the actuality of ether. For if we analyze this concept we find that it 
includes the concept of a continuous whole of the perceivable, and thus the 
concept of an existent continuous whole. It is for this reason that Kant insists that 
he has proved the actuality of ether analytically, according to the principle of 
identity: 
Hence there exists as an object of experience in space (although 
without empirical consciousness of its principle) a particular 
material which is continuously and boundlessly distributed and 
constantly self-agitating. That is, caloric is actual; it is not a 
material feigned for the sake of the explanation of certain 
phenomena, but rather, a material demonstrable from a universal 
principle of experience (not from experience) according to the 
principle of identity (analytically) and which is given a priori in the 
concepts themselves. 55 
It may seem that Kant has used something suspiciously similar to an ontological 
argument here; an argument from existence in concept to existence in actuality. 
This would be surprising given his efforts against them in both The One Possible 
Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God and the first Critique; 
furthennore, as if to preclude an ontological argument, Kant explicitly restates the 
principle that existence is not a real predicate at Ak. 22:549 (p. 86). This restating 
53 Vittorio Mathieu argues that Kant's ether proof i.s a new ontological proof in "Ather und 
Organismus in Kants 'Opus postumum"·. in H. Heimsoeth et al (eds.), Stlldien =1I Kants 
philosophischer Entv.'icklung (Heidelberg: Georg Olms, 1967). 
54 Edwards argues that Kant conceives ether as transcendentally real (Substance. Force. and the 
Possibilitv olKnowledge, 173-4), while Forster argues that ether is understood as a transcendental 
ideal in t1~e ~ritical sense (Kant's Final Smthesis. 91-3). 
55 OP Ak. 22:551, p. 87. 
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is not accidental, and there is good historical reason to believe that Kant was 
thinking about The One Possible Basis as he wrote these pages.56 If we look more 
closely, we see that with both this argument and the first, Kant is revisiting his 
argument from The One Possible Basis: Kant argues that the existence of ether is 
demonstrable from the requirement that there be some existence. In chapter one 
we saw that in The One Possible Basis "some existence" was required in order 
that anything be possible; that existence was then characterized in divine terms. 
Here in the Opus Postumum, following the Refutation of Idealism and 
Anticipations of Perception, "some existence" is a requirement for the possibility 
of experience: if outer experience is to be possible, there must be some existence 
outside me, and that existence must be a continuum without empty spaces. Thus, if 
experience is possible, then ether actually exists. This is demonstrated just as a 
much younger Kant initiated a demonstration for the existence of God - from the 
original necessity of existence, not from the concept of the thing in question. 
We can also see how Kant can deduce the attributes of ether analytically from 
its concept. In The One Possible Basis, the non-existential attributes of "some 
existence" could be deduced from the concept of "some existence", for this 
existence was thought to be what grounded possibility in general. The ground of 
all possibility had, analytically, to be omnipotent, infinite, eternal, etc. In the Opus 
Postumum, "some existence" is the ground of all possible experience and the 
ground of the unity of all possible experience, so the concept of "some existence" 
must include the attribute of universal distribution without empty spaces, and must 
include constant motion (for without these attributes, experience would not be 
possible). The attributes of that which exists prior to experience and affects the 
senses, then, are not detennined through synthetic a priori principles, but are 
deduced analytically from the concept of existence in general: 
The attributes of this [material] (since it is all-embracing, 
individual, and the basis of all [forces] for the unity of the object of 
the one experience) are given according to the principle of identity: 
56 Forster explains (Kant's Final Synthesis. 94-7). that Kant w~~ thinki~g about his One. Possi~/e 
B · 'n 1799 as he was preparing a preface for a new edition of his shorter works. mc\udmg aSls essay 1 ,< < 
that one. 
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namely, that it is universally distributed, all-penetrating, and all-
moving. [ ... ] And, as such, it is necessary, that is, permanent. For 
sempiternitas est necessitas phaenomenon [permanence IS 
necessity in appearance]. 57 
The concepts of permanence, universal distribution, and constant motion are not 
attributed synthetically to the ether as they would be to an object of experience; 
rather, they are deduced analytically from the concept of the possibility of 
experience. The existence of "some existence" has also been shown to follow 
necessarily from the concept of the possibility of experience. The actuality and 
attributes of the ether are logically unfolded from the very possibility of 
experience. So the ether is not posited to be a transcendent reality or noumenal 
cause existing independently of experience; the ether is the vel)' material of 
experience that is not directly experienced, but that makes all experience possible. 
Nor is the ether thought as a transcendental idea of a noumenal cause, the 
existence of which could never be assumed. Weare justified in asserting the 
existence of ether prior to experience, as pennanent, universally distributed, all-
penetrating and all-moving, as the very material of experience. We are thus 
justified in presupposing that this material is responsible for affecting the senses as 
the single object of perception. The existence of ether is an a priori transcendental 
material condition of possible experience. 
To summarize: in the ether proofs, Kant argues for the existence of a 
dynamical continuum, which is characterized in the following ways: 
1. as a self-subsistent, self-active productivity from which all inorganic bodies 
arise and derive their motion; 
2. as the totality of all the moving forces of matter which fills space 
completely; 
3. as the one and only object of possible experIence, which IS not itself 
directly experienced but is thought to affect the senses; 
4. as the material unity of the manifold, which supplements the synthetic unity 
of apperception in making experience possible in general; 
57 OP Ak. 21 :585, p. 92. 
Chapter 5 
224 
5. as the totality of all possible experience, that makes experience possible as 
a coherent, systematic whole. 
One way to bring these characteristics together would be to define ether as the 
productive system of forces that makes "nature in general", and thus also 
experience, possible from the material side. If, as Kant claims, we are also 
justified in believing this productive system to be responsible for affection, we 
now need an explanation as to how the senses are affected. Kant's ether proofs 
suggest an underlying relation between ether and the receptivity of the subject. 
How is this original relation between the dynamical continuum and the senses 
understood? 
5.4 Experience reformulated 
It seems clear that with the concept of ether, Kant has detennined the character 
of the material of experience. He cannot, of course, detennine what the character 
of the ether would be independently of experience, but he has shown what it is for 
experience. The ether exists as an all-pervasive dynamical continuum which must 
exist for experience to be possible. The ether provides the material condition and 
objective unity of appearances. As the totality of all objects of possible experience, 
it is also what makes possible the unity of experience. How, then, is experience 
understood to function, under the new condition that an objective unity of 
existence is given? 
First, we should reiterate that although the ether is the one unified object of 
possible experience, the ether is not experienced as such. Rather, Kant introduces 
a duality between the primary "indirect" appearance of the moving forces that 
d h d "d'" f' d tt 58 make up the ether, an t e secon ary lrect appearance 0 expenence rna er. 
We experience direct appearances only because the totality of indirect appearance 
exists as a material unity. The indirect appearance of ether is all-pervasive and 
internal to every thing; indirect appearance appears as direct appearance to the 
subject. The indirect appearance of ether, as I have already said, is not noumenal 
51( OP Ak. 22:340. p. 110. See Edwards. Substance. Force. and the Possibility of Knowledge. 170. 
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or transcendentally real. It is appearance, but as the totality of all appearance only 
its particular instantiations are experienced. For these particular instantiations to 
appear, the ether must affect the senses, and the subject must contribute its 
transcendental principles. This suggests that ether as indirect appearance is 
processed so that objects of experience, direct appearances, emerge for experience. 
Recalling Buchdahl's "realization" interpretation of Kant, in which objects of 
experience are refined from being generic "transcendental objects" through sense 
data and application of the categories, it is as if the indirect appearance is reali=ed 
as direct appearances or objects of experience. 
This suggests that the ether, as the material unity of the manifold, is now part 
of the concept of the transcendental object. In the first Critique, the concept of the 
transcendental object was produced as the fonnal objective unity of the manifold, 
based on the unity of consciousness. Here, that fonnal objective unity is 
supplemented by a material objective unity, so the concept of the transcendental 
object can be thought to be both the fonnal and the material objective unity of the 
manifold. The objectivity of things is now thought to be constituted not only by 
transcendental apperception in its synthetic relation to them, but also by the 
material unity of the ether. Objectivity in general must then be "coloured in" (just 
as it was in the Critique) through the subject's fonnal apparatus of concepts and 
principles. "Direct" appearances emerge as the result of "colouring in" what Kant 
11 ". . 1" 59 ca s eXIstence III genera . 
In chapter three I argued that the synthetic-apperceptive relation in which the 
objectivity of things is established is the relation of being. This relation was 
initiated by productive spontaneity, synthesizing the received manifold and 
producing unity in it. Now, with the additional factor of the material unity of the 
manifold, and with the additional characterization of that unity as self-active, the 
relation of being is not initiated only by the spontaneity of the subject; it must be 
initiated, in part, by the spontaneity of the ether with its self-active moving forces. 
Being is still the subject-object relation, but this relation is now brought about 
equally from both sides. This is suggested by the passage quoted above, in which 
Kant says that the moving forces of matter "'produce sensible representations of 
59 OP Ak. 21::! 17, p. 68; see also Ak. 21 ::!:!8, p. 75. where Kant says that the existence of ether is 
considered "apart from all properties except that of being an object of possible experience". 
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their objects" and "activate the material for their combination in a single possible 
experience".6o The complex of moving forces actively affects the senses, causing 
us to have representations, and causing us to refer these representations to the 
identity of self-consciousness; the forces could be said to "force" spontaneity into 
the relation of being. A matter-initiated relation of being was not available to us in 
the first Critique, because we were not at that point entitled to presuppose the 
existence of a self-active material unity. 
Kant argues, however, that the self-activity of the ether alone is not sufficient 
for our experience and knowledge of the moving forces, for as Forster says, 
"specific forces of nature cannot be cognized as it were passively, through staring 
at them, [ ... ] but only through interacting with them".61 Even in its receptivity, the 
subject must exercise self-activity in order to make the ether manifest as 
something suitable for affecting its senses. The subject must comport itself 
towards being affected by the ether. Receptivity cannot be merely passive, but 
must also be active. This is suggested in the tenth and eleventh fascicles (headed 
in the English translation "How is physics possible? How is the transition to 
physics possible?"), probably written in 1799-1800. Kant claims that the subject, 
through its own active forces, makes the dynamical continuum of ether manifest to 
itself and anticipates perception through a representation of the continuum. 
Primary matter is there, extant; but only through the subject's comportment to it is 
it made available as that which makes experience materially possible. 
This comportment occurs through the subject's own participation III the 
dynamical continuum, exercising its own moving forces. Kant suggests that the 
moving forces of the subject are not different from those of inorganic matter: "the 
moving forces of matter are what the moving subject itself does with its body to 
[other] bodies".62 Through our own dynamic impact on other bodies we are 
conscious, a priori, of the moving forces of matter, the system of which we 
anticipate for the sake of perception: 
110 OP Ak. 21 :586, p. 93. 
III Forster, Kant's Final Synth('sis, 100. 
Il~ OP Ak:22:326, p. 110. 
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Only because the subject [is conscious] to itself of its movmg 
forces (of agitating them) and - because in the relationship of this 
motion, everything is reciprocal - [is conscious] of perceiving a 
reaction of equal strength (a relation which is known a priori, 
independently of experience) are the counteracting moving forces 
of matter anticipated and its properties established.63 
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The subject is conscious of its own moving forces and is thereby conscious of its 
own interaction with other moving forces. Through this interactive relation, which 
is known a priori, the subject acquires an a priori representation of an object 
outside it. This representation is of the one and only object of possible experience, 
the material unity of the complex of moving forces. With this representation of the 
single object that materially causes perception, the subject anticipates perception. 
Kant claims that we acquire this representation in the following way: the subject 
has an effect on the outer sense-object, and this effect - the self-activity of the 
subject towards ether - "represents this object in appearance, and does so, 
indeed, with the moving forces directed toward the subject (which are the cause of 
perception)".64 In other words, the subject's self-activity towards the ether is a 
precondition for the subject's representation of the moving forces' effect on the 
senses; the subject comports itself towards the ether by affecting it, and then 
represents an object that affects the senses through moving forces. For this reason, 
Kant says that the subject is not passively affected but rather "affects itself' with 
. . 65 Its own representatIOn. 
Indeed, it is this representation of the ether, made possible by our own self-
activity, that is the first principle of a transition to physics. For it is this a priori 
representation of the totality of moving forces that gives us an elementary system 
of physics, the "sketch of a system" that Kant set out to determine with his 
Transition project. This sketch of a system allows us to enumerate and diversify 
the forces, and thus have experiences that are of individual bodies with different 
63 OP Ak. 22:506, p. 148. 
64 OP Ak. 22:505, p. 148. 
65 OP Ak. 22:405, p. 121. 
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dynamical properties.66 Since the totality of the moving forces is equivalent to the 
totality of possible experience, Kant is claiming that we have an a priori 
representation of the totality of possible experience, and that this representation 
anticipates all our individual experiences. We must "insert" this a priori 
representation of the whole of moving forces (i.e. the whole of possible 
experience) into phenomena in order to "extract" those same forces from 
experience (i.e. in order to have individual experiences of direct appearances). For 
this reason Kant characterizes our experience of individual bodies as a "cognitive 
product,,:67 
It is not in the fact that the subject is affected empirically by the 
object (per receptivitatem), but that it affects itself (per 
spontaneitatem), that the possibility of the transition from the 
metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics consists. 
Physics must make its object itself, according to a principle of the 
possibility of experience as a system of perceptions.[ ... ] For 
experience cannot be given but must be made; and it is the 
principle of the unity of experience in the subject which makes it 
possible that even empirical data (as materials by which the subject 
affects itself) enter into a system of experience and, as moving 
forces, can be enumerated and classified in a natural system.68 
The transition to physics consists in the self-activity of the subject, whereby it 
affects itself with the representation of a system of moving forces (system of 
possible experience). Physics itself, as the system of empirical findings 
"extracted" from experience, "makes its object" according to this representation of 
a system. Because it includes this a priori representation, physics is "not an 
empirical science", but it can be "a complex of empirical cognitions which are 
combined into one experience".69 Physics is not given to us by the world, but is 
66 OP Ak. 22:504, p. 148; see Forster, Kant's Final Synthesis. 98. 
67 OP Ak. 22:340-1, pp. 1 IO-l. 
61< OP Ak. 22:405-6, pp. 121-2. 
69 OP Ak. 22:407, p. 123. 
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produced through the embodied subject acting in the world and affecting itself 
with the representation of a world system.70 
Kant's claim that we have an a priori representation of the systematicity of the 
world is quite new, and should not be conflated with his earlier claims about 
systematicity in the first and third Critiques. 7I The Critique of Pure Reason argued 
for a cosmological system as an idea of reason, applied to order the experiences of 
understanding. The systematicity of nature in the Critique of Judgment was 
similarly a system of empirical events; the task of reflective judgment was to 
presuppose that nature, in the subsumption of particular empirical laws under 
more general ones, had adhered to a system that the human understanding could 
grasp. This amounted to the presupposition that nature, as totality of objects of 
experience, was suitable for cognition. In the Opus Postumum, however, Kant 
claims that we represent a system of non-experienceable moving forces prior to 
experience, on the basis of our original representation of the totality of existence. 
The distinction between the empirical systematicity aimed at in the third Critique 
and the a priori systematicity of the Transition project is emphasized by Kant's 
repeated insistence that this system is not a system from experience, but a system 
for experience.72 The system is then inserted into experience, making individual 
experiences and empirical laws possible. This does not make reflective judgment 
redundant, for a "microscopic" system of the moving forces does not give us a 
"macroscopic" system of empirical laws - although it does contain the elements 
that the macroscopic system must extract and classify, thus making the 
macroscopic system possible. 
In order to make possible an empirical system of nature, the subject's a priori 
representation of a world system must include the idea of organic bodies. In the 
analysis of Kant's concept of ether we found that it could not contain a principle 
sufficient to explain the production of organization, lest it be conflated with a 
Schellingian "world-soul". Recall that for Kant an organic body is characterized 
by its organization as both cause and effect of itself, and by its self-production. 
70 Note that Kant insists that physics is practiced through active experimentation, not through 
passive observation (OP Ak. 22:504, p. 148). .",. 
71 Alexander Rueger ("Brain Water, the Ether, and the Art of Constructmg Systems, I\.anl-.Studren 
86 (1995), 26-40), does conflate the systematicity of the OP with that of the CJ. but 1 belIeve the 
similarity of these ideas is only superficial. 
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This definition of organic bodies is maintained in the Opus Posfumum, with 
renewed emphasis on the "'fiction" of such an idea.73 If organic bodies are to be 
included within the totality of objects of possible experience (which is equivalent 
to the totality of moving forces) they cannot include the immaterial principle of 
the causality of a will. How are we to include such bodies in the a priori 
classification of bodies in general that comes about with the initial representation 
of the dynamical continuum? 
Kant's answer is similar to that of the third Critique: it is through a projection 
of our own self-activity onto nature. However, in the Opus Posfumum, self-activity 
is the subject's original self-motivated interaction with other moving forces. The 
human subject is conscious of himself as including this self-moving force that 
interacts with other forces. In his original representation of the dynamical 
continuum, the subject cannot detect the self-movement of the object of moving 
forces outside himself, but is entitled to include self-moving force in the a priori 
system of forces by analogy with moving force generally. 
How can we include such [organic] bodies with such movmg 
forces in the general classification, according to a priori 
principles? Because man is conscious of himself as a self-moving 
machine, without being able to further understand such a 
possibility, he can, and is entitled to, introduce a priori organic-
moving forces of bodies into the classification of bodies in general 
- although only indirectly, according to the analogy with the 
moving force of a body as a machine. He [must], however, 
generalize the concept of vital force and of the excitability of 
matter in his own self by the faculty of desire. 
By the same principle, the emergence of the organism of matter 
and its organization as a system for the needs of different species, 
becomes possible, [stretching] from the vegetable kingdom to the 
72 See, e.g., OP Ak. 22:464, p. 131; Ak. 22:610, p. 98. 
7J OP Ak. 21 :210, p. 64. 
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animal kingdom (at which point desires, as true vital forces of 
corporeal substances, first arise). 74 
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Organic moving forces are not equivalent to inorganic ones, since they can be 
represented as being part of the dynamical continuum only indirectly, by analogy. 
This does not mean that they are not part of that continuum - it is just that human 
consciousness only has access to its own self-moving force. But this access to a 
force not encountered in the continuum means that the subject is entitled to 
generalize that other bodies, perhaps even "our all-producing globe itself', have 
the same vital force as the human subject.75 Vital or vivifying force (l'is 1'ivijica), 
and thus organization and self-production, can be introduced into the totality of 
forces with which we enumerate and classify the objects of physics. The ability of 
a being to form and move itself is now part of the a priori representation of the 
ether with which we anticipate perception, meaning that Kant is able to attribute 
life to certain types of bodies a priori. 
We saw in the Critique of Judgment that Kant thinks of life as self-activity, the 
ability of a thing to detennine itself to act through concepts. Since such 
spontaneity could only be attributed to human subjects, organic matter in that text 
could only be thought to have life by virtue of a regulative principle of reflective 
judgment. Kant clearly continues to associate life with the faculty of desire in the 
Opus Postumum, as is clear from the passage above, but because life manifests 
itself in the subject's original interaction with moving forces, Kant is much 
readier to attribute life to organic beings. He claims that life is the productive force 
in the unity of an organic body, and indeed in the totality of the world as a whole: 
An organic (articulated) body is one in which each part, with its 
moving force, necessarily relates to the whole (to each part in its 
composition). 
The productive force in this unity is life. 
74 OP Ak. 21 :213, p. 66; see also Ak. 22:373, p. 118; Ak. 22:99-100, p. 197. 
75 OP Ak. 21 :213-4, p. 66. 
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This vital principle can be applied a priori, from consideration 
of their mutual needs, to plants, to animals, to their relation to one 
another taken as a whole, and finally, to the totality of our world.76 
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Life can be extracted from experience because vital force is included in the system 
of moving forces that anticipates experience. 77 Indeed, our own vital force our 
, 
own self-activity, is what makes possible that representation of the totality of the 
world that anticipates perception. We primarily and originally apply the principle 
of our own self-activity to the totality of the world of possible experience. Our 
comportment towards the world, even in our receptivity, is originalZv one of life or 
production. 
5.5 Productive ontology 
The activity and productivity of the subject extend to the senses, which must 
be self-active in their receptivity. Our comportment towards the world is thus a 
productive one. That is, the subject comports itself towards the ether with a view 
to producing from it objects of experience, and specifically objects that fonn part 
of the joint systems of physics and possible experience. The subject's productive 
comportment is its self-activity towards the ether, the reaching-out of life towards 
interaction with other moving forces. This interaction precedes and anticipates the 
subject's cognition of individual objects. It is thus a pre-cognitive relation to the 
extantness of the world. In chapter one I looked at Heidegger's interpretation of 
Kant, which claimed that a pre-cognitive relation between an intentional subject 
and the extantness of the world first establishes the field of what is intuitable. 
Finally we see how this plays out: in the Opus Postumum. the subject comports 
itself to the extantness of the ether. enters into reciprocal relation with it, and 
establishes it as the one and only object of perception, thus setting the conditions 
76 OP Ak. 21:111. p. 64. 
77 On this point see Guyer. "Organisms and the Unity of Science". 274-80. 
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for perceIvmg individual bodies. It is worth quoting at length Heidegger's 
description of the move he understands to ground perception in the first Critique. 78 
The perceptual uncovering of the extant must already understand 
beforehand something like extantness. In the intentio of the 
perceiving something like an understanding of extantness must 
already be antecedently present. [ ... ] The extant in its extantness 
belongs to the directional sense - that is to say, the intentio is 
directed toward uncovering the extant in its extantness. The 
intentio itself includes an understanding of extantness, even if it is 
only pre-conceptual. In this understanding, what extantness means 
is unveiled, laid open, or, as we say, disclosed. [ ... ] This 
understanding of extantness is present beforehand as pre-
conceptual in the intentio of perceptual uncovering as such. This 
"beforehand" does not mean that in order to perceive, to uncover 
something extant, I would first expressly have to make clear to 
myself the sense of extantness. [ ... ] This understanding of 
extantness, of actuality in the Kantian sense, is prior in such a way 
- it belongs in such a way to the nature of perceptual 
comportment - that I do not at all first have to perfonn it 
expressly; rather, [ ... ] it is implicit in the basic constitution of 
Dasein itself that, in existing, the Dasein also already understands 
the mode of being of the extant, to which it comports existingly, 
regardless of how far this extant entity is uncovered and whether it 
is or is not adequately and suitably uncovered. [ ... ] This is the 
condition of the possibility of the uncoverability of extant things. 
Uncoverability, the perceptibility of extant things, presupposes 
disclosedness of extantness.79 
78 Recall that "inlenlio" refers to the intentionality of the Dasein: "extantness" refers to. th~ 
existence of the given prior to its fomlalization by Kant's catego~ of ex istence: a~d "uncovenng 
and "disclosure" refer to the distinct ways in which beings and bemg are made mamfest. 
74 BPP 70-1. 
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Heidegger argues that for Kant, the perception or "uncoverability" of existing 
things presupposes the existing subject's initial intentional relation to the extant 
, 
in which the extant is "disclosed" as the ground of the things. Heidegger 
fonnulates this distinction between perceivable things and their ground of 
extantness as that of the ontological difference between beings and being, and 
adds: "it is manifestly this understanding of being to which Kant recurs without 
seeing it clearly".80 In the context of the Opus Postumum, this suggests that being 
is that original continuum of existence - ether - that is disclosed through the 
subject's comportment towards it, and that this relation of disclosure is the ground 
of the possibility of beings and their "uncovering". Is being, for Kant, merely a 
continuum of presence? If so, we would be led to adopt Heidegger's conclusion 
that Kant does not get beyond an ontology of presence. 
My claim is that Kant's final ontology is not so straightforward, and that it 
would be wrong to align being simply with the extantness of the ether. It is not the 
extantness of the ether but rather the active relation, or interaction, between the 
distinct elements of self-active life and self-active ether that is the ground of 
beings and of the perception of beings. In the preceding chapters I have suggested 
that "being" for Kant is the original relation of spontaneity to existence, from 
which relation both subjectivity and objectivity emerge as products. For the 
critical Kant, this relation could be none other than that initiated with 
transcendental apperception, where spontaneity actively synthesized the manifold 
of nature. It was recognized in chapter three that a primary intuitive relation, a 
relation of nature as given to sensibility, must underlie the relation of being. Kant 
could not detennine the character of the given, and was obliged to use the idea of a 
transcendental object (supersensible substrate) to explain how this intuitive 
relation was possible. This relation, the ground of the possibility of any further 
subject-object relationality and thus the ground of affection, was relegated to the 
realm of the supersensible. 
In the Opus Postumum, Kant detennines the original subject-object relation 
that is "deeper" than that of transcendental apperception. Kant has shown that we 
can think of the original materiality of the world as a self-subsistent, self-active 
RO BPP 72. 
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dynamical continuum, and he has explained how that continuum must affect 
sensibility for experience to be possible. The self-activity of nature affects 
sensibility only insofar as the self-activity of the subject affects nature. That is, 
affection is not characterized only by the passivity of the senses drinking in a 
world of moving force; it is also characterized by the self-activity or life of the 
subject interacting with a self-active field of moving forces. The subject's 
consciousness that it is an active part of the dynamical continuum - the feeling of 
its own life - brings it into a reciprocally affective relation to the dynamical 
continuum. But this relation is not only the material interaction of forces, for the 
self-activity or life of the subject is grounded in the faculty of desire. The subject 
acts, and interacts, according to concepts, and thus brings a formal element to its 
relation to the dynamical continuum. The relation is determined by the subject's 
formal comportment, its intention to bring about objects of experience. The 
original relation between self-active life and self-active force is thus a relation 
between fonnality and materiality. This relation, which is the first condition of all 
experience and knowledge, is the relation of being. It can be characterized as the 
original relation between subject and object, between life and force, between 
fonnality and materiality, or between freedom and nature. 
This original relation is a productive relation. For as we have seen, Kant 
defines life in the Opus Postumum as "productive force", and explicitly 
characterizes the dynamical continuum as producing objects of secondary matter 
through its ongoing oscillation. Life and force are both characterized as 
existentially productive, and the relation between them is characterized as 
epistemically productive. Once the original condition for the possibility of 
experience is established with the life of the subject affecting itself with the forces 
of the ether, its task is to produce objects of experience by detennining the 
manifold fonnally through the categories. "In this fashion, empirical 
representations, which are perceptions belonging to physics, are produced, as 
object, by the subject itself,.8l The subject has a comportment toward things not 
as produced, but with a view to their production. Insofar as the subject has life and 
self-activity towards the world, the subject has a productive comportment towards 
XI OP Ak. 22:465, p. 131. 
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it. Heidegger's reductive reading of the being of things as their producedness does 
not capture the character of being as productive relation; nor does it adequately 
assess the comportment of the subject towards actively producing experience. 
Ontology, as I have argued, is located in the realm of possible experience. 
involving both epistemic and existential elements, in their interrelation. Here, 
possible experience is grounded by the relation of life and force, and ontology is 
located in the realm of this relation. I have claimed that this is also the realm of 
existential and epistemic productivity. Ontology, then, is located in the realm of 
production, and being, which is the dynamically interacting relation of form and 
matter, is production. Being is not the ground of original production, however, for 
it does not produce spontaneity; spontaneity as self-active life, and thus the 
relation of being itself, are made possible by the subject's freedom. This suggests 
that freedom is outside of being, as the idea of a supersensible substrate still 
employed to explain the possibility of our relation to the world. It also suggests 
that the productivity of freedom - moral productivity, as I described it in the 
introduction - is thought to constitute spontaneity and to be the ultimate ground 
of the subject's epistemic productivity. The subject has a productive comportment, 
approaching the world with a view to the production of objects of experience, 
because it is fundamentally constituted by free productivity, the capacity to 
originate things or events. 
Free moral productivity, however, falls outside of the bounds of this thesis, 
because it falls outside the bounds of ontology. The thinking self, practical 
freedom, and God are, for Kant, other than being. Because they are outside the 
bounds of possible experience, they are outside the bounds of ontology. Kant has 
much to say on these topics in the later sections of the Opus Posfumum, those 
written very close to the end of Kant's life, but these are topics for another 
investigation. There is just one point I will make in conclusion. The distinction 
between possible experience and the transcendent is the distinction between being 
and what is other than being, but even this distinction, for Kant, must be unified. 
Kant claims that it is '"man in the world" that functions as the point of relation 
between God and the world. Man is both, as life, part of dynamical interaction. 
and, as a free person with rights and duties, part of the supersensible - man is 
both being and other than being. Kant thus says, under the title "System of 
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Transcendental Philosophy in Three Sections", that man is the copula between the 
supersensible and the sensible: 
God, the world, universum, and I myself, man, as moral being. 
God, the world, and the inhabitant of the world: man in the 
world. 
God, the world, and that which thinks both in real relation to 
each other: the subject as rational world-being. 
The medius terminus (copula) in judgment is here the judging 
subject (the thinking world-being, man in the world). Subject, 
predicate, copula.82 
If Kant's final understanding of transcendental philosophy compnses three 
sections - God, the world, and man who relates them - then transcendental 
philosophy is about the relation of being to what is other than being, and human 
beings are this very relation. Appropriately, one of Kant's very last reflections, 
written on the wrapper of the sheaf of papers that is now the Opus Posfumum, 
reads: 
Transcendental philosophy precedes the assertion of things that are 
thought, as their archetype, [the place] in which they must be set. 83 
The relation of being to what is other than being, and perhaps the distinction 
between what is ontological and what is not, is the context or horizon for our 
thought; our judgments and assertions presuppose a specific understanding of 
being, and of our participation in it. 
X2 OP Ak. 21 :27, p. 231. 
83 OP Ak. 21 :7, p. 256. 
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Chapter 5 Summary 
In this chapter I have looked at Kant's Opus Postumum to detennine his final 
productive ontology. Two problems of production emerged from my analyses of 
the first and third Critiques and the Metaphysical Foundations: the problem of the 
material production of diverse individual bodies, and the problem of the original 
production thought to underlie spontaneity and nature and to make their relation 
possible. I claimed that with the notion of ether, Kant attempts to solve both these 
problems, and that in his fonnulation of proofs for the existence of ether, Kant's 
transcendental idealism and theory of being are modified. 
The diversity of individual bodies was explained to be produced by the 
oscillation of the ether, an all-pervasive totality of moving forces. In his ether 
proofs, Kant attempts to prove the existence of this totality, implying that a 
dynamical continuum of existence is the one material condition for the possibility 
of experience. I claimed that Kant's understanding of experience changes to 
accommodate the existence of the ether: since the ether provides material unity in 
the manifold, the role of transcendental apperception is altered, relying both on 
synthetic unity and on material unity. We are entitled to think of this material 
unity, the totality of moving forces, as the single object that affects the senses, and 
Kant argues further that the self-activity of the subject is necessary for affection. 
Through its active participation in the totality of moving forces, the subject is 
characterized as affecting itself through an original, a priori representation of the 
totality of moving forces, which makes experience possible. This original 
participation, in which the subject represents the totality with a view to producing 
objects of experience, is a productive comportment, and the original relation 
between life and force - dynamical interaction in general - is the relation of 
being. In Kant's final productive ontology, being is the dynamical interaction that 
produces existence, experience, and knowledge. 
Conclusion 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis I have examined Kant's ontology and concept of being in tenns 
of a concept of production, by contrast with the silence of other commentators on 
these topics. Why should we consider Kant's ontology to be a productive 
ontology? My argument can be summarized as follows. 
1. In chapter one I explained that ontology for Kant is the study of concepts 
and principles, insofar as they apply to possible experience. Ontology, therefore, 
concerns the relation of epistemic conditions to existence, the relation of fonn to 
matter, or the relation of subject to object. Being, for Kant, is defined as the 
positing of a thing, and therefore as the relation of the thing to the subject's 
capacity to judge. Being is the relation of subject to object, and is therefore the 
concern of ontology. 
2. In chapter two we saw that the "object" side of the relation of being is 
nature or matter, which can only be detennined as such through its relatedness to 
the subject. Through the relation of being, the materiality of the world is 
fonnalized and detennined to be a nature reducible to interacting fundamental 
forces. Existence is thought as this interaction - as dynamical productivity - and 
indeed must be intuited as action, for it is only through the outer intuition of the 
action of impenetrability that we infer the material pennanence that makes inner 
intuition possible. Our intuition of nature as productivity is a necessary component 
of possible experience (although it cannot be detennined as productivity outside of 
experience ). 
3. In chapter three we saw that the "subject" side of the relation of being is the 
spontaneity of understanding, which is productive in the synthetic unity of 
apperception. Apperception, in first synthesizing and unifying the manifold, 
initiates the relation of being and produces the objectivity of the object. In so 
doing, the subjectivity of the subject - the analytic unity of apperception - is 
also produced. In and through the relation of being. apperception produces 
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possible experience. The relation of being, then, is a relation between productive 
spontaneity and the world as it is received by the senses; a relation which produces 
the world as object of possible experience, and ultimately produces it as a 
productive nature. The relation of being is productive, and ontology, which is 
concerned with the realm of this relation, is concerned with the realm of epistemic 
production. 
If we characterize Kant's ontology as a productive ontology, then his 
epistemology must also be acknowledged to be based on epistemic production. 
Knowledge acquisition takes place through the interaction of fonnal and material 
conditions. It is at the site of this interaction that being is located, and it is at the 
point of partaking in this interaction that the being of things can be asserted. 
Things have being only if they enter into productive interrelation with the subject. 
This does not mean that independently of their relation to a subject, things do not 
exist; it means that independently of this relation they do not have being or 
subject-relatedness. Being is fundamentally subject-related. 
The being of the subject, however, also depends upon the subject's productive 
interrelation with things outside it. Again this does not mean that a world-
independent mind could not exist, but it could not have being. Being IS 
fundamentally human-relatedness to something. This position is similar to 
Heidegger's claim that being is always being-in-the-world. 1 If being-in-the-world 
is part of the constitution of the subject, then the Kantian subject fundamentally 
includes the capacity to initiate the relation of being. In chapter five. we saw that 
Kant characterizes the "life" of the subject in just this way. Life is the subject's 
capacity to act freely, to bring itself into relation to the dynamical continuum, and 
thus to initiate the relation of being. This inner capacity characterizes the 
comportment of the subject towards the world. The subject's comportment is a 
productive one, approaching the world with a view to its production as object of 
experience, but it might also be characterized as an ontological comportment, 
approaching the world with a view to the being of both subject and world. This 
productive, ontological intent constitutes the Kantian subject, as the very life of 
I Beina and Time. 49-51. {:> 
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the subject. Kant's epistemology, therefore, is based not only on ontology, but also 
on a philosophy of life. 
Heidegger is wrong to ascribe to Kant an understanding of being as "produced 
pennanent presence", and to reduce Kant's notion of being to mind-independent 
materiality. As I have shown, mind-independent materiality can have nothing to do 
with being, for being is the subject-relatedness of things, and the thing-relatedness 
of the subject. Similarly, productive comportment cannot mean, as Heidegger 
suggests it does, that the Kantian subject views things based on the presupposition 
that they were created by God. Productive comportment is much more original 
than that, characterizing the life of the subject, and fonning its ontological and 
epistemic intentionality towards things. The subject approaches things with a view 
to their production, and with a view to their being, because the subject is 
essentially constituted by its capacity for relating to things. This position is much 
closer to Heidegger's own view in Being and Time than it is to Heidegger's 
reductive interpretations of Kant in Basic Problems of Phenomenology and Kant 
and the Problem of Metaphysics. Now that Kant's understanding of being has 
been discussed in its difference from Heidegger's reading of it, the similarity 
between his position and Heidegger's own position would provide rich material 
for further study. 
Another topic for further research is the relation, that I suggested at the end of 
chapter five, between being and what is other than being. Human freedom, in its 
moral productivity or capacity to originate events, was suggested to be the ground 
of the subject's epistemic productivity. The fact that the subject approaches the 
world with a view to its production as object of experience - and thus the 
initiation of the relation of being - is grounded in the subject's constitution as 
freedom. The question of a relation between being and freedom, between ontology 
and ethics, perhaps between the "is" and the "ought", is thus set up. I would have 
liked to say more about this relation between Kant's theoretical and practical 
philosophies, under the condition that theoretical philosophy has been 
reinterpreted as a productive ontology. The third Critique, in its attempt to unify 
the theoretical and practical domains, would be found to have much to say about 
the relation of ontology and freedom. There is much material for a further and 
broader study of Kant's productive ontology. 
Conclusion 
It would, finally, be useful to situate Kant's productive ontology, particularly 
in the Opus Postumum, in the context of Spinoza's and Schelling's productive 
ontologies. While Kant publicly distanced himself from Spinoza's thought, there 
is much in his ontology to suggest that he was sympathetic to some aspects of it. It 
would be interesting also to ask to what extent Schelling was influenced not only 
by Kant's transcendental idealism and matter theory in general, but specifically by 
the concept of production implicit in both. I regret that I have not been able to 
address these topics in this study, but I have, I hope, prepared the ground on which 
such further research might build. 
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